Foreign Direct Investment and Corruption. An econometric analysis of the multidimensional effects of corruption upon FDI inflow by Kolnes, Vegard Lotsberg
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment and Corruption 
 
 
An econometric analysis of the multidimensional effects 
of corruption upon FDI inflow 
 
Vegard L. Kolnes  
 
 
Master’s thesis in Comparative Politics 













Foreign Direct Investment and Corruption 
 
 
An econometric analysis of the multidimensional effects 
of corruption upon FDI inflow 
 
Vegard L. Kolnes  
 
 
Master’s thesis in Comparative Politics 































Title: Foreign Direct Investment and Corruption 
 













The goal of this thesis is to estimate the effect of corruption upon the levels of FDI inflow and 
it poses the following research question: What effect does corruption have upon the level of 
foreign direct investment inflow to a country? Moreover, do internal types of corruption (e.g. 
bureaucratic corruption), and external contexts (e.g. level of development) affect the manner in 
which corruption affects foreign direct investment inflow to a country? 
 
The thesis attempts to clear up a contention in the literature in which the effect of corruption 
upon FDI inflow is contested. It does this in two ways. First, proposing a theoretical framework 
to understand the effects corruption can have by fusing together elements from political risk 
theory and the OLI-paradigm. Second, using a relatively unused econometric method, which 
allows one to use a random effects model to distinguish between the effects which key 
independent variables have: (1) across time “within” countries and (2) “between” countries. 
Panel data from 1995 – 2012 are employed with a global coverage. The dataset is compiled 
from three different original datasets. 
 
The findings of the thesis suggests that the effect of corruption is on average negative for FDI 
inflow. However, the thesis also finds that the effect of corruption is very dependent on context. 
In some contexts, corruption is found to have a positive effect on FDI inflow in this thesis. 
Unfortunately, the data for different types of corruption are not good enough to perform reliable 
estimations. The results show in a clear manner that the contention in the field is due to 
systematic differences produced by different estimation techniques, and an overly simplified 
view of what corruption is. The suggested theoretical framework is able to explain the results 
and incorporate the different findings of the literature and this thesis by focusing on corruption 
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1.1. Research question 
“What effect does corruption have upon the level of foreign direct investment inflow to a 
country? Moreover, do internal types of corruption (e.g. bureaucratic corruption), and 
external contexts (e.g. level of development) affect the manner in which corruption affects 
foreign direct investment inflow to a country?” 1 
The research question above is the focus for this thesis. As such, the thesis focuses on two 
variables, foreign direct investment (FDI) and corruption. It also goes one step further, focusing 
on different types of corruption and different contexts for corruption, such as country 
characteristics. It is motivated by two factors, one theoretical and one empirical. The 
relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment has been studied closely, and 
there is a large literature on the subject. However, there exists two contradicting camps of 
understanding amongst scholars. One is the sand camp. They argue that corruption works like 
sand in machinery, because it increases the costs of an investment through several factors, thus 
corruption has a negative effect on foreign direct investment.2 The other is the grease camp. 
They argue that corruption can work like grease in the machinery, because it can create several 
benefits and increase the efficiency of market processes. Thus, corruption has a positive effect 
on foreign direct investment (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008, 13). Several researchers also find a non-
significant relationship in econometric analyses. This contention in the literature creates an 
interesting puzzle, why are there two camps? What causes them to find different answers to the 
same question? The second motivation is an empirical one. The majority of the literature on 
foreign direct investment and corruption find support for the sand logic. The official stance of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) is also null-tolerance of corruption. As such, one would 
expect countries with high corruption to receive less foreign direct investment. However, with 
a simple search through the data available and economic news, one can observe that highly 
corrupt states such as China, Indonesia, Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania, to mention a few, 
receive very large sums of foreign direct investment (UNCTAD 2014). In addition the inflow 
                                                          
1 According to Wendt, these are essentially constitutive questions, and cannot hope to provide answers in terms 
of causality (Wendt 1998). Indeed, I argue that my results cannot prove causality, but correlations and 
associations. Theory and framework will be used to discuss possible causalities. 
2 For a detailed walkthrough of the sand and grease camps, see chapter two.  
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of foreign direct investment continues to increase in magnitude even though the levels of 
corruption, as measured by several organizations, does not change, or even change for the worse 
(Transparency International 2016). This is also puzzling, and very interesting.  
After studying the literature on foreign direct investment, corruption and foreign direct 
investment and corruption separately, several potential caveats presents themselves in regards 
to previous scholarly work on the theme. First, the conceptualization and measurement of 
corruption is not discussed or critically analyzed. Second, much of the early econometric work 
employs cross-sectional data, which has its limitations, and these results are rarely questioned 
in regards to these limitations. Thirdly, most relatively new econometric studies employ the 
fixed effects technique, which is completely valid, as long as it is reflected in your research 
question and theoretical interest. For the large majority of the published articles on this theme, 
it is not.  
All these factors motivated the choice of theme and the research question presented at the start 
of this section. Further, the relevance of the theme in terms of the importance for society, 
nations, the world, was an important factor in deciding on the theme of this thesis.  
1.2. Relevance of the theme 
The magnitude of foreign direct investment has increased very much during the last two 
decades. In 1990, the global size of FDI was at 172 billion dollars. In 2005, it had increased to 
a stunning 1060 billion dollars, and by 2013, the total was at an overwhelming 2202 billion 
dollars (UNCTAD 2014). Multinational corporations, the entities which conduct foreign direct 
investment, constitute over one quarter of total global output (Dunning and Lundan 2008, 15). 
Thus, MNCs play a critical role in the global economy, and therefore, a critical role in the 
economy of nations. While some of the effects of FDI is somewhat contested in the literature, 
a large majority finds that it has a very positive effect on economic growth.  As all governments 
are interested in furthering their nation’s development because this increases the living 
standards of people and/or the elites, securing FDI should be an important political strategy. 
Several of the determinants of foreign direct investment are influenced by political-decision 
making, such as locational advantages and the investment climate. One potentially important 
factor for the investment climate or locational advantages of a country is corruption.   
Corruption is viewed as the number one enemy of development, and particularly so for 
developing countries. However, it is not just a developing country issue. In 2013, about 50 
people in the Spanish government were convicted in a massive corruption scandal. In 2003, 
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several political leaders in France were involved in a corruption scandal with the oil company 
Elf. In addition, in 2016, the Vimpelcom (with Telenor) case is still ongoing in Norway, and 
Statoil is once again in trouble for large payments that can be construed as corruption in Angola. 
Lastly, the recent panama papers clearly show that systematic corruption and attempts to hide 
it is also very common in highly developed countries. (Aase 2016; Henley 2003; Kagge 2015; 
Kassam 2014; ICIJ 2016). These are just a very few of many corruption cases with developed 
countries involved.  Further, corruption is stated to cost as much as 5 percent of global GDP 
every year (Heywood, 2015, p. 1). It creates deviations in investments, undercuts political 
institutions, and increases inequality, poverty and in general is argued to decrease economic 
growth (Søreide, 2014, foreword).  
While corruption does seem as an important and logical determinant for foreign direct 
investment however, as stated, its effect is contested. Corruption is also a phenomenon that is 
affected by political decision-making. Whether corruption is high or low, criminalized or not is 
up to the politicians in a country. Therefore, I see this theme as highly relevant for political 
science. The findings on the relationship between corruption and FDI has large implications for 
what policies should be undertaken in regards to attracting FDI, and FDI is important for 
development.  
1.3. Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis attempts to make several important contributions, both for theory on the field of 
foreign direct investment and corruption, methods in social science, and political policies.  
The theoretical contribution is partly the added focus on the importance of the conceptualization 
of corruption, and viewing corruption as a multidimensional concept. Much literature view 
corruption as a single dimensional phenomena, while others argue that corruption comes in 
different types and manifests itself in many different acts (Søreide 2014). This thesis attempts 
to conceptualize corruption as a very broad phenomenon, and further that corruption can be 
thought of as different types, which will have consequences for the type of effect we can expect 
upon multinational corporations. Further, drawing on political risk theory the thesis also 
suggests a framework for understanding the effects of corruption on multinational corporations. 
It is argued that corruption can produce mainly three different effects: risk, uncertainty, and 
potential benefits. The relative size these effects have in regards to each other will define what 
sort of effect corruption has on FDI. The thesis also emphasizes the importance of contextual 
factors for the effect of corruption. The thesis finds that the data on different types of corruption 
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is of very low quality in terms of coverage. As such, the thesis cannot confirm or disprove that 
different types of corruption matters for the effect on FDI. The context of corruption however 
is found to be very important for the effect of corruption on FDI. The institutional quality of a 
country and the level of development is found to be important, and the effect of corruption is 
also found to have changed over time.  
In order to estimate the effect corruption has on FDI, this thesis employs panel data and 
regression analysis. It is argued that the type of estimation used is very important for the type 
of results one will get, and that it is vital to be aware of exactly what the different estimations 
estimate, and what implications this has for interpretations of the results, and for the research 
question. This thesis uses a relatively unused transformation to create two components for the 
variable of theoretical interest, a within component and a between component.3 This will allow 
me to estimate the entire effect corruption has on FDI inflow in one estimation, instead of only 
the within effect with fixed effects estimation, the net effect of a random effects estimation, or 
the between effect of a between estimation, and it will take care of a major econometric issue, 
unobserved heterogeneity. This estimation method will thus use the entire variance spectrum 
of the variables of interest, while at the same time producing, to a high degree, efficient and 
unbiased coefficients. The thesis also controls for a wide variety of econometric caveats that 
are not always considered in the published articles on the field. In order to maximize the point 
of different estimations, the consequences for results and interpretation, and the importance of 
knowing what the different estimations estimate and make it as clear as possible, several 
estimations and estimation techniques are used. These are presented in a structured, simple and 
pedagogical manner, so that the arguments and points are directly illustrated with coefficients 
for the reader to see. The thesis finds that indeed, the estimation technique chosen has large 
implications for the results produced, and that these implications are very systematic across 
different models.  
In terms of contribution for policies, the thesis argues that if the effect of corruption is changing 
across different types of corruption and different contexts, then the policies recommended 
against corruption needs to be nuanced. The thesis finds that corruption is indeed a 
multidimensional phenomenon, which is highly dependent on the context. As such, simple one 
size fits all policies against corruption is not to be recommended. Depending on the institutional 
                                                          
3 The within component consists of variance within a group (country) over time, essentially the longitudinal 
variance. The between component consists of the variance that is specific to the group (country) and different 
between the different groups, essentially the cross-sectional variance.  
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context of the country and the level of development, different types of policies should be 
recommended.  
To summarize then, the thesis contributes with an attempt to clear up a contention in the 
literature by adding an original theoretical contribution. It will contribute in the form of a 
relatively unused econometric technique in social science, within and between estimation with 
a clear presentation of what it does and how the results can be interpreted. It will produce results 
that contribute to the types of policies academics should recommend to decision-makers in 
regards to foreign direct investment. Lastly, it contributes in the form of a summary of a very 
large and relatively scattered literature.    
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter two will define and present framework for 
foreign direct investment and corruption. It will also present the framework used in this thesis 
to understand and explain the effects of corruption on foreign direct investment.  
Chapter three will present the literature on the field of FDI and corruption through a literature 
review, and will also simultaneously produce hypotheses based on the literature and the 
research question of this thesis.  
Chapter four will present the data of the thesis. It will present and discuss the choice of 
measurement for the dependent variable, FDI inflow. It will present the choice of all 
independent variables of theoretical interest, and discuss the choice of their measurement. It 
will also present the choice of control variables and their measurement. Finally, it will present 
some descriptive statistics for the dataset and discuss the country coverage. 
Chapter five will present the method and methodology. The econometric assumptions of linear 
regression will be presented and discussed with a focus on any potential flaws my data might 
have. Different estimations for estimating panel data will be presented and discussed, namely 
fixed and random effects. Then the within and between transformation will be presented. The 
method of multiplicative interactions will also be discussed, as several of the hypotheses in the 
thesis have a conditional nature. Finally, the decisions made in terms of fixes and solutions will 
be presented.  
Chapter six will present, analyze and discuss the findings of the hypotheses specific models. 
The theoretical implications will be discussed throughout the chapter, and summarized at the 
end, with the consequences for policies.  
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Chapter seven will conclude the thesis, directly answer the research question and point out 
























2.0. Setting the theoretical framework for FDI 
and corruption 
The function of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the theoretical frameworks used to 
understand foreign direct investment and multinational corporations. It will also define 
corruption and frame it within the theoretical framework of FDI and political risk. Much 
literature on both FDI and corruption will be reviewed in this chapter, but this is literature that 
is in general foundational for the thesis and the framework employed, not a review of literature 
that pertains directly to my research question.4 Finally, it proposes a descriptive and causal 
model of how corruption could affect FDI.  
2.1. Foreign Direct Investment 
FDI is a type of investment that MNC’s (publicly or privately owned) can do in foreign 
countries (Dunning and Lundan 2008, 7). It is a mode of entry into another country from the 
one that the MNC is located and operates from. When Coca Cola invests directly in Guatemala 
to create a factory, or when Statoil invests enough to create a significant ownership share in a 
gas company in Mozambique, it is FDI. What is essential is that the corporation maintains a 
significant degree of control in the asset it invests in, and that the investment has a long-term 
horizon. In contrast, there is, for example, volatile stock market investments, which have short-
term profit horizons or exports, which requires no investment into the receiving country. 
Institutions such as the IMF, OECD, UN and the World Bank have quantified FDI as an 
ownership stake of 10 percent or more, and this is usually the operationalized measure criteria 
of FDI (Almfraji and Almsafir 2014; Dunning and Lundan 2008; Teixeira and Guimarães 
2015). Historically FDI has been a very small part of the economy, however with increasing 
globalization, massive improvements in communication, transport and liberalization of capital, 
FDI has grown extremely fast, and is now a key component of both the international economy, 
individual nation-economies, and particularly of developing-economies. In 1985, the net inflow 
of FDI in the world was at 51 billion dollars, in 1995, it was at 331 billion dollars, in 2005, 
1062 billion dollars, and in 2013, it was at a staggering 2202 billion dollars (Chakrabarti 2001; 
Dunning and Lundan 2008; UNCTAD 2014). The reason for this massive increase is, as stated, 
increasing globalization with technology, communication, the liberalization of capital and the 
                                                          
4 This will be done in chapter 3.  
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economic field after the fall of the Bretton Woods system in the early 70s, and FDIs unique 
stability as opposed to other forms of investment and capital flows (with its long term 
horizon)(Chakrabarti 2001, 89).  
One important distinction when talking about FDI is flows and stock. FDI stock is the 
accumulated and current size of FDI in a country, and it includes reinvested earnings and 
intracompany loans, not just the capital investment itself (equity capital). This must not be 
confused with FDI inflows, which is the level of FDI that comes into a country from year to 
year (the capital investment). As such, FDI inflow is in its own way a stock variable of FDI 
inflow for the entire country year, making the distinction rather confusing. FDI inflow is not a 
change variable of FDI stock (Wacker 2013, 5). It is simply the total amount of FDI inflow to 
the country for the year, and as such, it can be negative and positive. For this thesis, I employ 
FDI inflow as the dependent variable (see chapter 4, section 4.1).  
2.1.1. Foreign direct investment and development 
The aforementioned effects FDI can have on a host-country is dependent on whether the 
investment is horizontal or vertical, plus some host-country characteristics.5 Navaretti and 
Venables argue that the effects come from three primary channels. The product markets, factor 
market and spillover effects (Navaretti and Venables 2006). Product market effects happen 
particularly from horizontal FDI. The products that have previously been exported/imported are 
now manufactured in the host-country. This reduces import and increases host-country 
production. This can have either a positive or a negative effect, depending on host-country 
characteristics. Factor market effects can happen in both the capital and labor market. FDI can 
increase the amount of capital that is available for investment, thus increasing aggregated 
supply. In the labor market however, the logic is not as straightforward. On one hand, it can 
increase the demand for labor, increasing employment. On the other hand, it can create demand 
for a skill level and composition that differs from the existing one in the host-country, 
decreasing employment. The last channel, and arguably the most important one, is 
technological spillovers in the form of technology transfer in the local market, the acquisition 
of competences in labor, and learning from markets. In addition, FDI can affect secondary 
parties such as sub-contractors of supplies of necessary goods in raising their standards and 
efficiency, thus affecting the entire relevant sector of the country (Navaretti and Venables 
                                                          
5  Vertical FDI is when a company breaks up its production chain in different countries. For example moving 
their production facilities to a developing country. Horizontal FDI is when a company duplicates itself (the entire 
product chain) in another country (Navaretti and Venables 2006, 26–28; Protsenko 2004) 
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2006). Considering that FDI affects countries through several channels, and that the effects are 
dependent on host-country characteristics, it should come as no surprise that FDI’s effect on 
economic growth and development is somewhat contested. However, the majority of the 
literature finds a strong, positive effect of FDI on economic growth (Almfraji and Almsafir 
2014)(Also, see table 1)  
Table 1, FDI effects on Economic growth 
 
Effect Sources 
Significant positive Manuchehr and Ericsson (2001) 
Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) 
Choe (2003) 
Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2006) 
Shaik (2010) 
Griffiths and Sapsford (2004) 
Chakraborty and Nunnenkamp (2006) 
Al-Iriani (2007) 
Faras and Ghali (2009) 
Umoh, Jacob and Chuku (2012) 
Weak positive De Mello (1999) 
Null Sarkar (2007) 
Negative Shaik (2010) – For the primary sector 
Khaliq and Noy (2007) 
(Almfraji and Almsafir 2014, 207) 
 
2.1.2. Determinants of foreign direct investment 
The list of previous studies on the determinants of FDI is long, and cannot be accounted for in 
its entirety in this thesis. I will instead present here some of the most important findings and 
variables that have been found to determine FDI flows that I will use as control variables. This 
is by no means an exhaustive exercise, but a brief introduction to the previous studies.  
Chakrabarti criticized previous literature on FDI for being unwieldy, and without meaningful, 
conscious and constant use of control variables. He went on to test the most used variables in 
the literature in a sensitivity analysis. He found several variables to be of consequent 
importance. Among these were: Market size, labor cost, growth rate, openness, trade deficit, 
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and tax levels (Chakrabarti 2001). However, with the exception of market size, most variables 
were susceptible to small alterations in the conditioning of the data set. An important argument 
in his summary of the literature is the fact that there are several articles in conflict on the same 
variables, thus the effect of, for example, trade deficit is contested (See table 2). Research on 
FDI determinants after Chakrabarti’s review have continued to use variables such as exchange 
rate/inflation effects (volatile vs stable), taxes, political institutions, trade protection and trade 
effects (Blonigen 2005). Bloningen also argues that the reason earlier literature reviews found 
such instability in the established determinants were because panel data was scarce, thus 
allowing small variations to have large impacts. Thus, the variables previously found to be 
“unstable” might be determinants after all.  




Positive Negative Insignificant 
Market Size:  Bandera & White 
(1968) 





Root & Ahmed (1979) 
Kravis & Lipsey 
(1982) 
Nigh (1985) 













Labor Cost  Caves (1974) 
Swedenborg (1979) 
Nankani (1979) 



















Trade Barrier  Schmitz & Bieri 
(1972) 
Lunn (1980) 
Culem (1988) Beaurdeau (1986) 
Blonigen & Feenstra 
(1996) 
Growth Rate Bandera & White 
(1968) 
Lunn (1980) 




 Nigh (1988) 
Tsai (1994) 





 Schmitz & Bieri 
(1972) 
Wheeler & Mody 
(1992) 











Exchange Rate  Edwards (1990) Caves (1988) 
Contractor (1990) 
Froot & Stein (1991) 
Blonigen (1995) 






Tuman and Emmert 
(1999) 
Tax Swenson (1994) Hartman (1984) 
Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) 
Hines & Rice (1994) 





Barrel and Pain (1998) 
Billington (1999) 
Wheeler & Mody 
(1992) 
Jackson & Markowski 
(1995) 
Yulin & Reed (1995) 
Porcano & Price 
(1996) 
(Chakrabarti 2001, 91–92) 
By studying the previous literature, it is clear that the most important determinants in the FDI 
literature is the size of the potential market, the costs associated with investing and hiring, and 
the stability and effectiveness of the government and the national economy. This makes both 
intuitive and logical sense, as all these factors can directly affect the profit margin and risk of 
an investment, and according to the laws of capitalism, all investments must maximize profit, 
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and at the very least be projected to be profitable.6 The variables I chose to represent these 
factors will be fleshed out in detail in chapter 4.  
2.1.3. The theories and frameworks of FDI 
The different theories on FDI have primarily come from previous research on multinational 
corporations in developed countries. This is natural, as these were the first to internationalize. 
There are primarily three different theories for understanding and framing FDI; the production 
cycle theory, the internationalization theory, and the framework employed in this thesis, the 
eclectic or Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) paradigm. These theories, or 
frameworks, are used to understand the decision-making process of MNCs. As such, my 
proposed causal model of corruption is subject to this framework, as illustrated by figure one 
and two.7  
The production cycle theory explains FDI decisions out from the production of new products, 
and how it then is beneficial for MNCs to engage in FDI. It suggests four stages in a production 
cycle: innovation, growth, maturity and decline. While this theory can explain certain types of 
investments during the 50s and 60s, it is too specific to be employed as a general theory of FDI, 
because it is unable to explain the investment trends in and after the 70s. Particularly in modern 
times, companies do not necessarily follow the production cycles four stages, and so the theory 
no longer fits the empirical reality (Denisia 2010).   
The internalization theory has become the core for understanding FDI. It is the activity in which 
MNC’s internalizes the global operations with a common governance structure and ownership. 
Hymer argues that MNC’s will engage in FDI only if they have some advantage over the local 
competition (which their governance structure and competences could be, which by 
internalization will be the same no matter where in the world the company is placed), so that 
they can profit from the investment (Denisia 2010, 105). An example could be Coca Cola 
investing in a foreign country to compete with some unknown brand of Cola soda. Their 
advantage then being their company structure and brand. The governance structure of the 
company would be the same in the US and in, say, South Africa. The logic of this theory is 
                                                          
6 For more details on determinants and control variables, see chapter 4, section 4.3.  
7 All of the elements discussed on corruption, such as potential benefits, risk and uncertainty, is subject to the 
cost – benefit analysis that takes place in multinational corporations, which the OLI paradigm attempts to 
describe and explain. So, if corruption produces very high risk relative to the potential benefits, the effect of 
corruption would be to increase the cost factor in the multinational corporations decision making process, 
making it less likely to invest.  
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adopted into the eclectic paradigm and not rejected, which is currently the most used framework 
for understanding FDI today.  
In 1977 John Dunning proposed the OLI framework, which is a general framework for 
understanding all foreign direct investment by drawing on both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic theory (Denisia 2010; Dunning 2001). Dunning argues that there are three 
overarching competitive advantages, which spurs three different motives for FDI. The first is 
the ownership-specific advantages. This can be anything from the amount of physical capital, 
technological patents, and management strategies and/or staff. These advantages are strictly 
firm specific. The second one is the location specific advantages. These characteristics of a 
potential host-nation makes it more or less attractive for FDI. This is the advantage in which 
the focus of this thesis is placed, and most of the previous literature on FDI determinants is also 
focused here. The last advantage is the internalization advantages, as briefly discussed above. 
Internalization advantages influence how a company decides to do business in a foreign 
country. FDI is not the only mode of entry available; there is export, licensing or joint ventures, 
which all have their own pros and cons. If a MNC sees a large foreign market, which they can 
make a profit on, but do not see it as worth the risk of directly investing, or that their company 
structure might be less efficient there, they might opt for exporting or maybe a joint venture 
instead.  
These advantages lead to three motives for FDI. The first is market seeking. MNC’s will be 
attracted to a foreign location because of the size of the host-nation market, the potential growth, 
and/or the investment climate. The second motive is resource seeking. Resource seeking is 
further divided into natural resource-seeking, strategic asset seeking and technology seeking. 
The last is efficiency seeking. This motive is created when a MNC can lower the costs of its 
operations and production by moving to another country. This motive is more likely to spur 
vertical FDI, than horizontal FDI.8 It is also natural to assume that these three motives are not 
separated, but can work in conjunction to either increase or decrease the probability of a FDI 
decision in a given host-country. Navaretti and Venables, amongst others, have found that the 
theoretical predictions of the OLI framework is usually consistent with the empirical evidence 
of FDI (Dunning 2001; Dunning and Lundan 2008) . I therefore use this framework for 
understanding the behavior of FDI, and subject my proposed theoretical framework of 
                                                          
8 If the prime motivation is to cut costs, not to explore a new market or get access to some resource, there is 
essentially no need to duplicate the entire corporation in a new country. You could simply build for example the 
factories producing the product in the new country (a part of the value chain).  
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corruption and its effects and proposed causal model under the eclectic paradigm (see figure 1 
and 2). This means, as touched upon previously, that the proposed model for corruption works 
within the locational factors in the OLI-framework, as such, it is marked with a star in figure 1.  
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2.2. Corruption, what is it and how do we define it? 
Corruption has received more and more attention during the last decades. In 2011, “World 
Speaks” announced that corruption was more discussed than poverty, unemployment and 
security issues. This is partially attributed to the increasing awareness that corruption is 
extremely costly, not just in economic terms in which it is estimated to cost as much as 5% of 
the world GDP annually, but also societal in distorting the distribution of resources, causing 
more inequality, poverty and misery on a large scale (Heywood 2015b, 1). In the academic 
circles, it is obvious that corruption has received increased focus. There has been a sharp 
increase in published articles concerning corruption during the last 25 years, with a cumulative 
total of over 6000 as of 2010 (Heywood 2015b, 1). However, even though it has received much 
attention, scholars still disagree as to the basic definitions of corruption, and as such, it is 
essentially a contested concept. Conceptualization of corruption is thus important for this thesis 
in terms of validity.  
2.2.1. Defining corruption 
Corruption is a complex concept and phenomenon, which has had many different meanings 
over time and in different parts and cultures of the world. This is also what makes it such a 
Location* 
Effect of corruption, based on 








difficult phenomenon to agree on and measure in social science, and it is to this day essentially 
a contested concept (Kurer 2015, 30). To attain as much validity for the measurement of a 
concept as possible, Adcock and Collier presents a ladder of abstraction in which concepts can 
be divided into different levels (Adcock and Collier 2001). The first and most general of which 
is the background concept. What are the broad constellations and meanings behind the concept 
of corruption? Historically, corruption in the west has been tied to a conception of decay or 
flaw. Something that does not fulfill its intended traits or function, something that is dissolving 
from that which constitutes it. These broad understandings have been deemed as corruption. 
Within political science then, the term is associated to political institutions, decision-makers 
and processes that does not fulfill their function and/or traits (Philp 2015, 20). This makes a 
definition of political corruption (hereof: corruption) dependent on our understanding of politics 
and its functions. In this process, it is easy to be biased by political systems and orders that are 
not necessarily universally the same in a globalizing world, i.e. democracy/autocracy and 
cultural norms and values. I will argue in this thesis, for example, that one can have relatively 
solid political institutions and corruption at the same time. Corruption is not necessarily only a 
characteristic of poor institutions. Suffice to say, that all actions or perception of situations 
where someone uses their position, knowledge and/or contacts to achieve a benefit that goes 
against social norms or the law is associated with corruption, for understanding the background 
concept.  
Following Adcock and Colliers’ ladder of abstraction, the next step is to define the systematized 
concept. Before entering into a detailed discussion on conceptualization, one must define the 
framework for concepts that one employs. Goertz argues that there are mainly two groups when 
it comes to concepts. The necessary and sufficient group and the family resemblance group.  
The necessary and sufficient concepts consist of certain indicators, which must all be fulfilled 
for the concept to be relevant. Family resemblance concepts also has certain indicators, however 
not all need to be present for the concept to be appropriately used (Goertz, 2005) . A classic 
example of this is the concept of democracy, which has been defined under both groups. Alvarez 
et. al used a necessary and sufficient framework to define democracy as a regime. Their 
definition consisted of the following indicators: The chief executive must be chosen by popular 
election or by a body that was itself popularly elected (offices) and an alternation in power 
under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken 
place (contestation) (Alvarez et al. 1996). If one of the indicators is missing, it is not a 
democracy. Others employ the family resemblance group in which a democracy qualitatively 
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becomes better when adding higher scores on indicators of political rights, civil rights, political 
freedom and degree of political contestation, and not excluded as democracies for low or zero 
score on some of the indicators (Goertz 2005, 9). Because corruption is such a diffuse concept, 
and materializes in many different ways, I will employ a family resemblance understanding of 
the concept.  
One of the earliest to be referenced on a definition of corruption in the systematized sense was 
Nye. Collier and Adcock argued that a systematized concept is characterized by a specific 
formulation and definition, making it much clearer and narrower than the background concept. 
Nye employed a wide definition, which several others have tweaked and used as a template for 
later definitions (Kurer 2015).  
“Corruption is behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates 
rules against certain types of private-regarding influence”(Nye 1967, 417) 
Several later definitions have tried to specify the behavior that deviates from the normal duties 
of a public role, because it is so ambiguous. Important to note is that already the private – private 
relation is discarded. For the purpose of this thesis, and in terms of available data, I only focus 
on the public – private dimension of corruption.9 Scott provides three approaches to interpret 
Nye’s ambiguity: legal norms, public interest and public opinion (Scott 1972, 3).  
 Legal definition: “Prohibited by laws established by the government” (Kurer 2015, 34).  
 Public-interest definition: “If an act is harmful to the public interest, it is corrupt even 
if it is legal; if it is beneficial to the public, it is not corrupt even if it violates the law” 
(Gardiner 1993, 32) 
 Public opinion: “.. the public is asked whether it considers an act corrupt, and the 
public’s judgement is used as the definitional criterion”(Kurer 2015, 34).  
                                                          
9 Note that there is a large debate as to whether private – private corruption should be included. That is 
corruption that takes place entirely in the private sphere, and does not include the public sector or government. 
Without entering into this discussion here (due to space limitations), suffice to say that because it is the norm in 
the academic literature to exclude it, and because data for this dimension is largely unavailable, I exclude it as 
well. To include it would require a different systematized concept (deviating from existing literature), following 
that, different indicators and operationalizations, and thus, different measurements and data that I simply do not 
have because it is not available and very little of it exists. However, corruption is measured by perceptions, and 
peoples perception on corruption could very well be affected by corruption scandals in the private – private 
dimension, thus spilling over into the measurement of corruption as it is understood in this thesis. This is quite 
the quagmire, and I cannot solve it in this thesis.  
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There are obvious advantages to the legal definition. It makes the edges of the concept clear, it 
is easy to operationalize the concept, and counting the acts of corruption becomes very 
straightforward. However, there are clear issues with this. Rules change over time and space. 
Which rules should then be applied? In addition, acts that are not strictly illegal are not corrupt. 
Bribery, nepotism and collusion can easily be made legal in a nation, thus making it non-
corrupt, but most of us would see this as corrupt. Most of the actions in the banking and finance 
sector in light of the financial crisis of 2007 were not illegal per definition, but would be viewed 
as a corrupt situation by most.10 
Where the legal definition fails to capture what most people associate with corruption the 
public-interest definition does. The financial crisis example would now be encompassed by the 
definition of corruption, as would any bribery, nepotism or collusion, even though it was strictly 
speaking legal. This definition however also has its limitations. Firstly, it presupposes that the 
social consequence of corruption is negative, which is highly problematic given that several 
articles and scholars find or argue that there are positive effects of corruption. It also requires a 
universal definition of the public interest, which is by nature heterogeneous and contentious. 
This is why we have politics in the first place. 
The public opinion definition, while from a democratic value standpoint might be attractive, is 
argued to be far too volatile and unstable to be used as a definition. The concept of corruption 
would change, quickly, based on new inputs to and outputs from the population (Kurer 2015, 
34–35). The paradox then, is that most aggregated measures of corruption are based on the 
public opinion from surveys and interviews. However, to the defense of the aggregated 
measures newer research has actually found that the background concept of corruption carries 
much consensus globally.11 The world values survey finds that nearly all the countries in their 
sample condemn bribery, with very little variation. The Afrobarometer finds that nearly all the 
Sub-Saharan nations view both bureaucratic corruption and nepotism as deplorable and 
unjustifiable acts (Kurer 2015, 37–38).  
In this thesis, I will employ the general definition of Nye on corruption as the systematized 
concept in a family resemblance understanding as used by the major organizations in the world: 
                                                          
10 In addition, after the government bailout it is a more fitting example of corruption in this thesis, as the public 
involvement is much clearer. .  
11 This could be a relative inertia effect though. Who knows if this consensus will hold over the next 30, 40, 50 
years? The issue with a human lifespan and academia is that we see things in our lifetime as constants, when 
indeed it is simply a passing moment in the grand scale of things.  
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Corruption is the misuse of public office for private gain.12 Employing either the legal, public 
interest or public opinion definitions as the systematized concept alone could force the thesis to 
focus on a limited geographical and longitudinal area, increasing the intention of the concept at 
the cost of extension. A too intensive definition can cause the relation between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable to break down all together (Goertz 2005, chap. 3). This 
thesis is global in its statistical approach, and aims to cover as much time as possible in 
determining the effect corruption has on foreign direct investment. Using Nye’s definition, 
written as the World Bank, Transparency International, OECD, the EU and the UN does, allows 
for all of them to be included, making the concept very extensive and broad. 
As for the operationalization of corruption, following Adcock and Colliers conceptualization 
ladder (2001), the next step in conceptualizing is to list different indicators that is observable in 
the physical world, things we can actually measure. Note that as I have chosen to follow the 
family resemblance logic, it is enough for any one of the indicators to be positive for the concept 
of corruption to be applicable, as opposed to the necessary and sufficient logic. Indicators of 
corruption are then the acts of or the degree to which people perceive the acts of corruption. 
For example, indicators of corruption could be acts of collusion, acts of bribes, and acts of 
embezzlement. In the family resemblance logic, we would call something corrupt if only an act 
of bribe was observed or perceived to be happening, while no acts of collusion or embezzlement 
happened or were perceived to be happening, while we would not do so in the necessary and 
sufficient logic.  
2.2.2. Acts and types of corruption 
Corruption manifests itself empirically in many different ways. Since the systematized concept 
is very broad and open, this is only natural. In many cases, corruption is often written and 
spoken of in very concrete ways, such as bribes required to gain access to certain services, or 
the nepotism involved in the hiring process in an institution, or the collusion between elite 
decision-makers and leaders in the private sector. The concept of corruption catches all these 
specific acts, because they all fit into the misuse of a public office for private gain, which we 
can see if we back trace the conceptualization ladder of Adcock and Collier.  
Tina Søreide argues that corruption can take many forms. However, it usually has some 
resemblance towards extortion or collusion. The problem with most previous literature on 
                                                          
12 The World Bank, United Nations, OECD, European Union, Transparency International.  
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corruption, she argues, is the notion that corruption is a single dimensional phenomenon. When 
there are clearly many different forms of corruption, the results you get can depend on which 
act of corruption you chose to look at (Søreide 2014, 5). Based on previous literature one can 
summarize the following acts of corruption:13  
 
Table 3, Acts of corruption 
 
Act of corruption Description 
Bribery The act of intentionally forcing someone to pay 
something extra, or being paid something extra 
for a service or product. This something can take 
the form of gifts, loans, rewards or other 
advantages. Bribes can be seen as both extortive 
and collusive.  
Embezzlement To use ones position to steal, misdirect or 
misappropriate funds or assets that one is 
entrusted with the control of.  
Fraud To intentionally deceive someone so as to get an 
illegitimate advantage, either economically, 
political or otherwise.  
Collusion To have two parties come to an illegitimate 
agreement to achieve personal benefits by use of 
public office or power, also including improper 
influence on the actions of one of the parties 
(such as top level decision-makers). 
Patronage, clientelism and nepotism To use ones position to gain systematic 
advantages by allocating resources to others or 
giving official positions to friends or relatives to 
further one’s own position or benefits.  
(Søreide 2014, 2) 
While corruption can manifest in many different ways or acts, I argue in this thesis that one can 
categorize corruption by type, which encompasses the different acts of corruption. Corruption 
can happen at the civil servant or institutional level, such as the bureaucracy, referred to as 
                                                          
13 This table is not exhaustive, but a summary of the most common acts of corruption. Note that it is not always 
clear if an act is corrupt in terms of the definitions of corruption, or simply criminal.  
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bureaucratic corruption. These are the types of situations where one can bribe to speed up a 
process, or gain the upper hand in a procurement process, or where it is necessary to bribe to 
get access to the service the bureaucracy provides. This type of corruption tends to be relatively 
systematic and predictable. To add to the scope of literature, this type of corruption is also very 
similar to what Karklins called low-level administrative corruption and self-serving asset 
stripping by officials (Karklins 2002, 24). Corruption can also happen amongst the elites, the 
elected officials or at the leadership of the political institutions, referred to as political 
corruption. This type of corruption happens in different settings. This could be the collusion 
between corporations and politicians, which not only corrupts a process in the system, but also 
creates a corrupt system in itself. Often, the potential gains are higher and so is the risk and 
uncertainty (Ackerman 1999, 27; Amundsen 1999, 3; Dahlstrom 2011, 5). Relative to the 
degree to which political corruption occurs, the third type of corruption suggested by Karklins 
is synonymous here as well (Karklins 2002, 27), which is state capture. State capture (a term 
used by many scholars) usually happens through political corruption, and warps the entire 
purpose of the state.  
The two different types of corruption (political and bureaucratic) argued for in this thesis could 
have different causes, happen in different places, and most likely have different causal 
mechanisms (Goswami and Haider 2014, 242; Jakobsen 2012, 97). It is therefore not unnatural 
or illogical to assume that their effects are different as well, even though they are both part of 
the concept corruption. It is logical to assume that an investor would react differently to a 
country with a history of unpredictable and powerful political leaders, prone to bribery and 
collusion, than to a country that is known for systematic bribes in the bureaucracy. Political 
corruption potentially changes the entire system, while bureaucratic corruption, at most, bends 
the rules within the given system. This might be a factor for the theoretical dispute between the 
grease and sand logic in the matter of corruption and FDI.14 For the purpose of this thesis then, 
I differentiate between two internal types of corruption, political corruption and bureaucratic 
corruption.15   
One important issue to comment on here is that even though I argue for two different types of 
corruption, these two types of corruption often go hand in hand. If a country has corrupt political 
                                                          
14 The grease and sand theories of corruptions effect on FDI is explained in section 3.1. 
15 These types are by no means exhaustive, but they fit the data available for this thesis, and the theoretical 
framework I employ for corruption. Other types of corruption that have been researched are for example absolute 
and relative types of corruption and arbitrary and pervasive types of corruption, types by degree of corruption in 
the public sector (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Karklins 2002)).  
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leaders, the bureaucratic system is also often corrupt. If the bureaucratic system is corrupt, it is 
usually an indication that the higher levels are also corrupt, particularly if the corruption is 
systematic and over time. However, there are several cases where there are individual instances 
of bureaucratic and political corruption that does not imply that the “political elite”, the “entire 
bureaucracy”, or the entire system in the country is corrupt. An example could be Denmark, 
which is the highest scoring (non-corrupt) country in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI). There are several cases there of bureaucrats that have been caught red 
handed in corruption. I do not believe that the political leaders in Denmark are corrupt for that 
reason (and neither does Transparency International). In addition, individual political leaders 
have been caught in corruption, but I do not believe I can bribe the Danish bureaucracy for a 
building permit for that reason. The point remains though, that since these two types often go 
hand in hand, it will be difficult to measure any differences between them (this translates to 
multicollinearity). This is perhaps the biggest caveat of this thesis, and the degree to which I 
can say anything on this will come down to the quality of the data.  
2.2.3. The contextual and conditional nature of corruption 
As is clear from the research question, this thesis is not only concerned with the internal 
dimensions of corruption, but also how the context might shape the effects corruption has. From 
the early theoretical works, which are the foundation for the grease and sand camps of the 
literature, it is obvious that the contextual factors are important. Huntington argues that 
corruption can have a positive effect for investment and economic growth, because it can in the 
absence of efficient institutions (context) work as an informal institution through which 
business can occur (Huntington 1968). Further, Leff argues that in countries that are known to 
be slow and inefficient in the bureaucracy (context), corruption can work as an efficiency 
increasing factor, thus increasing investment (Leff 1964). The entire framework of political risk 
consists of several factors, as will be described below, which can increase risk and uncertainty 
for investors when deciding on a foreign direct investment (Jakobsen, 2012, ch. 3). It thus 
follows that an effect of corruption could be very dependent on the context these variables 
create (see figure 3). For example, whether a country is seen as having a high quality 
bureaucracy or a solid rule of law could potentially affect the effect of corruption. The choice 
of contextual factors to investigate in this thesis will be guided by previous literature, and will 




2.3. Corruption and the political risk framework 
“Political risk is any political event, action, process or characteristic of a country that have the 
potential to, directly or indirectly, significantly and negatively affect the goal of a foreign direct 
investor” (Jakobsen 2012, 39). Whenever a MNC considers making a foreign direct investment 
based on any of the motivations outlined in the OLI-paradigm, all the possible costs to the 
profitability of the investment must be considered in a cost-benefit analysis. These costs, be 
they economic or political in nature, will affect the attractiveness and the degree of motivation 
the MNC will have for investing in a given country.  
There are essentially four sources of political risk; the obsolescing bargain mechanism, political 
institutions, socio-political grievances and attitudes and preferences. In this literature, 
corruption is seen to work primarily through political institutions, but can also work through 
the obsolescing bargain mechanism. I argue that corruption is a phenomena in its own right, not 
just a characteristic of flawed institutions.16 These sources of risk act through mainly five 
different types of actors; Government, rebel/terrorists, non-governmental activists, other 
companies and foreign state or multilateral organizations. For the purpose of this thesis, in terms 
of potential costs, the government and state apparatus is the focus. There are primarily three 
different effects, government intervention (creeping or outright expropriation and 
renegotiation), war and unrest, and interventions by other non-state actors (Jakobsen 2012, 41). 
As such, the political risk theory or framework posits that political factors and phenomena can 
be understood as factors that enter the cost-benefit analysis of multinational corporations when 
they decide if and where to invest. All political factors, decisions and events are seen as creating 
some degree of risk, a probability that it will negatively affect the economic profit of an 
investment.  
Drawing partly on the political risk framework and the theories on corruption and its effects on 
investment I argue that corruption can have mainly three effects on multinational corporations, 
which will increase either the cost factor or the benefit factor in the corporations cost-benefit 
analysis when deciding to perform a foreign direct investment.17 The first is the potential 
                                                          
16 Investments in natural resources are particularly prone to this type of political risk. To the degree that 
corruption indicates or works as a proxy for political leaders with short time horizons and self-interested profit 
maximization, corruption will increase the likelihood that the deals and contracts negotiated beforehand between 
the MNC and the state could be renegotiated in lieu of the MNC’s decreasing power of negotiation as the capital 
and physical equipment is sunk into the investment in the host nation.  
17 The political risk framework does not entirely suit my proposed framework for how corruption can affect FDI 
inflow. I therefore only borrow its mechanisms and proposed causality for how political factors can affect 
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benefits corruption can provide. By drawing on parts of the corruption literature, we can observe 
there have been several who state that corruption can provide opportunities that can decrease 
costs, increase profit margins of investments, give certain competitive advantages and provide 
access to otherwise unavailable sectors (Egger and Winner 2005; Huntington 1968; Leff 1964). 
All else held constant, these benefits will increase the benefit factor in a cost-benefit analysis, 
and thus corruption can increase FDI inflow.  
The second is that corruption can increase the risk of a foreign direct investment. When you 
bribe someone for a service, or collude with someone for a better deal or access to something, 
there is for example usually a monetary cost. However, corruption is by nature unenforceable. 
You cannot know with absolute certainty that what you paid for is what you get, if you get 
something at all. The degree of risk corruption can create for an investment is dependent on 
many sub-factors, such as the size of the monetary cost, the familiarity and degree of 
systematism in the country regarding corruption, how likely it is to get caught, and then, how 
likely it is to get prosecuted and how likely it is that the media will run with a scandal and 
expose you to reputational costs (Busse and Hefeker 2007; Shapiro and Globerman 2002; Wei 
2000).18 Disregarding all these factors, the key aspect that defines the risk effect is that it is 
indeed a risk. Relying on the seminal work of Knight, risk is something in which you can 
quantify to some degree the likelihood of success or failure (Knight 1921).   
The third effect is that corruption can create outright uncertainty. To the degree to which you 
know nothing, or extremely little about how corruption will affect the security and profit margin 
of your investment, corruption is not creating a risk effect, but uncertainty. Uncertainty is 
separated from risk because you cannot quantify to any substantive degree the likelihood of 
corruption affecting your investment in a negative or a positive way (Knight 1921). For 
example, if you know country A is corrupt, and you know the political elite is corrupt, you 
might have to collude with a powerful individual or elite group. If you do not know at all 
whether they will keep their end of the deal you cannot calculate any probabilities, and you 
cannot work it into the budgeting of the investment. They are then just as likely to expropriate 
or renegotiate the investment once it is done, as they are to honoring their side of the deal.  
Now, I would argue that these three factors are by no means separated from each other. 
Corruption does not create either a degree of risk, uncertainty or some potential benefits. These 
                                                          
multinational corporations through their cost – benefit analysis. Political risk is far broader, and it is inherently 
negative for FDI, whereas I argue that corruption can also be positive.  
18 This list is by no means exhaustive, but merely illustrating.  
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effects work together in relative size to each other. So, depending on internal (types of 
corruption) and external (contextual setting) factors, I expect that the degree of risk, uncertainty 
and potential benefits will change, relative to each other. If the potential benefits increase 
because corruption gives you access to and monopoly on an oil field, the effect of corruption 
will be quite different than if corruption gives you a small competitive advantage in a relatively 
small procurement process. The reason for this is that the potential benefits change relative to 
the risk and uncertainty effect corruption can produce. Referring back to section 2.2.2 and 2.3., 
I argue that political corruption will create more uncertainty because of its nature, bureaucratic 
corruption will primarily produce a degree of risk due to its nature, whereas the contextual 
factors will affect the relative size of both the degree of risk, uncertainty and potential benefits. 
Thus, my proposed causal figure is the following: 19   















                                                          
19 Note that I in no way claim to prove causality in this thesis. Statistical techniques allow us to see correlations, 
and we can then apply theory to try to interpret causality. This is what this model is for, and it builds my 
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3.0. Literature review and hypotheses 
This chapter will go through relevant literature on corruption, FDI, and corruption-FDI to 
generate hypotheses on the effect corruption has upon FDI inflow in order to answer my 
research question. Primarily, I focus on literature that produces different answers as to the 
relationship between FDI and corruption, studies that employ different typologies of corruption, 
and studies that use different contextual factors that are relevant for corruption or interact 
corruption with contextual factors.  
3.1. Corruption and FDI  
In the literature, there exists mainly two scholarly camps on corruption and its effect on FDI. 
One negative (corruption decreases the inflow of FDI) where corruption is viewed as sand in 
the machinery, decreasing FDI because it could increase costs in terms of risk and outright 
uncertainty. The other is positive (corruption increases FDI inflow) where corruption is viewed 
as grease in the machinery, increasing FDI because it allows for short-cuts, lower taxes, 
beneficial regulations and rules, and in fact, less uncertainty and risk. These two camps are 
contradictory in their findings on effects, but their proposed causal mechanisms are essentially 
the same, which is that corruption has characteristics that decision makers in MNCs analyze in 
their cost – benefit analysis (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008, 13). Several articles have found corruption 
to have a negative effect. Kaufmann argues that corruption forces firms to devote human and 
financial resources to manage bribes, when these resources could be more productively 
employed elsewhere on other tasks. Thus, the MNC invests somewhere else (Kaufmann 1997). 
Payment of bribes is also prone to a certain degree of risk because it implies that the receiver 
of the bribe will do what he or she promises, which they might not, there is no enforceable 
agreement. In addition, since bribery is an illegal action there is no security net, such as the 
courts, to adjudicate if promised or “paid for” services are not delivered, as one can do with 
legitimate contracts (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008, 14). In his seminal article, Wei finds that corruption 
decreases the amount of FDI flows to a country, as does several others (Busse and Hefeker 
2007; Cuervo-Cazurra 2008; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Lambsdorff 2007; Shapiro and 
Globerman 2002; Wei 2000). Based on this I present the first hypothesis:  
H1a: Corruption decreases the amount of FDI inflow to a country.  
However, as indicated above, several scholars also find a positive relation between corruption 
and FDI. Corruption can act as a grease, speeding up transactions, creating incentives for action, 
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and making procedures happen that would otherwise not (Huntington 1968). According to Leff, 
corruption can thus work as a market correcting incentive against ineffective regulation and 
bureaucracy, bringing competition into a non-existing or monopolistic sector/market (Leff 
1964). Empirically, Wheeler and Mody found no significant relation between corruption and 
FDI (Wheeler and Mody 1992). Hines found no relation either, except for US based MNCs 
(James R. Hines 1995) . Egger and Winner found that corruption increases FDI in both the short 
and long run, and particularly so in developing countries (Egger and Winner 2005). As such the 
second hypothesis is:  
H1b: Corruption increases the amount of FDI inflow to a country.  
3.2. Types of corruption and FDI 
As I argue above in chapter two, corruption is a multidimensional concept. It is then not illogical 
to assume that the different internal types of corruption might have different effects on FDI. In 
fact, several scholars have pointed out that the ambiguity of corruption’s effect on FDI might 
come from the fact that researchers use an aggregated measure for the whole concept of 
corruption, instead of using disaggregated, more intensive parts (Søreide, 2014, p. 5). Several 
articles on corruption differentiate between bureaucratic corruption and political corruption 
(Amundsen 1999, 3). Bureaucratic corruption can be the systematized, everyday corruption in 
which lower government officials require bribes to produce a service. This can be anything 
from admitting a child to a school, putting someone on a waitlist for a health service, stamp 
and/or sign documents that will allow a business venture to start up or proceed, and so on. This 
type of corruption, since it is often systematic and on a large scale, is often predictable and 
stable. As such, it is possible to budget the potential cost of this type of corruption. Following 
the “sand” logic of corruption, this will make investments less profitable, or if at the margins, 
not profitable, affecting the decision of a MNC to invest somewhere else, decreasing FDI flow. 
On the other hand, following the “grease logic”, it could allow processes to be sped up by 
increasing incentives for getting work done and pushing through services and paperwork to 
maximize the gain from bribes. From the framework employed in this thesis on corruption and 
FDI, I expect that if any type of corruption has more positive than negative effects, it is 
bureaucratic corruption. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis:  
H2b: Bureaucratic corruption increases the amount of FDI into a country.    
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Political corruption, as argued before, takes place at the highest levels of politics and the state 
(Amundsen 1999, 3). When the members of government who are in a position to affect the 
creation and enforcement of legislation and policy are able to twist or side-step the laws and 
rules of the state, prolong and increase their power above their initial mandate or enrich 
themselves by influencing policy or laws from a personal motive, we are dealing with political 
corruption. Political corruption creates larger issues than merely disturbing the allocation of 
resources, it can also affect the very climate around which the state and nation exists and decay 
institutions such as for example the rule of law (Amundsen 1999, 3). To the degree to which 
political corruption becomes widespread, the term state capture is also applicable (Karklins 
2002). Political corruption is often manifested in the manipulation of political/governance 
institutions, making the “rules of the game” in both politics and the economy unclear and 
unpredictable, particularly for outsiders. This is why some scholars (Ackerman 1999; 
Amundsen 1999; Dahlstrom 2011; Karklins 2002) and I argue that this type of corruption does 
not only increase the risk of an investment through for example bribes, it also increases the 
general uncertainty around the safety of an investment and the profitability altogether. If 
politicians and top state-bureaucrats are corrupt, it is very possible that the political stability 
around those in power, either the regime, party or individuals, is at best unstable. This could 
indicate that the top decision-makers have short time horizons in their decisions, thus a higher 
likelihood for them to amass short-term gains for themselves. This would increase the 
probability of expropriation of FDI. Expropriations, while possible to insure against, are of 
course extremely costly to whatever MNC that experiences it. In addition, less extreme but still 
unpredictable outcomes are possible, such as renegotiations of contracts or increases of taxes 
and ownership shares. A regime or politician would not even have to go back on their deal with 
the MNC for these outcomes to happen. If a deal is made while engaging in political corruption, 
the next regime, party or leader might view it as void and criminal, changing the deal. As such, 
I propose the following hypothesis:  
H3a: Political corruption decreases the amount of FDI into a country more than bureaucratic 
corruption. 
3.3. Corruption and the institutional framework 
As was touched upon in chapter two, section 2.3, it is very possible that corruption is affected 
by contextual factors, such as all the factors that comprise the investment climate. Huntington 
and Leff (1968; 1964) stated that in lieu of non-existing or inefficient formal institutions, 
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corruption could increase investment based on the potential benefits it can provide. I therefore 
create hypotheses with two institutions, or collection of institutions, namely governmental/state 
institutions, and the judicial institution. 
3.3.1.  Corruption and governmental/state institutions 
One of the arguments made in this thesis is that the conceptualization of corruption is lacking 
and flawed in the literature. Some view corruption as flaws in governmental and state 
institutions (Goswami and Haider 2014; Shapiro and Globerman 2002), and therefore not a true 
phenomenon in its own right.20 Others view corruption as a phenomenon of its own, separate 
from any particular institution, such as the bureaucracy, justice system, public services, and so 
on.21 In addition, Tina Søreide argues in her new book on corruption and the justice system that 
corruption is something that can take place in countries with solid institutions, referring to the 
French Elf case (Søreide 2016).  I adhere to this understanding as well. It is perfectly possible 
to have good institutions, be they of democracy, bureaucracy or juridical. For yet another 
example, Italy is acknowledged as a highly developed, democratic and institutionalized 
country. It is also infamous for relatively high levels of corruption (“Transparency 
International” 2016).  
As discussed, I argue that the negative effects of corruption in terms of affecting foreign 
investors, is the relative degree of risk involved, and the relative degree of uncertainty it can 
create around the investment relative to the potential benefits. Now, clearly there are benefits 
as well, as described in chapter two. If governmental and state institutions such as the 
bureaucracy, public services, and the civil servants are of high quality in terms of competences, 
efficiency and capacity, several of the advantages that comes with corruption would be less 
needed (the function as an informal market, increasing speed and efficiency, making up for 
lacking incentives in bureaucracy). As such, the amount of risk and uncertainty relative to the 
potential benefits would change, possibly making corruption mainly a cost in a cost – benefit 
analysis taken in the decision making process of the multinational corporation, framed by the 
OLI-paradigm. I therefore propose the following hypothesis 
                                                          
20 Whether by explicit explanation, such as “levels of corruption as a proxy for the quality of x institution” or by 
not explaining it, adding it into a government or institutions aggregated variable.  
21 Note that even in the cases where corruption is seen as a phenomenon in its own right, high levels of 
corruption is often associated with poor quality of different institutions.  
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H4: In countries that have high quality governmental and state institutions, corruption decreases 
the inflow of foreign direct investment.  
3.3.2. Corruption and the judiciary.  
The juridical institution, or rule of law as some refer to, has from both the FDI literature and 
the political risk literature, received special attention. It is by many viewed as a key institution 
for both business and the quality of governance in terms of providing secure property rights and 
protecting the individual from the state and others (Herzfeld and Weiss 2003, 621; Jakobsen 
2012, 96–97). If corruption negatively affects FDI inflows by increasing risks and uncertainty 
around the investment concerning whether or not people will hold up their end of the deal, by 
doing unfair renegotiations, creating problems, or even outright expropriate the investment, a 
solid and institutionalized judiciary and rule of law would be a great security net. If the courts 
are independent of the state and government, not arbitrary and unfair (prioritizing country 
interests over the law), issues can be subjected to fair arbitration. For example, if a key 
bureaucrat or politician suddenly reneges on a contract, or subjects the investment to increased 
costs or even tries to expropriate it, it will not necessarily be of any real consequence if the 
courts could reverse it and impose sanctions. In addition, a strong rule of law and judiciary 
would work as a check on leaders and decision-makers, reducing uncertainty around them 
holding their end of the deal (Jakobsen 2012, 96).  
On the other hand, if the courts and rule of law are highly institutionalized, it might actually 
reinforce the risks and uncertainty corruption creates,22 because you would have no control or 
influence over what the judiciary would or could do. If a deal is made through corrupt processes, 
the judiciary might find the company equally responsible, finding the deal null and void, and 
imposing fines on the company. In addition, the risk of someone leaking the information to the 
judicial authorities are larger, and the certainty of sanctions are larger (you would be less able 
to bribe your way out). The degree to which one can trust the individuals one engages with in 
corruption would also be lower, because they would have a viable option of reporting this to 
the judicial authorities. Therefore, I present the following hypothesis:  
H5: In countries that have high quality juridical institutions, corruption will decrease the inflow 
of foreign direct investment.  
                                                          
22 To be perfectly clear, I am not arguing here that a strong judiciary and rule of law would deter FDI inflow in 
and of its own (it would probably increase it), but that the effect of corruption would be different in this setting.  
31 
 
3.4. Corruption and political regime type  
Scholars have argued that democratic governance is ineffective in a global economy, dragging 
out processes, increasing transaction costs, increasing uncertainty through channels for the 
people to interfere and change policies and deals, and in many ways being in friction with a 
free market capitalist economy (Li and Resnick 2003). Meanwhile, other scholars contend that 
democratic institutions and regimes actually increase FDI inflows because they create a 
predictable and stable climate through checks and balances on the people in power. It also 
provides promises of market friendly policies, because those in office want to remain there, and 
investments are good for the economy, which is a major determinant for electoral victory 
(Jensen 2003).  
If the argumentation for why democracy should reduce FDI inflow is true, then one can observe 
that the mechanisms through which the potential benefits of corruption work become more 
relevant and important (Leff 1964). If democracy reduces efficiency, slows down bureaucratic 
processes, makes access to certain sectors difficult, and subjects contracts and investments to 
pressure from the people, the possible advantages of corruption becomes larger, and possibly, 
more necessary. Corruption could then increase the efficiency and speed of the bureaucracy by 
creating incentives for action, it could allow access into sectors that officially are off limits, and 
it could hide deals from the public, because corruption is a hidden phenomenon (Huntington 
1968; Leff 1964). If this logic were true, then one would expect corruption to increase FDI 
inflow in democratic countries. I therefore propose the following hypothesis:  
H6: In highly democratized countries, corruption increases FDI inflow to the country.  
3.5. Corruption, natural resources and FDI 
From the literature, we can observe that FDI could be both attracted by and deterred by 
corruption. Researchers have found positive empirical findings to both these strands of logic. 
One dimension that could affect these results, but that is not captured by single aggregate 
measures of FDI and corruption is that of foreign direct investment into countries with natural 
resources. In the extractive industries (mining, oil and gas, forestry), the rents or profits to be 
gained are potentially massive due to the demand for these goods and the magnitude of supply 
such a project can create. If we consider the proposed framework and causal logic above 
(section 2.1.3, figure 1 and 2, section 2.4 and figure 3), all that corruption does in the decision-
making model of the OLI framework is to increase a risk, uncertainty factor and potential 
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benefits, which when all else is held constant will affect the cost – benefit equation 
multinational corporations perform before investing. However, when the possible gains are so 
potentially massive this logic might not be as straight forward anymore, and the potential 
benefits that are pointed out from the grease logic of corruption might increase. 
As such, for foreign direct investment into countries with large natural resources, the potential 
benefits of corruption might become so large, that the risks and uncertainty becomes relatively 
small. Wiig and Kolstad also show that MNC’s can benefit from dysfunctional institutions with 
corruption in the oil sector, because they allow for collusion between the political elite and the 
MNC (Wiig and Kolstad 2010). In a later article, Wiig and Kolstad also find that countries with 
extractive resources receive more FDI as corruption increase, but however, at a diminishing 
rate (Kolstad and Wiig 2013). Thus, I argue that some of the potential benefits from corruption 
(lower taxes, larger ownership share, competitive advantage in procurements), can become 
larger under different circumstances, such as with large natural resources, very much larger. I 
therefore propose the following hypothesis:  
H7: In countries with large natural resources, corruption increases FDI inflow to the country.  
3.6. Corruption and increasing reputational costs 
As has been presented several times in this thesis, early theoretical work on investments, 
economic growth and corruption argued that corruption could have characteristics that would 
actually increase investment. Now, I argue that these potential benefits will always be relative 
to the potential risk and uncertainty that corruption creates for investors. As time has 
progressed, the degree of risk in terms of getting caught, and the costs associated with this 
should one get caught have increased dramatically. As the effects of corruption upon society 
have received attention, countries have become much more negatively oriented towards 
corruption, and the tolerance for it has decreased significantly. The media is also always on the 
lookout for a potential corruption scandal. Corruption has also been criminalized over the years.  
Several laws and conventions make multinational corporations responsible and prosecutable if 
they engage in corruption in a growing number of countries. The US enacted the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices act in 1977, and increased its scope, application and sanctions in 1998 (US 
Department of Justice 2015). The OECD enacted the convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 1999 (OECD 2016). The EU 
ratified and enacted the Criminal Law Convention against Corruption in 2002 (Council of 
Europe 2016). The United Nations Convention against Corruption was enacted in 2005, though 
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having been in the works since 2000 (UNODC 2016). Several MNCs have been convicted and 
sanctioned by use of these laws and conventions, for example Statoil (Jakobsen 2012, 97). The 
publicity received if caught in such a corruption scandal is also potentially very costly, with 
stock prices potentially falling. As such, I argue that over time, the risk/uncertainty factor 
relative to the potential benefits of corruption has increased in general over time, because you 
are now much more likely to be caught than before, and corruption has been criminalized to a 
much larger degree over time. Thus, I present the following hypothesis:  
H8: The effect which corruption has upon the inflow of FDI has become more strongly negative 
since the year 2000.23 
3.7. Corruption in developing countries and FDI  
Scholars have pointed out that in developing countries the political and economic institutions 
are not mature enough to handle the pressure of the global market or attract and create 
investment, thus they fall behind on infrastructure and further development (Sachs et al. 2004). 
As such, one could expect that the positive aspects of corruption in terms of providing speed 
and effectiveness in bureaucratic processes, competitive advantages in tenders and 
procurements, granting access to otherwise monopolistic sectors, and in many ways function as 
market institutions where there are none, could become more important than the relative 
negative aspects. This is also the logic behind Huntington and Leff’s arguments for a positive 
effect of corruption on investments and economic growth (Huntington 1968; Leff 1964). As the 
bureaucracy, ministry of finance, and politicians are slow and inefficient, corruption’s greasing 
effect could negate this and work in place of these formal institutions. In addition, some scholars 
have studied specifically country samples with less developed countries (Busse and Hefeker 
2007; Cuervo-Cazurra 2008), finding differing results. As such, corruption could very well have 
a different effect in developing countries, than in developed countries because the potential 
benefits of corruption becomes relatively larger than the risks and/or uncertainty. I therefore 
propose the following hypothesis:  
H9: In less developed countries, corruption increases FDI inflow.  
 
                                                          
23 The year 2000 may appear to be an arbitrary choice. However, both the US legislation and the OECD 
convention are adopted before 2000, and discussions of conventions in the EU and UN is ongoing right after 
2000. I therefore believe the year 2000 to be a natural cut off point for a cumulative effect, though this is open to 
debate. Regressions were also run with 2002 as the year dummy, but the results did not significantly change.   
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3.8. Methodological review 
As previously stated, the literature on foreign direct investment and corruption is already quite 
large, and growing. With a main divide between the grease logic and the sand logic camps there 
is quite some ambiguity in findings, which has been illustrated in the hypothesis generation and 
literature review. One aspect of this thesis is to use a relatively unknown and unused method to 
achieve estimations that are more precise. It is not unnatural to think that the reason for so many 
differing findings is due to methodological choices, with estimation techniques and data 
samples. I will here list in table 4 several studies that have been used in this thesis with their 
finding and methodological choices.  
Table 4: Literature by methodology and data 
 
Article Method Data Finding (+ = 
positive, - = 
negative, / = 
insignificance) 
Evidence on 
corruption as an 
incentive for foreign 
direct investment 
(Egger and Winner 
2005) 
Fixed effects and 
instrumental variables 
estimation.  
Lags all independent 
variables 
Panel, 73 countries, 
1995 – 1999. FDI 
stocks as dependent 
variable, corruption as 
main independent 
variable 
               + 
Corruption is 
insignificant in the 
fixed effects 
estimation. Positive 






and Hefeker 2007) 
Fixed effects and 
General method of 
moments (GMM).  
Lagged FDI as 
independent variable.  
Panel, 83 countries, 
1984 – 2003. Foreign 
direct inflow as 
dependent variable. 





Corruption is not 
significant.  
GMM: Significant at 
10%, corruption 
decreases FDI.  
 
Does political risk 
deter FDI inflow 
(Goswami and Haider 
2014) 
Fixed effects and 
pooled OLS.  
Panel, 146 countries, 
1984 – 2009. FDI 
inward stock as the 
dependent variable. 3 
political risk factors as 
main independent 
variables.  













and Zurawicki 2002) 
OLS and Probit 
regression 
Cross sectional, 89 
countries, 1996 – 
1998, averaged. FDI 
inflow and outflow as 
dependent variable. 
- - + 
In absolute terms, 
corruption deters 
FDI. In relative 




Corruption as main 
independent variable.  




FDI? (Kolstad and 
Wiig 2012) 
OLS regression Cross sectional, 104 
countries, 2003 – 2006 
averaged. FDI inflow 
from China as 
dependent variable. 
Institutions (arguing 
that corruption is 
partly a proxy for this) 
and natural resources 
as main independent 
variables.  
               + +  
Higher institutional 
quality decreases 
Chinese FDI. This 
effect is magnified 
when the home 
country has large 
natural resources.  
Digging in the dirt? 
Extractive industry 
FDI and corruption 
(Kolstad and Wiig 
2013) 
Fixed effect Panel, 81 countries 
1996 – 2009. FDI 
inflow(extractive) as 
dependent variable, 
corruption as main 
independent variable  
                  +  
More corruption 
attracts more FDI in 
extractive industries. 





OLS regression Cross sectional, 45 
countries. FDI inward 
stocks as dependent 





Corruption has a 
strong negative effect 
on FDI 
Global Foreign Direct 
Investment Flows: 





OLS regression Cross sectional, 144 
countries, 1995 – 1997 
averaged. FDI inflow 












the lower corruption) 
the more FDI inflows 
and outflows.  
Better the Devil You 
Don’t Know: Types of 




Quasi-Fixed effects.  Cross sectional, 74 
countries, 1999. FDI 








negatively affect FDI 
inflow in general, in 
transition economies 
there is a small 
positive effect. For 
arbitrary corruption 
the effect is positive, 
for pervasive 
corruption the effect 
is very negative.  
The Effects of 
Corruption on FDI 
Inflows (Al-sadig 
2009) 
OLS regression and 
Fixed effects 
Panel, 117 countries, 
1984 – 2004. FDI 
inflow per capita as 
dependent variable, 
corruption as main 
independent variable 
- +     / 
The OLS regression 
finds a significant 
negative effect of 
corruption. The fixed 
effect estimation 




A sample without 
OECD countries 
finds a nearly 
significant positive 






3.8.1. Panel versus cross-sectional data, and heterogeneity 
Of the studies that use econometric estimation, several employ cross-sectional data, particularly 
so for the studies of the early 2000s (Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Shapiro and Globerman 2002; 
Wei 2000). This is of course perfectly natural, as panel data was scarce and panel data 
estimation relatively new. All of these studies mainly find a negative effect of corruption (or 
indexes of which corruption is a part) on foreign direct investment. This is criticized by Egger 
and Winner, who state that the negative effect is sensitive to both the relatively small country 
sample of these studies, limited amount of observations due to the lack of a time dimension, 
and unobserved heterogeneity bias which cross-sectional OLS regressions cannot control for 
(Egger and Winner 2005, 933). For the newer panel data studies, all of them employ either a 
pooled OLS or fixed effects estimation. As I will discuss in detail in this thesis, fixed effects is 
excellent if you are only interested in the within effect over time on some dependent variable. 
However, most of the studies in this field make no distinction as to whether they are interested 
only in a within effect, a net effect or a between effect. To allow for the between variation, 
some of them employ pooled OLS, but this technique is unable to differentiate the cross 
sectional and the time dimension, potentially inducing massive bias in our coefficients. All the 
studies that employ fixed effects state that they do this to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity,24 which is the norm in both political science and particularly so in economics. 
However, the cost of performing fixed effects seems to be extremely underestimated by the 
studies analyzed here. The effect of corruption is largely between countries (see section 4.5). 
This is seen when most studies show that corruption is not significant in a fixed effects 
estimation (which only estimates its effects within countries over time). This could potentially 
lead to wrong conclusions when your research question is concerning simply the effect of 
                                                          
24 By creating separate intercepts for each group unit, country, and then controlling this variation away, fixed 
effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the group level. Unobserved heterogeneity, if present, will bias 
our coefficients, making the results unreliable. This will be discussed in detail in chapter five.  
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corruption on FDI, not only the effect corruption has over time within a country (Al-sadig 2009; 
Busse and Hefeker 2007; Goswami and Haider 2014). We can also observe that the sign of the 
relationship between corruption is very sensitive to the country sample (i.e OECD, African, 
Chinese outward FDI), and particularly so to the estimation method. Fixed effects tends to, as 
said, produce insignificant and in some cases positive effects, pooled OLS tends to produce 
negative or insignificant relationships, while OLS regression on cross-sectional data estimates 
a negative relationship. In this thesis, I will estimate both the within and the between effect 
specifically, by using the random effects estimation. As such, I will be able to clearly 
disentangle the different effects of corruption within the same model.  
3.8.2. Endogeneity as reverse and simultaneous causality 
Most studies mention to a certain degree that corruption and foreign direct investment might 
have an endogenous relationship.25 This is given more focus in the newer studies than in the 
older ones. Kolstad and Wiig openly state that corruption is endogenous to FDI, however they 
do not differentiate between endogeneity as reverse causality, omitted variables and unobserved 
heterogeneity, and that an instrumental variable is needed to control for this. Because this is 
unavailable they rely on the fixed effects estimation to negate the collective issue (Kolstad and 
Wiig 2013, 373). Al-Sadig also writes that endogeneity in the form of simultaneity and reverse 
causality is an issue, but argues that this problem is alleviated by lagging the independent 
variables (Al-sadig 2009, 273). Busse and Hefeker also briefly discuss the endogeneity of FDI, 
quality of institutions and factors of risk (corruption), and they add the  lagged version of the 
dependent variable as an instrument to control for endogeneity (Busse and Hefeker 2007, 400). 
In their article on economic growth, foreign direct investment and corruption, Freckleton et.al 
also argues that endogeneity is a serious issue in the literature, and that it has not received 
enough attention. They argue that introducing lagged variables negates some of the issues of 
endogeneity (Freckleton, Wright, and Craigwell 2012, 644). As I will show and discuss in the 
methods chapter, the fixes employed against endogeneity as reverse causality and simultaneity 
which we see in the literature are not nearly efficient enough to be called solutions. If the issue 
of reverse causality and simultaneity is not handled in the data collection phase it is nearly 
impossible to fully guard against its potential bias (Bellemare, Masaki, and Pepinsky 2015).  
                                                          
25 In this thesis, all references to endogeneity is to be understood as reverse and or simultaneous causality, if not 
explicitly stated otherwise. Other phenomena that are in some literature also referred to as endogeneity, such as 
unobserved heterogeneity, is not part of the endogeneity term for this thesis, unless specified for a given section 
or argument.  
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What are the implications of the issues of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity in the 
literature? Essentially, we cannot claim causality directly from the statistical results and we 
need to be skeptical of our coefficients.26 If it is not clear whether it is corruption or some other 
unobserved variable (as with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity) that causes some effect in 
foreign direct investment, we cannot know whether the coefficient we observe is due to our 
included independent variable, or some other factor. The same goes for reverse causality and 
simultaneity. If it is not clear whether the change in corruption causes a change in FDI, or a 
change in FDI causes the change in corruption, we cannot argue on causality, only association 

















                                                          
26 Causality must be argued for on theoretical grounds following the theory and frameworks one employs.  
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4.0.  Data and Determinants 
This chapter will present an overview of and describe the data I employ in this thesis. I will 
show how my variables are measured and discuss the validity between the theoretical 
phenomenon I want to measure, and the actual measurement. I will further describe the dataset 
I use for my regressions with some descriptive statistics, and comment on its qualities, flaws 
and characteristics.  
The dataset used in this thesis is comprised of three different databases. The dataset (Teorell et 
al. 2016) from the Quality of Government Institute is used as the template dataset, because it 
contains the majority of the variables I need for my estimations. The second dataset is from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the third is from 
International Profiles Database (IPD). The Quality of Government (QoG) dataset is used by 
several scholars in several fields, and is regarded as being of high quality. The UNCTAD 
dataset is much used in literature on foreign direct investment, several of which have been 
referenced in this thesis. The IPD dataset is one of the datasets used by Transparency 
International for their corruption index and it is from a state institution (French). I therefore 
consider the sources of my data to be of high quality, and very reliable. These datasets have 
been merged together using the “merge” command in STATA.  
4.1. The dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment  
The dependent variable in this analysis is the annual aggregated FDI inflows by country-year. 
I use data on global FDI flows for a maximum of 171 countries for the period 1995 – 2012. The 
data for this variable is collected from the UNCTAD database. This is done because the Quality 
of Government dataset only provides FDI flows in terms of percentage of GDP and the regular 
FDI inflow variable is more used than the FDI/GDP measure in the literature. UNCTAD is the 
United Nations branch that is tasked with compiling and analyzing development issue data. It 
is a highly reliable source, which is used by many scholars in the field. The use of either FDI 
inflow or FDI stock to measure FDI is used interchangeably in the literature, but with a small 
majority employing flow data. I have chosen to use FDI inflow, because I see it as measuring 
more directly what I am interested in, which is the annual level of FDI from decisions made by 
multinational corporations on a yearly basis, as they react to changes and differences in the 
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independent variables in this thesis.27 FDI inflow also has some advantages over FDI stock. 
FDI stock is less comprehensive in coverage than FDI inflow and the change in FDI stock is 
not only predicated on decisions to invest or not by multinationals (revaluations, reinvested 
earnings and write-downs also affect stock). FDI inflow must not be confused with a pure 
change variable either. It is, in its own right a stock variable with an absolute value. FDI inflow 
is the added sum of FDI compiled quarterly during a year (Wacker 2013, 5).  
The dependent variable is measured in millions of US dollars. In the literature, it is very 
common to use a logarithmic transformation on FDI  (Al-sadig 2009; Busse and Hefeker 2007; 
Cuervo-Cazurra 2008; Egger and Winner 2005; Gani 2007; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Kolstad 
and Wiig 2013). The reason for this is that due to extraordinary circumstances there are some 
extreme outliers in FDI inflow, which causes the variable to be skewed, and not normally 
distributed. This is confirmed when looking at histograms of the variable, and normality tests 
(see method chapter). As the logarithmic transformation is recommended in econometric 
literature for this type of variable, and because the majority of the literature on FDI employs it, 
I chose to transform my dependent variable into a logarithm. However, the procedure turned 
out to not be as simple as typing a command into STATA. Due to mathematical theory, one 
cannot log a negative value. In FDI inflows, the extreme outliers are both positive and negative. 
Negative FDI inflows occur when something dramatic happens, such as war, civil war, financial 
meltdown, and so on. In addition, large negative values can indicate restructuring of some sort 
in the corporate sector. 28 These numbers are then not to be interpreted directly (OECD 2006). 
There are 155 country-years of negative values in my dependent variable, of a total of 3455 in 
the time period 1996 – 2012. To avoid dropping these observations, I tried a transformation that 
added a constant positive value, thus putting all negative values between 0 and 1.0. This was 
also done by Busse and Hefeker in their article (Busse and Hefeker 2007). This transformation 
however created some serious issues in my regressions.29 Because I am interested in the general 
                                                          
27 FDI inflow per capita was also considered as the dependent variable. However, because it has only been used 
by one source I was able to find, the country sample of FDI would decrease (for example Montenegro lacks 
population data), and because the effect of population size is partly controlled for in the GDP variable I have 
chosen not to use this. It could be interesting to try this variable out in future research though, to see it if has any 
significant changes on the findings in this thesis.  
28 For example, Afghanistan experienced negative FDI inflows in 1997 – 1999, just on the precipice of invasion 
and stayed around 0 until 2004. When the situation stabilized (relatively) FDI inflow increased. Iraq also 
experienced negative FDI right before and during the invasion of 2003. Denmark in 2010 and Australia in 2005 
are examples of corporate restructuring.   
29 The baseline regression was run without the transformation, and results were in line with previous literature. 
The economic determinants (control variables) were all more or less significant, and the results made intuitive 
sense. When the transformation was added to the dependent variable, nearly all of the variables lost their 
significance, and some coefficients changed sign. Several scholars have criticized this transformation (STATA 
forums), stating that it should be avoided as a fix for logarithmic transformations.  
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trends of FDI inflow, the factors that normally affect multinational corporations to invest here 
as opposed to there, these extreme outliers, caused by exceptional circumstances, are not really 
of theoretical interest to me.30 Therefore, due to the technical complications and focus of this 
thesis, I chose to drop the 155 negative observations.31 Fortunately, the negative values are 
scattered across several countries and in relatively short time spans; thus, I do not lose a country 
unit by dropping these observations, only the 155 country-year observations.  
The logarithmic transformation is done by the “log (x)” command in STATA, which effectively 
drops out any negative observations automatically. The dependent variable, log FDI inflows, is 
then left with 3300 observations between 1995 and 2012.32 Because the dependent variable is 
logarithmically transformed, the interpretation of the coefficients in the regression results will 
not be interpretable as one unit increase in X causes Z unit increase in Y. This is because we 
are now estimating proportional change using geometric means (Noymer 2011). The 
interpretation becomes one unit increase in X causes Z percentage increase in Y. What is key 
to have in mind when interpreting the coefficients of the independent variables then, is the scale 
of the independent variables. Corruption has a 0 – 10 scale, while taxes is scaled 0 – 100. If 
corruption has a coefficient of 0.2 and taxes has a coefficient of 0.02, it might seem like taxes 
has an unsubstantial coefficient size, at least compared to corruption. However, taxes has the 
potential for more change in values than corruption. Taxes could change from a value of five 
to 35, which would make the coefficient quite substantial indeed, 60 percent increase of FDI 
inflow in this abstract example. The interpretation for taxes would be, for one unit increase in 
taxes, FDI inflow increases with 2 percent, all other variables held constant at their mean. 
4.2. Independent variables 
The independent variables reflect the theoretical discussion that lead to the hypotheses in 
chapter three. The measures used for the dependent variable, independent variables of 
theoretical importance and control variables in this thesis is presented in the table below, with 
the sources and how they are measured.33 
 
                                                          
30 To study the effects of these exceptional circumstances would be an interesting project in itself.  
31 I would not have dropped these observations had there been another way. I spent much time and resources to 
find a way around this, but to no avail. The country-years that are dropped are listed in appendix 9.3.  
32 Because the corruption variable is measured to 2013 and some of the control variables are only measured up to 
2012, the effective scope of the thesis becomes from 1995 – 2012.  
33 This table describes the variables as they are from the source. For example, Trade goes from 1960 – 2012 in 
the source dataset. I however only use data from 1995 – 2012.  
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Table 5: Variables, measures and sources 
 
Variable type  Variable Measure 
 
Source:  
Dependent variable FDI inflows Foreign Direct Investment 
inflow (Millions of dollars). 
Min. Year: 1980 
Max. Year: 2014 
N: 211. n: 7174 





   
 Corruption Perceptions based index, 
consisting of surveys and expert 
interviews. 0 (highly corrupt) – 
10 (not corrupt).  
Min. Year: 1995  
Max. Year: 2013 









Total natural resources rents are 
the sum of oil rents, natural gas 
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), 
mineral rents, and forest rents, 
divided by GDP (% of GDP).  
Min. Year:1970 
Max. Year: 2012 









 Regime The polity score is computed by 
subtracting the p_autoc score 
from the p_democ score; the 
resulting united polity scale 
ranges from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly 
autocratic)  
Min. Year: 1946 Max. Year: 
2012 
N: 182 n: 8728 












Combines into a single grouping 
responses on the quality of 
public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service 
from political pressures, and the 
World Governance 




credibility of the government's 
commitment to policies. -
2.5(bad) – +2.5(good).  
Min. Year: 1996 
Max. Year: 2012 




 Quality of 
Rule of Law 
Rule of Law includes several 
indicators which measure the 
extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society. These include 
perceptions of the incidence of 
crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, 
and the enforceability of 
contracts.  
min. Year :1996 
Max. Year: 2012 










A time dummy, separating the 
sample from 1996 - 2012 into 
two. All country-years up and to 
1999 is coded 0, all country 
years from and beyond 2000 is 
coded 1.  
 
Year – QoG.   
 Level of 
development 
The Human Development Index 
(HDI) is a composite index that 
measures the average 
achievements in a country in 
three basic dimensions of human 
development: a long and healthy 
life, as measured 
by life expectancy at birth; 
knowledge, as measured by the 
adult literacy rate and the 
combined gross enrolment ratio 
for primary, secondary and 
tertiary schools; and a decent 
standard of living, as measured 
by GDP per capita in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) US dollars.  
Min. Year:1980 
Max. Year: 2013 





Report – QoG: 
undp_hpi 
Control variables    
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 Market size PPP GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to 
international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. 
An international dollar has the 
same purchasing power over 
GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the 
United States. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. 
Min. Year :1990 
Max. Year : 2012  









Inflation, average consumer 
prices. Percentage change. 
Min. Year:1980 
Max. Year: 2013 
N: 188. n: 5472 
T: 33 
 
IMF – QoG: 
imf_inflch 
 Level of taxes Taxes on income, profits, and 
capital gains are levied on the 
actual or presumptive net 
income of individuals, on the 
profits of corporations and 
enterprises, and on capital gains, 
whether realized or not, on land, 
securities, and other assets. 
Intragovernmental payments are 
eliminated in consolidation 
Min. Year:1990 
Max. Year: 2012 






Indicators – QoG: 
wdi_taxipcgr 
 Openness to 
trade  
Trade is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross 
domestic product. 
Min. Year:1960 
Max. Year: 2012 









GDP growth rate 
Annual percentage growth rate 
of GDP at market prices based 
World development 




on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on 
constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP 
is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any pro 
duct taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the 
value of the products.  
Min. Year: 1961 









Several organizations try to measure the extent of corruption in different countries. However, 
only a few are consistently used throughout the literature, and to the degree that they match the 
definition of corruption in section 2.2, I consider them for use in this thesis. The three indices 
presented here were selected by validity (they fit my conceptualization of corruption), previous 
use in literature and availability.34  
Corruption perception index (CPI) – Transparency International:  
The CPI is in many ways a poll of polls. It is based on surveys from a manifold of reliable and 
high quality sources which are aggregated, thus creating a score between 0 (completely 
corrupt), and 100 (no corruption). This index ranks countries “in terms of the degree to which 
corruption is perceived to exist amongst public officials and politicians”. Transparency 
International define corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”, and as such, 
they are quite in line with the definition I have employed for corruption. In addition, they 
specify that it is the different types of “political corruption” they are interested in (Transparency 
International, B 2016). Several methodological criteria need to be fulfilled to be a part of the 
CPI. The surveys must be focused on measuring the “overall extent of corruption”, a country 
must have at least three independent surveys that rate them, and each of those surveys must be 
                                                          
34 Some articles use the ICRG risk data, because it has a very wide coverage, good conceptualization of 
corruption that argues to measure both political and bureaucratic corruption. However, because of availability 
issues I do not discuss this measure in my thesis.  
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done in more than one country, with the same methodology (Transparency International, C 
2016). The CPI has encountered some critique, particularly as a panel data variable. Lambsdorff 
(2007) points out that the methodology of the CPI has been tweaked twice, and as such, one 
must question the comparability of before and after these tweaks. Several scholars have chosen 
to use the CPI in spite of this critique however, and Lambsdorff’s critique has been criticized 
for being personally motivated.  
Control of Corruption (CoC) – Worldwide governance indicators:  
The CoC is an index that is part of the Worldwide governance dataset, created by the World 
Bank. This corruption measure is partly made from a critique against the CPI. Supposedly, this 
index is aggregated from more sub-indices, such as commercial risk companies and non-
governmental organizations (NGO’s). Much like the CPI, this index can also be characterized 
as a poll of polls, and the CPI and CoC actually use many of the same sub-indexes. Still, the 
CoC claims to be of higher quality, measuring more variation of corruption. The CoC aims to 
measure the “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, 
4), thus also fitting my definition of corruption. It is the increased focus on petty corruption that 
supposedly makes this a superior measure of corruption. The CPI supposedly focuses too much 
on political corruption.35 One key feature of its aggregation methodology is the use of an 
unobserved components model, to create weighted averages in the aggregated indicators, with 
error margins (WGI 2016) 
The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) – Transparency International:  
The GCB is a direct survey conducted by Transparency International, with a more diversified 
focus than the CPI. It asks questions around people’s perception of corruption in the present 
and past, their view of trends, propensity of bribes, and it does this by institutions. This is not a 
poll of polls, it is a more direct survey conducted by different Transparency International 
chapters. It employs the same understanding of corruption as the CPI, since they are both under 
Transparency International, and as such, its measurements fits my definition of corruption 
(Transparency International, D 2016). Unfortunately, there has been massive changes in the 
GCB since its start in 2003, up to its latest release in 2013. This makes time comparisons 
difficult.  
                                                          
35 Petty corruption is sometimes used as a synonym for bureaucratic corruption, while grand corruption is 
sometimes used as a synonym for political corruption.  
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Political and Bureaucratic corruption – International Profiles Database:  
Institutional profiles is a development research organization created by the French Ministry of 
Economics and Finance. Initially, a research project to help develop policy for the French state, 
it became a project in which its results were to be accessible by all.  Its database is created from 
a survey in which experts and people are asked to grade the institutions of their country. They 
have had four rounds of their survey, with published databases from 2001, 2006, 2009 and 
2012, covering 51 base countries, and 80% of world GDP (Institutional Profiles Database 
2016). Transparency International, further consolidating the quality of this database, has used 
their data. The reason for using this specific database is that they gather perceptions on distinctly 
two different types of corruption, which fit with my conceptualization of corruption, political 
and bureaucratic corruption and it potentially allows me to test an important hypothesis in this 
thesis, namely the effect of different types of corruption. I have gathered the data from these 
four publications manually, added them together to create panel data, and merged it with the 
two other datasets.  
Choosing one:  
Only one of these corruption measures can be specified for each regression model. This is 
because they measure the same thing, and as such can be expected to have an extremely high 
degree of multicollinearity.36 Three factors were given weight when choosing one measurement 
over the others. The first is validity. Transparency International and the World Bank measure 
are very similar, and score well considering the definition of corruption in this thesis. The 
Global Corruption Barometers measurement uses the same definition of corruption, but it is 
more oriented towards sector specific corruption. The second is reliability. Again, Transparency 
International and the World Bank is equal, while the Global Corruption Barometer has changed 
fundamentally several times since its start. The third factor is coverage. The Global Corruption 
Barometer goes only from 2004 to 2012, with 504 observations. This makes it an inferior 
measure to the other two. The World Bank measure goes from 1996 to 2012, with 2629 
observations. Transparency International’s measure is slightly superior in this regard, starting 
in 1995 with 2429 observations. When the variables are lagged (see method chapter), this will 
cause the World Bank measure to lose more observations than Transparency’s. In addition, 
Transparency Internationals measure is more used by the literature than any others are.  
                                                          
36 The corruption variables CPI and CoC have a 0.97 value of collinearity in a correlations matrix! 
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For robustness and extra assurance, I ran two separate regressions with the World Bank measure 
and the Transparency International measure. The coefficients have the same sign, significance 
and almost the same size, which is expected due to their extremely high collinearity value.37  
4.2.1.1. Perception-based measures 
The dominant way to measure corruption since the 90s has been with perception-based surveys 
and expert interviews. Most of the major indices, as mentioned above, such as, the CPI, GCB, 
IPD and the CoC are all perception-based measures. These ways of measuring corruption 
however, has faced much critique because of their inherent systematic bias, and relative 
poorness as good proxies for actual levels of corruption (Heywood 2015a, 137). Several 
scholars point out that the very bias the aggregation methods in the CPI and CoC was supposed 
to counter, is worsened, due to the errors not being random such as Kaufmann argued and 
assumed, but systematic (Heywood 2015a, 143). In addition, perceptions of corruption has been 
argued to instead of representing current levels of corruption, they represent a more general 
record of corruption in the country due to people’s inherent memory bias, often creating 
cynicism. This is a large problem if the point of the measure is to help the formulation of policies 
against corruption, or as in this thesis, analyze effects at a given place, time, or over time (Rose 
2015, 172). The bias created for this measurement also translates into measurement bias, which 
is a type of specification bias in the linear regression (see section 5.1).  
Because I am forced to use perceptions based data, I reflected long on this issue, and one 
argument came to mind. One could argue that MNC’s do not have a different ability than we 
do to observe reality. As such, their decisions might in turn be affected by corruption as it is 
measured by these flawed measures, not as corruption truly is. If employing a post-positivistic 
ontological view this is not a very un-realistic assumption (Guba and Lincoln 1994). We view 
the world imperfectly, and reality as we see it is affected by what we do, in this case the 
measures and results we publish on corruption. In terms of using perceptions-based data for 
estimating effects on other peoples’ decisions (MNC’s in my case), perception data might not 
be so flawed after all. It is important however to keep in mind that the measures of corruption 
might have a systematic bias, and one needs to be aware of this when interpreting results. 
                                                          
37 It has been noted in the literature that the corruption variables are counterintuitively measured, as low 
values indicate higher corruption and vice versa. Some few decide to rescale the corruption variable (Kolstad 
and Wiig 2013; Cuervo-Cazurra 2008), while many others do not (Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Egger and Winner 
2005; Reiter and Steensma 2010; Teixeira and Guimarães 2015). I chose not to rescale.  
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The only solutions to the critique above on perceptions based corruption data is; to create more 
sensitive indices (which is extremely difficult and opens up to new criticism of choices). To 
create an index of actual cases of corruption (of course this will be biased by the fact that 
corruption is largely a hidden phenomenon and not universally criminalized), and to conduct 
qualitative studies instead, and sacrifice generalizability for validity (Heywood 2015a, 146–
150). As such, there is no universal solution to measuring corruption, although consensus on 
the concept would definitely help.  
4.2.2. Natural resources and Extractive sectors 
Natural resources is seen in the literature as a large motivator for FDI. This makes sense, as it 
taps into and represents an entire motive for FDI nearly by itself, namely resource seeking FDI 
(see section 2.1.3). Theoretically, I see this as meaning that even though the market and 
efficiency motivations for a foreign direct investment might be low, negative or of no 
consequence, available natural resources can, on its own, attract FDI, thus countering the 
predicted FDI flow based on market seeking and efficiency seeking variables. Natural resources 
is therefore an important control variable. As a proxy for available natural resources I use the 
sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft),mineral rents, and forest rents, 
divided by GDP, so we get the extractive sectors percentage of total value added to the nation’s 
economy. This follows the operationalization of Warner and Sachs, which many have based 
their operationalization on (Kolstad and Wiig 2011; Sachs and Warner 1995) This variable is 
measured by the World Development Indicators project of the World Bank. Since I am 
interested in the effect of large natural resources, because the smaller size of the natural 
resources, the lesser the attraction of MNC investment, I create a dummy variable. All countries 
that have an extractive sector of 30 percent or larger of total GDP is treated as a country with a 
large natural resources. This also effectively removes countries that are not very dependent on 
their extractive resources.38 If countries are highly diversified and can rely on rents from all 
sorts of sectors, they may not have the same incentive to demand anything in return from 
multinational companies, or require anything in return from multinational companies. By using 
this natural resource dummy and an interaction to corruption, it becomes a theoretically 
interesting independent variable, potentially affecting the effect of corruption on FDI inflows. 
Because natural resources are potentially important for FDI inflow, I use the original natural 
                                                          
38 I also ran a regression with 20 percent as the cut off, but the results did not change much. The coefficient 
became somewhat smaller in the fifth estimation.  
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resource variable as a control variable in all regressions, except for the regression that measures 
the effect of corruption on FDI in countries with large natural resources.  
4.2.3. Democracy and non-democracy 
Polity IV measures autocratic and democratic countries on a continuous quality scale between 
-10 (completely autocratic) and 10 (full democracy). It does this by measuring several sub-
indicators such as civil liberties, political institutions and checks and balances. Because the 
theoretical interest is whether democracy or non-democracy affects the effect of corruption on 
FDI inflow, I create a dummy from this variable.39 Based on Polity IV’s own categorization, I 
create a dummy called democracy that contains all countries with a score of six or higher. This 
is in accordance with Polity IV and their technical note, that states that all countries with a score 
of six or higher are democratic countries (Polity IV 2016). This dummy variable is interacted 
with the corruption variable, to estimate the effect of corruption in democratic countries.  
4.2.4. Quality of Institutions 
Much of the literature that argues that corruption is a deterrent for FDI does so by arguing that 
corruption decays the quality of political institutions, such as the bureaucracy and the rule of 
law (see section 3.2 and 3.3.). This is extremely difficult to model, as corruption is potentially 
endogenous to the quality of institutions, which would make the collinearity values high (see 
correlations matrix, appendix 9.1). To see if the effect of corruption upon FDI inflows is 
different in countries with a relatively high quality in relevant institutions I add two variables 
from the World Banks Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), namely the quality of 
governmental and state institutions and the quality of the rule of law. Because of theoretical 
interest and due to collinearity issues I create a dummy variable for both of them. The countries 
that score higher than zero on the measurement is coded as one (high quality), and those who 
score zero or less are coded zero (low quality).40 This allows me to test whether corruption’s 
effect on FDI, to the degree that we can separate the effect from the quality of institutions, is 
affected by the quality in these institutions. While this test is theoretically valid because 
corruption and quality of political institutions are two different things, though potentially 
endogenous, it rests on the premise that there can be high corruption in countries with high 
quality in political institutions, and vice versa. In my opinion, it is clear that corruption does 
                                                          
39 I could have selected the ACLP democracy variable which is a dichotomous variable originally, but it had 
shorter coverage than Polity IV.  
40 The cut off for the dummy is chosen based on the methodology of the WGI, (WGI 2016) 
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exist in countries that have high quality in political institutions. As the introduction presented, 
several corruption scandals surface on a yearly basis in countries such as Norway, Denmark, 
Sweden, the United States, France, Germany, and so on. Italy, for example, is a country that 
scores well on the quality of institutions measurements (top 70 percentile), but poor on 
corruption (score 44 of 100).  
The WGI is a dataset that measures the perceptions of people on the quality of governance by 
employing many business, citizen and expert surveys in all types of countries. The data is not 
gathered directly, but by different research institutes, NGO’s and private firms. The variables 
in the index are all measured from -2.5 (poor quality) to 2.5 (good quality). They also have a 
control of corruption variable, which I have presented earlier in this chapter.  
The rule of law variable is measured as “the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society; and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (WGI 2016) 
The quality of governmental and state institutions is measured as: “perceptions of the quality 
of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies” (WGI 2016). 
4.2.5. International condemnation and pressure 
Another external factor that could affect the effect of corruption on FDI is how corruption is 
viewed by the public, degree of criminalization and degree of reputational damage through 
media coverage. There is no doubt that both the accessibility of information through the media 
and internet has changed drastically, but also in the formulation of laws against corruption for 
multinational corporations has there been huge changes, and one can argue that the moral view 
on corruption has changed in the public. Based on the enactment of the conventions and laws 
presented in section 3.6, I create a time dummy variable from the descriptive variable in the 
Quality of Government dataset, year. By interacting this with corruption, one can measure 
whether corruption has different effects on FDI inflows after the year of 2000 than before. As 
this is a descriptive and sorting variable in the dataset, it is available for all countries at all times 
in the sample. All years before 2000 takes the value zero, while all the years on and after 2000 




4.2.6. Developing countries.  
To see if corruption’s effect on FDI inflow is affected by the level of development in a country, 
I add the United Nations Developments Program’s variable on human development. This is an 
often used proxy for a country’s level of development, even though it does not claim to measure 
the entirety of development. The level of human development is also highly correlated to the 
level of infrastructure, urbanization and economic prosperity in a country. As such, a high score 
on the Human Development Index (HDI) also usually indicates the maturity of the state, its 
institutions, and its effectiveness.41 I created one dummy variable from the HDI variable. All 
countries that score 0.7 or higher is classified as developed countries and coded 0, while the 
countries that score 0.69 or lower is classified as less developed countries and coded 1. The 
values for the dichotomization is chosen from the technical note and the ranging scheme of the 
UNDP itself (UNDP 2016). 
4.3. Control variables  
In addition to the independent variables listed here, which are of theoretical interest to this 
thesis, I add the following control variables that are not of theoretical interest, but are potentially 
important determinants of FDI inflow: GDP, GDP growth, taxes, volatility of inflation, 
export/import and natural resources. All these variables have proven important determinants in 
the foreign direct investment literature, and to exclude them would probably cause my models 
to be underspecified, causing a specification bias. As was touched upon in section 2.1.2, the 
control variables also represent the three different motivations of FDI, resource seeking, market 
seeking and efficiency seeking.   
I have chosen to measure market size as absolute GDP. It has been pointed out though that this 
measure has some weaknesses. It could measure the size of the population, as opposed to the 
actual size of a market. The alternative is to use GDP per capita. However, GDP per capita will 
underestimate strong economies with large populations, such as the USA for example (Blonigen 
2005). In addition, even though absolute GDP may reflect larger population, not larger markets 
due to low income levels in the population, this might not be a real issue anyway. People do not 
need to have the living and income standard of for example Norwegians to purchase goods. It 
is not only the most affluent countries that have populations that can buy goods that are not 
                                                          
41 Note that there is a discussion in academia as to the validity of the UN, IMF and World Bank measures for 
developed / less developed countries. For more detail, see (Nielsen 2011).  
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strictly necessary. I therefore chose to use absolute GDP as the measure of market size.42 The 
variable is measured in the World Development Indicators at the World Bank. It is available in 
the QoG dataset and is measured in millions of power parity purchasing US dollars. 
Economic stability is expected to be important for multinational corporations when deciding to 
invest in a country or not. A steady level of inflation is preferable, as it makes budgeting, 
planning and investing easier, and it implies a stable and foreseeable economy. High inflation 
or volatile inflation indicates an unstable economy where growth, employment and trust in 
financial markets is dynamic. Thus, the conditions for an investment might change relatively 
quickly (Asiedu 2002). Due to some extreme values, this variable has been logarithmically 
transformed.  
The effect of tax levels on FDI inflow is somewhat contested. Several scholars find that higher 
taxes decrease FDI inflow, some find that taxes are not that important, while some find that 
higher taxes increases FDI inflow (Blonigen 2005). It is considered an important determinant 
though, and as such I include it in my models. Level of taxes is measured as the total average 
level of taxes on income, profits, and capital gains and are levied on the actual or presumptive 
net income of individuals, on the profits of corporations and enterprises, and on capital gains, 
whether realized or not, on land, securities, and other assets. The variable is measured by the 
World Development Indicators at the World Bank.  
Openness to trade is supposed to reflect the attitude of a country towards foreigners in their 
economy. The more trade, the more open and positive the country is expected to be. This is 
important because it is conducive to market friendly policies and good investment climates 
(Blonigen 2005). Openness to trade is measured as the sum of export and imports, divided by 
GDP. This tells us how large part of the economy trade with other nations is. The variable is 
measured by the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Due to some extreme 
values, this variable has been logarithmically transformed.  
Market growth is potentially an important variable of FDI inflow. It is closely tied to market 
size and follows the same logic. If an economy is swiftly growing, there are many opportunities 
to “get in on the action”. As such, the higher growth, the more potential, and the more likely it 
is that FDI flows will increase. The higher the growth, the larger the market becomes as well, 
                                                          
42 I also ran a regression with GDP per capita as the control variable. While the coefficient size changed some, 
significance levels and the sign was the same. In addition, there were no substantial change in significance for all 
the other variables in the regression.  
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which will attract market seeking FDI (Alon 2010). Market growth and potential is measured 
as GDP percentage growth, and is measured by the World Development Indicators at the World 
Bank.  
4.4. Descriptive characteristics of the data 
The descriptive statistics for my variables are presented in table 5 below. Instead of only using 
the regular summary command in STATA, I first use a special summary command that  reports 
the within and between standard deviations of the variables (xtsum). This will allow us to see 
the ratio of within and between variance the independent variables have.  
Table 6: Within and Between variation 
 
Variable  Between st. deviation  Within st. deviation 
FDI inflow 2.490 1.379 
Corruption (TI) 2.041 0.430 
Bureaucratic corruption 1.028 0.545 
Political corruption 0.930 0.459 
Democracy 6.225.  2.020 
Human Development Index 0.161 0.022 
Bureaucratic Quality 0.981 0.185 
Political Stability 0.968 0.304 
Quality of Rule of Law 0.979 0.175 
GDP growth  4.666 4.968 
GDP 1.28 3.27 
Extractive sector/GDP 14.252 5.476 
Taxes 11.816 4.576 
Export and Import/GDP 43.755 16.84 
Inflation rate volatility (%) 16.400 33.391 
 
This table clearly shows that for the majority of the variables, the majority of the variance is 
between countries. If one were to run a fixed effects model to test the effects of these variables 
upon FDI, the between variation would be controlled out and we would estimate only the within 
variance. Some of the independent variables do reveal a large amount of variance over time. 
Market potential measured as GDP growth and market size measured as GDP naturally has the 
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most variance over time. What is interesting however is that they do have surprisingly large 
between variation as well. The reason for the majority of within variance is from the nature of 
the variables, the size of an economy does grow over time, and that is reflected in the within 
variance. Economic stability, measured as the change in inflation rates, also has its majority of 
variance from the within component, which indicates that inflation rates have been unstable 
over time. 
Table 7: Regular characteristics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
FDI(log) 3300 6.148 2.748 -11.512 12.657 
Corruption, CPI (TI) 2429 4.284 2.216 0.4 10 
Bureaucratic 
Corruption, IPD 
200 1.695 1.157 0 4 
Political  
corruption, IPD 
200 1.957 1.031 0 4 
Polity IV  2901 3.294 6.547 -10 10 
HDI 1238 0.667 0.163 0.262 0.943 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
2629 -0.060 .997 -2.450 2.429 
Political  
stability 
2646 -0.645 0.999 -3.32 1.668 
Quality of Rule 
of Law 
2686 -0.068 0.992 -2.668 1.999 
Market  
potential 
3288 4.129 5.672 -47.552 106.278 
Market size 3174 3.92 1.34 2.33 1.60 
Natural  
resources 
3305 9.955 15.186 0 94.640 
Taxes 1849 22.569 12.642 0.348 75.237 
Trade(log) 3136 4.338 0.546 -1.175 6.331 
Economic 
stability(log) 
3133 1.542 1.157 -5.115 6.900 
 
From the regular summary table above we can observe that there are large differences in 
amounts of observations on the different variables. FDI inflow for example, has 3300 
observations, while HDI has 1208.43 This can cause a high number of missing observations in 
the regression. There is also large variation in FDI inflow. This is good, because little variation 
would make it difficult to measure impacts of the independent variables. As mentioned above, 
                                                          
43 Initially the observations for the independent variables were slightly higher. However, as will be discussed in 
section 5.1 and 5.6 I lag the independent variables to attempt to remedy the issue of reverse causality and 




FDI has been logged, and the negative values dropped. However, values between zero and one 
that are transformed will become negatives, and this is ok. The problem is when you have values 
that are negative before the transformation. As such, the minimum value is still a negative, -
11.5, while the maximum is 12.6. In addition, corruption shows much variation with 
observations all over the zero to ten scale with a total of 2429 observations. In general, this 
dataset has many observations, which is one of the benefits of panel data. The exception is the 
two variables from IPD, which will only be used for one model with 200 observations each. 
Further, the Polity IV measure of democracy has much variation, and so does the Human 
Development Index, with observations covering nearly the entire scale and relatively large 
standard deviations from the mean. However, the Human Development Index does have 
relatively few observations, compared to the other variables. This is also reflected in the 
regression model with the HDI as an explanatory variable, where the total n drops to 1025. The 
quality of political institutions variables also displays solid variation with over 2600 
observations. These have very similar coverage due to being from the same dataset. The fact 
that variables such as these, which do not have much variation over time (within), display such 
variation reflects the fact that the data sample is highly diversified in regards to country 
coverage. This is a good quality to have in a dataset.  
One of the downsides of my dataset is that of missing observations. As such, when ordering the 
dataset by country and year in STATA, I am notified that the dataset is unbalanced. This is 
mostly due to the fact that I have merged several datasets together, and the raw datasets have 
varying coverage. Missing observations are not usually an issue, as long as the missing 
observations are not systematic. If the missing observations are systematic, then the reason they 
are missing is somehow correlated to the dependent variable (Verbeek 2004, 381). I do not see 
any correlation between foreign direct investment, and the fact that for example the values for 
foreign direct investment inflow is missing from Afghanistan in 1997 and 1998.  Because my 
time series starts in 1995 (96 with lag) and ends in 2012 I avoid the most common repercussion 
of missing observations, namely that of heavily underrepresented low developed and/or non-
democratic countries. If the time series had started in 1970, developed and democratic countries 
would have been heavily overrepresented, giving us misleading coefficients for a general 
relationship. Values can be imputed manually to decrease the number of missing values. 
However, this requires that we have some data to justify our guess. The large majority of the 
missing values in my dataset are from countries that simply have no coverage in one of the raw 
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datasets, and as such we have no origin or point to estimate from.44 In addition, many missing 
observations come from countries that are covered later than others, such as Afghanistan. Of 
the control variables that are included in every regression, taxes has relatively low observations 
and causes many missing observations.  In fact, over 600 observations are lost when adding the 
taxes variable to the regression. I therefore run my baseline regressions without that variable, 
but I add regression results with it in a column because it is has proved significant in other 
studies.  
Because the missing observations are not systematic, there is no particular danger in employing 
the unbalanced dataset.  
4.5. Country sample  
Because I am most interested in global trends, I do not narrow my sample of countries to for 
example African countries or Western countries. In addition, several of the interactions I run 
requires that I have a good spread and coverage of country types (i.e less/highly developed, 
highly corrupt/little corruption, highly institutionalized/lowly institutionalized). As such I 
include all the countries I can to approximate a world sample. Initially the Quality of 
Government dataset contains 211 countries. However, the UNCTAD dataset contains only 179 
countries between 1995 and 2012. The majority of these “missing countries” is due to the fact 
that the countries do not exist anymore in the time period I study. Only a few countries are left 
out due to non-coverage.45 The coverage of countries is very broad and relatively balanced for 
my time period. All the regions of the world is represented by several countries. In the majority 
of the regression models, the number of countries is 171. The only variables that has a 
significantly lower coverage of countries is the political and bureaucratic corruption variables, 
and the economic control variable, taxes. In these regression models the number of countries is 
47 and 140. 
 
 
                                                          
44 For example, Andorra is simply not covered in the UNCTAD database, but it is covered in the Quality of 
Government database, thus generating missing observations.  
45 Countries such as the Soviet Union exist in the Quality of Government dataset, because it starts in 1946. In the 
time period I am studying however, the Soviet Union no longer exists, and as such has no data on the variables, 
and becomes a “missing country”. The full list of countries that are dropped for different reasons is available in 
appendix 9.3 and the complete list of the 171 countries in the majority of the regressions is also available there.  
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5.0. Method  
This chapter will describe and discuss my choice of method, the linear regression, my choice 
of data, panel data, my choice of estimation technique, within and between random effects 
estimation and GEE estimation, the method of multiplicative interactions and in the end 
summarize my choices and attempts to fix econometric issues. With this chapter, I hope to make 
the differences in estimations clear, and clarify why it is so important to choose the correct one 
in regards to what our research question is.  
5.1. The nature and assumptions of linear regression.  
Linear regression models attempt to create a best possible fitted line to describe changes in 
some variable of interest (dependent variable, D.V.) by using a certain amount of variables to 
explain the changes that happen (independent variables, I.V.). However, simply finding a best 
fitted linear line based on our data is usually not enough. We want to be able to say more, we 
want to be able to infer our findings from our sample into a larger universe or population. We 
want to establish that there is a fundamental relationship between our variables of interest, not 
a historical or context specific coincidence. As such, the method of regression is based on 
statistical theory, so that if our results hold, we can generalize our findings. The basis of a linear 
regression model is usually  
1) 𝛾 = 𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑋2+ . . . + 𝛽𝐾𝑋𝐾 +  𝜀  
In equation 1, 𝛾 is our dependent variable, 𝛽1 is the constant value of our dependent variable, 
also called  the intercept term, and the other β’s are the coefficients of the independent variables 
that are X, which we believe explains the changes or variation in 𝛾. 𝜀 is the error term, which 
contains all of the variation in 𝛾 that we don’t explain with the independent variables we have 
included. Now, for this model to have any actual meaning beyond the sample on which we base 
the values of our dependent and independent variables we need to make certain statistical theory 
assumptions, which, if they hold, will allow us to extend our results to a greater population from 
which our sample has been collected. The degree to which they hold will also create certain 
attractive characteristics in our regression model, namely: Best Linear Unbiased Estimates or 
BLUE (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 60). In econometrics books, they distinguish between 
parameters, often using the symbol β, and the estimator, often symbolized by b. In this thesis, 
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when I write equations or use symbols for the equation, they always represent the estimator, if 
not specified as the parameter.  
1. The first assumption is that our model is indeed linear in its parameters. If the actual 
relation between Y and X in the population is not linear, then we cannot hope to fit a 
good linear line on the relationship between Y and X with our coefficients (β). It follows 
from this logic, that our model needs to be correctly specified (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 
97). A model can be misspecified a number of different ways; omitting a relevant 
variable, including an irrelevant variable, using the incorrect functional form and errors 
can be made in the measurement process.  
As for my model, there are some clear issues that are important to be aware of and control for 
if possible. While I have added the most used variables to explain FDI in my estimation there 
is good reason to think that some relevant variables are left out. This can cause our included 
estimators (β) to be biased, if they are correlated to the relevant variables left out (omitted 
variable bias and unobserved heterogeneity, see discussion below). If the variable that was left 
out is not correlated to the other independent variables it can still affect the variance in the 
estimation, causing unnecessarily high standard errors, increasing our chance of committing a 
type two error (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 223).46 The variables selected for my estimation have, 
as described in chapter 4, a good theoretical and empirical reason to be there. They are of 
theoretical importance in the field of FDI, and they have been used previously by other studies 
and found to be significant. I therefore do not suspect that my model suffers from inclusion of 
irrelevant variables. In addition, almost all the control variables are continuously significant in 
nearly all my models.  
With regards to errors in measurement there are certainly issues with my model, due to a few 
variables. This has been discussed in chapter 4 for the variables in question. It is particularly in 
the variables that are aggregated from perception (corruption), expert interviews and surveys 
(the quality of institutions) that might be measured wrongly or contain a certain systematic bias. 
In addition, it could be that the error in measurement is caught up by the error term, causing the 
issue of a correlation with the independent variable and the error term. This is a constant issue 
with social science data, and it is important to consider this while interpreting our coefficients 
and drawing inferences. In effect, these sort of measurement errors can cause biased variables, 
                                                          
46 There are two types of errors in regards to hypothesis testing. A type one error is to reject the null hypothesis 
when we should not have. A type two error is to keep the null hypothesis, when it should have been discarded 
(Gujarati and Porter 2010, 500) 
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as they do not reflect the real universe or population.47 There are also many missing 
observations on several variables in my dataset. This is a normal problem when working with 
large datasets and particularly with merged datasets. This has been discussed in the descriptive 
statistics section (4.4).  
As for the functional form of my model, scatterplot and histogram has been used to see if a 
linear model is the right estimation to estimate FDI inflow. The results showed that while 
following a linear form to a certain degree, there are some serious spikes and outliers, which 
will not fit well on a linear function. This has been pointed out in previous literature as well, 
and the recommended fix for this is to log FDI inflows. Once this had been done, new histogram 
and scatterplot revealed a much better fit for a linear regression (See appendix 9.4). This also 
ties into the assumption of normality, which is discussed below.  
2. The second assumption is that our independent variables (X) are uncorrelated to the 
error term, ε. If our independent variables are correlated to the error term, we cannot 
estimate unbiased coefficients.  
E(𝑋𝑘, ε) = 048 
When the independent variables are not correlated to the error term, they are often described as 
being exogenous. As such, when they are correlated to the error term, they are described as 
endogenous. Endogeneity is in the econometric literature a term for a group of phenomena that 
correlates the independent variables to the error term, and thus to the dependent variable 
(Woolridge, 2002, p. 50). However, many political scientists relates endogeneity directly to 
reverse causality and simultaneity (Bell and Jones 2015, 138). As such, for all the other chapters 
of this thesis, econometric issues are referred to by their most direct name (i.e unobserved 
heterogeneity, reverse causality), and not as a form of endogeneity. Most notable and relevant 
for my analysis are unobserved heterogeneity, measurement error, simultaneity and reverse 
causality.  
Unobserved heterogeneity:  
As mentioned above, any relevant variable not included into our model will become a part of 
the error term (because ε equals the parameter 𝛾 minus the estimated 𝛾). This can cause the 
issue known as unobserved heterogeneity, which causes biased estimators. The issue of 
                                                          
47 However, see argument in section 4.2.1.1 on perception based measures, MNC decisions and ontological view.  
48 This is simply a mathematical expression of the assumption, to make it perfectly clear what assumption I am 
writing about.  
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unobserved heterogeneity is a source of much discussion because it has large implications for 
the estimation method. The issue of unobserved heterogeneity will be discussed to great length 
below (see section 5.2 and 5.3). The common fixes for this issue is to employ a fixed effects 
model, or use instrumental variables (Woolridge 2002, 51).49 
Measurement error:  
When the measurement error of a variable causes information that is relevant for explaining our 
dependent variable to drop out of our model, this information will become a part of the error 
term. If this information has a correlation to the variable we have measured wrongly, there will 
be a correlation between the included independent variable and the error term (Woolridge 2002, 
68). This has been discussed above.  
Simultaneity and reversed causality:  
If 𝛾 has an impact on 𝑋2, meaning that the causality does not run the way we hypothesize, or it 
runs both ways, we cannot assume that  𝑋2 is independent from the error term. For example, if 
corruption not only affects the level of FDI inflow, but somehow the level of FDI inflow affects 
corruption as well, our estimation will be biased, if we do not take this into account (Verbeek, 
2008, p. 138).  
The most common situation this happens in, is if 𝛾 and 𝑋2 are simultaneously determined. In 
economics, this refers to systems where several closely related variables are determined in 
common equations (Verbeek 2008, 138; Woolridge 2002, 68). Take Verbeeks own example of 
the Keynesian consumption function. We want to determine the function of aggregate income 
on aggregate consumption. However, aggregate income is not an exogenous variable to 
consumption, because aggregate income is calculated from aggregate consumption and 
aggregate total investment in the economy. Thus, 𝛾 and 𝑋2 are jointly or simultaneously 
determined. Because 𝛾 affects 𝑋2 the assumption that E(𝑋𝑘, ε) = 0 does not hold (Verbeek 
2008, 139).  
The issue of reverse causality and simultaneity between FDI and corruption, which are the main 
variables of interest in this thesis, is a known issue in the literature (see section 3.8.2). This is 
also nicely illustrated by the fact that there is a literature, albeit far smaller, on the effect FDI 
has on the levels of corruption in a country (Kwok and Tadesse 2006). As such, I see a clear 
                                                          
49 Note that a fixed effects model only controls for the between variation unobserved heterogeneity (the group 




potential issue with reverse causality and simultaneity in my models. The problem of omitted 
variables causing heterogeneity bias is certainly a concern (see section 5.2 and 5.3), and I am 
well aware of the potential measurement errors on perception based variables. However, I do 
not see it as likely that the error in measuring corruption is correlated to the error term 
(Woolridge 2002, 68). A reason for this is the argument that MNC’s FDI decisions would also 
be based on flawed information (see section 4.2.1.1.).  
There are several ways to handle the subcategories of endogeneity. For reverse causality, 
lagging the independent variables in question is a treatment that has been very common in 
political science (Bellemare, Masaki, and Pepinsky 2015, 1), although it has lately been argued 
that it does not solve the issue. The most recommended fix is to use an external instrumental 
variable to correct for the bias (Verbeek 2008, 140–141).  As for simultaneity, one can perform 
simultaneous equations, use external instruments or employ other estimators such as GMM. 
One can also lag the independent variable as with reverse causality, although again according 
to new literature, this does not really solve the issue (Al-sadig 2009, 273; Bellemare, Masaki, 
and Pepinsky 2015, 29; Freckleton, Wright, and Craigwell 2012, 644). For the unobserved 
heterogeneity bias, one must either employ a certain estimation technique (fixed, random and 
within and between will be discussed), or use external instruments. It is important to keep in 
mind that remedies for econometric issues do not produce perfect models, they however 
alleviate the problem to a degree so that hopefully, our models are not so wrong as to not be of 
use.  
3. The third assumption is that the error term, ε, follows a normal distribution (normally a 
t-distribution), and as such has an expected average value of zero. This is key for 
generating standard errors and performing hypothesis testing (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 
97). When the error term is normally distributed it is also independently and identically 
distributed (IID). 
𝐸(𝜀) = 0 
This assumption is often referred to the normality assumption. Breaking this assumption would 
lead to issues when calculating the standard errors and thus t values of our independent 
variables. It would not cause bias or ineffectiveness in the estimators. While several of my 
variables depict skewedness to a certain degree (which could cause a break in the normality 
assumption) in histograms, it will not be a problem in most of my models. The Central Limit 
Theorem ensures that with a large sample size (usually >200) the disturbance term will 
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approximate a normal distribution. However, the variables on political and bureaucratic 
corruption only have 200 observations, and as such, they might be affected if normality was an 
issue. To be sure of this, I run the shapiro-francia test of normality (see appendix 9.5). The test 
is significant for most variables which indicates that the variables do not follow a normal 
distribution.50 However, these tests are susceptible to creating significant results for large 
sample sizes. My variables usually have over 1500 observations each. I thus choose to rely on 
the central limit theorem. For the political corruption model this caveat will be kept in mind as 
a potential weakness.  
4. The fourth assumption is that the variance of the error term is homoscedastic. This 
means that on average, the spread of the variance is equal on both sides of the mean 
value for all of the observations, and is constant. If this is true, the variance of our 
independent variables will also be homoscedastic (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 97). 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜀𝑖) =  𝜎
2 
It is commonly known in the field of econometrics that heteroscedasticity is very usual in cross-
sectional data. A simple example illustrates this. If we want to measure the effect of personal 
disposable income on the degree of savings people do, it is illogical to believe that people that 
are rich and people that are poor will have the same degree of variance in their degree of saving 
due to increased income. Rich people can afford to save more, and thus will have a higher level 
of variance than the poor, who will find it difficult to save money (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 
275). When countries are the unit of measurement, we often also get issues with 
heteroscedasticity due to issues of scale. GDP measured in the US will have a much larger 
variance than GDP measured in Norway, simply because the US is a much larger country and 
has a much larger absolute scale of GDP. I run a residual scatterplot to see if there are any 
indications of heteroscedasticity. As suspected, the residuals follow an upwards funnel shape, 
indicating heteroscedasticity (see appendix 9.6 for result). This can cause my model to be either 
positively or negatively biased in its estimation of the standard errors, removing the BLUE traits 
of our estimators. This makes our hypothesis testing, and therefore our ability to infer or 
generalize, compromised. We can no longer trust our standard errors and t values (Gujarati and 
Porter 2010, 280). The issue of heteroscedasticity can be countered in several ways. One can 
estimate with special techniques that allow us to conduct a variance stabilizing transformation, 
                                                          




such as weighted least squares. Another possibility is to logarithmically transform the variable 
in question. One can also employ robust standard errors that cluster variance around the unit of 
analysis (countries).  
5. Assumption number five states that there can be no autocorrelation between the error 
terms of different observations. This means that there can be no dependency or structural 
relation between the values taken on a given variable across time and space. 
 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜀𝑖 𝜀𝑗) = 0. Where “i” and “j” indicate two different observations on the same unit.  
While heteroscedasticity is common in cross sectional data, autocorrelation is common in time 
series data. This is logical given the nature of how we measure our data in a time series. If there 
is no dependency between two observations of, let us say GDP, then that means that GDP could 
just as likely take any other value as opposed to some percentage increase of the last 
observation. Since observations of GDP usually are based on the observation preceding it, with 
a given percentage growth, there is clear correlation between the values in these two time 
observations, and thus also in our error terms. This type of effect dependency is often referred 
to as inertia or sluggishness (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 312 – 315). The consequence of 
autocorrelation is, like heteroscedasticity, that our estimators will no longer be efficient. They 
will be either negatively or positively biased, producing standard errors and T scores that are 
unreliable (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 316). In my dataset, which is a panel, all of my variables 
are likely to suffer from autocorrelation. Variables such as GDP, trade, and GDP growth will 
probably be affected by inertia, measures of corruption are usually based on the previous year 
measure, and the same is true for most of my quality of institutions variables such as quality of 
rule of law and bureaucracy. I have run a Wooldridge test, which conducts an autoregressive 1 
year lag scheme to see if there is high correlation between the residual and its corresponding 
one-year lag of the independent variables. It is highly significant for nearly all the variables,51 
indicating that my independent variables are affected by autocorrelation (see appendix 9.7). The 
suggested way of dealing with autocorrelation is to transform the variables so that the values 
are no longer auto-correlated. These transformations usually calculate the degree to which a 
value is dependent on the value preceding it, and subtracts this. These transformations are often 
referred to as generalized difference models. Another suggestion is the use of robust standard 
                                                          
51 Market potential and trade show signs of no autocorrelation. However, when logarithmically transformed, 
trade is significant for autocorrelation.  
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errors, which attempts to correct for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Gujarati and 
Porter 2010, 325). 
I also ran the Wooldridge test on the dependent variable, FDI inflow. It reveals that FDI inflow 
is very dependent on last year’s value (up to 82 percent). This is known as an AR 1 issue 
(Autoregressive 1). 52 A common procedure to account for this is to add the one year lagged 
version of the dependent variable as an independent variable. This is not an unproblematic 
treatment though. By adding the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the 
equation, we expose the model to very high multicollinearity and make it difficult to achieve 
any significant coefficients, as well as theoretical and logical issues in the interpretation. 
Another solution is, as with autocorrelation in the independent variables, to use a 
transformation. The Prais-Winsten transformation is a known treatment in the field, and is a 
form of generalized difference model. It essentially calculates the degree to which a model 
relies on the previous year’s variance, and then subtracts this. However, through mathematical 
manipulation it allows us to keep the first year observations, thus not transforming the values 
into pure yearly change values (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 326). The Prais-Winsten 
transformation is not directly accessible for panel data in STATA. However, the STATA 
forums and Jeffrey Woolridge himself, recommends the “xtgee” command, which utilizes 
generalized estimation equations (STATA Forum 2015). This command allows us to specify 
that we have an AR 1 issue, and it uses a Prais-Winsten transformation to control for this. The 
generalized estimation equations is somewhat technically different from random effects 
estimation, but not substantially different and the results they produce are extremely similar 
(Gardiner, Luo, and Roman 2009, 235). Another issue that relates to autocorrelation is the issue 
of stationarity.  
Stationarity:  
When using a time dimension as one does in panel data, the issue of non-stationarity can be a 
problem. Stationarity is present in a given variable if its mean, variance and 
covariance/autocorrelation is constant across all 𝑡. Essentially, it states that you may have data 
that violates the assumptions of linear regression, but those flaws need to be constant. This 
assumption can be broken by for example trends in data, which is quite usual in economic 
variables such as GDP and GDP growth. If there is non-stationarity in our data, it can lead to a 
                                                          
52 This is also obvious from Model 1 where I report the rho value for the fixed and random effects estimations. 
The larger the rho value, the larger amount of the variance of the dependent variable is explained by the previous 
value of the dependent variable itself.  
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spurious regression. This will cause us to make a type one mistake (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 
380). I have run the test “xtfisher” in STATA, which checks if there is any unit roots in the 
variables, signifying stationarity. Most of my variables are significant in the test, which rejects 
non-stationarity (see appendix 9.8). However, as expected GDP shows non-stationarity and 
somewhat surprisingly democracy also shows signs of non-stationarity, though not as strongly 
as GDP. The proposed fix for this is to transform the non-stationary variables by differencing 
them (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 382–384). However, by using the Prais-Winsten transformation 
in the generalized equations estimation I do employ a differenced estimator. This will then 
alleviate the non-stationarity issue.  
6. The final assumption is that there can be no multicollinearity. Collinearity is the degree 
to which certain variables measure the same variation. If the degree of collinearity is 
high, and the higher it gets, it will affect the collinear estimators in question and produce 
high standard errors. In addition, if two variables are affecting each other are both on 
the right hand side of the regression equation it will cause high multicollinearity.  
When the level of multicollinearity becomes high, we increase the likelihood of committing a 
type two error (Gujarati and Porter 2010, 248). As such, we might include an important variable 
that increases our substantively explained variance of the dependent variable, but because the 
variable is so highly collinear with another independent variable, one of these variables might 
become insignificant, even though they are both substantively important to have in the model. 
An example from my data could be corruption and level of development. These two variables 
measure different theoretical things, but they are highly collinear, measuring up to 72 percent 
of the same variance (see correlations matrix, appendix 9.1). Thus, they might inflate each 
other’s standard errors. Dropping level of development however, would be to commit a 
misspecification error (which as explained above can cause estimator bias), because level of 
development has a theoretical and proved importance of explaining FDI inflows (Reiter and 
Steensma 2010). In my correlations matrix it is quite clear that several of my variables might 
suffer due to multicollinearity. Most notably is corruption and the level of development, 
corruption and governmental and state institutional quality and quality of judicial institutions. 
To see if the multicollinearity is a problem, I run a VIF test on my models and reports this in 
the results. No econometric law defines a tolerance limit for the values on a VIF test, however, 
it is common to worry about multicollinearity when the VIF value comes close to 10 or higher. 
However, if there is high multicollinearity, measured by the VIF test, and the result is still 
significant, these results should still be trusted. In fact, O’Brien argues that if the VIF is very 
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high (>20) and the results still come out as significant, the small difference in variation between 
the two variables in question must be very important, and should not be viewed with skepticism 
at all (O’brien 2007, 683). If the VIF values for any of the regression models is high, this will 
be discussed in the results.   
Due to high multicollinearity in several variables of theoretical interest, I run hypothesis 
specific models to answer the individual hypotheses. This is also in line with one of the most 
common fixes for dealing with multicollinearity, which I criticized above, namely dropping one 
of the variables. However, with hypothesis specific models, at least we do not discard a 
potentially important variable completely; we simply estimate two different models. For 
example, the quality of governmental and state institutions is only added for the model that 
attempts to answer the hypothesis relevant for that variable. The same goes for the variable on 
the quality of judicial institutions. If I had used these highly collinear variables together in all 
my models, they would have drastically increased the multicollinearity of all my models, and 
highly increased the standard errors. To do these hypothesis specific models is a valid solution. 
Firstly, the multicollinearity in several of my independent variables is not there because I 
actually theoretically measure the same things. It is there because the measurements are flawed. 
Secondly, this method is much better than to simply drop several of the independent variables 
and reduce the scope of this thesis, because it achieves the same while still keeping the ability 
to use all of the independent variables of interest, only in different models. This is particularly 
so if we adhere to O’brien’s argument that multicollinearity is not an issue at all, as long as the 
variables come out significant.  
If all these assumptions of the linear regression hold, or holds to a certain degree when using 
other, but similar estimators to the OLS estimation (such as GLS), we can generate standard 
errors for our estimators (𝛽2 𝛽3, ..  ), our estimators will be BLUE, and as such perform valid 
hypothesis testing. By performing hypothesis testing we get results that tell us whether we can, 
with a reasonable level of probability, extend our sample-based results to the wider population 
(Gujarati and Porter 2010, 103–105).  
5.2. Panel data  
Because I am interested in seeing what effect corruption has on FDI inflow, it is natural that I 
study as many countries as possible since FDI is a global phenomenon, using cross sectional 
data. To be able to say anything substantial about corruptions effect on FDI inflow it is also 
very beneficial to add a time dimension. This will allow us to observe what effect changes in 
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variables have. This leaves me with employing time series cross sectional data, or panel data. 
Panel data is built on observations of different units repeatedly over time. As such, it enables 
for more sophisticated, and most importantly, more realistic models than either cross-sectional 
data or time series data separately (Verbeek 2004, 341). It is also the most commonly used type 
of data in comparative political economy, and quickly growing in political science (Beck and 
Katz 2011, 332). There are several advantages in using panel data, such as explanatory power 
and number of observations, but there are also some particular issues concerning the key 
assumptions described above. In my data, the cross-sectional unit of observation is country and 
the time series observation is country-year.  
Observations increase drastically with panel data, because the unit observed is counted (1, 2, 3 
…n) over time (1, 2, 3 …T), which means that the total number of observations will be n * T. 
If there are one hundred countries in the analysis over a period of ten years that means we have 
one thousand unit observations, instead of simply one hundred or ten. In the world of regression, 
a higher number of observations is very useful in both increasing the degrees of freedom we 
have for modeling, and the general robustness of the analysis. Panel data also allows us to 
observe the effect of our variables at several points in time, which is useful in minimizing the 
risk of effect preceding cause, giving us results that are more robust and decreasing the 
likelihood of a spurious correlation. Further, there is simply more information to be collected 
from panel data, as it covers two dimensions (time and space), as such giving a more realistic 
picture of the reality which we try to estimate. However, the most coveted feature of panel data 
is that it creates possibilities of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved 
heterogeneity, if present, will break a key assumption described above, namely that our 
independent variables are not correlated to the error term. (Verbeek 2004, -345) (also see 
section 5.1, assumption 2).  
How we approach and handle the possibility of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is 
essential in panel data analysis, because it ultimately produces different estimation techniques, 
such as fixed or random effects. To explain the issue of unobserved heterogeneity and how 
panel data estimation can control for it, let us break down a standard panel data regression 
equation shown above (1)), but now differentiating between two components of the error term.  
2)   𝛾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡+ . . . + 𝛽𝐾𝑋𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡        𝜀𝑖𝑡 = (𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖) 
Equation 2 is the same as equation 1 above, except we here distinguish two components of ε, 
and we use 𝑖 to denote cross sectional observation and 𝑡 to denote time series observation. The 
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error component 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the random error term that captures all unobserved variation that varies 
over time (the typical within effects produced from the time dimension). The error component 
𝛼𝑖 captures all the unit specific unobserved variance, which does not vary over time (the typical 
between effects from the cross-sectional dimension). Now, our independent or explanatory 
variables are often correlated to some degree to other independent variables. When the omitted 
independent variable is correlated to another independent variable specified in our model, the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity surfaces. The reason for this is that the variation explained 
by the omitted variable is absorbed into the error term, which our included independent variable 
is not supposed to be correlated to. Our estimation is unable to differentiate the effect coming 
from the error term and the effect coming from our correlated independent variable, making it 
biased and inconsistent. Fixed and random effects can, through exploiting the unobserved 
heterogeneity effect over time and groups, control for this effect, but in very different ways, 
restoring the assumptions we need to fulfill to extend our results (Bell and Jones 2015, 141). 
5.3. Fixed effects and random effects.  
The fixed effect model estimates intercept terms for each individual group unit (countries in my 
case). It is usually seen as the golden standard for researchers employing econometrics, because 
of its simplicity, and because of the efficient controls it provides. Producing individual group 
unit intercepts means, if countries is the group unit, that Norway would have its own intercept, 
Sweden its own, Germany its own, and so on. These individual intercepts will capture all the 
group specific variation that is constant, as such controlling for any unobserved group specific 
variables and effects that affect the dependent variable and our included independent variables, 
should they be present in the error term. Thus, the equation becomes:  
3)  𝛾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡+ . . . + 𝛽𝐾𝑋𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡       𝜀𝑖𝑡 = (𝜇𝑖𝑡) 
Then, the fixed effects estimation eliminates or controls away the group specific intercept term, 
𝛼𝑖. As such, we end up with a “within effects” estimator, because the only effects allowed are 
the ones that are not group-specific and constant, but those who are within a group, changing 
over time (Woolridge 2002, chap. 10). Thus, if there is any unobserved heterogeneity between 
any country specific effects variables (between effect) and our included independent variables, 
we effectively remove this bias. If considering the within and between variation summary table 
in section 4.5, all that between variation would be eliminated from the regression. As such, if 
we run a fixed effect regression and we include a time-invariant variable (only has between 
variation) that is of theoretical importance for our analysis, it will be omitted by the model 
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because it is group specific and does not vary over time. So there are some clear trade-offs with 
this method. In addition, if there is any unobserved heterogeneity bias between any omitted 
within effects variables that are absorbed in the error term and our specified independent 
variables, we do not remove the problem by using fixed effects (Bell and Jones 2015, 139). 
However, due to the nature of hierarchical data and homogenizing effects there is almost always 
some form of unobserved heterogeneity bias from group specific, time invariant variables that 
we do not include for whatever reason and our specified independent variables (Arceneaux and 
Nickerson 2009; Bell and Jones 2015; Christophersen 2013, 108).  
In a random effects model the group specific effects are included (𝛼𝑖), because they are assumed 
to be on average independently and identically distributed just as 𝜇𝑖𝑡, and the intercepts are 
allowed to vary for each group unit (Woolridge 2002, chap. 10). By not removing the country 
specific and constant variables we include more information into our model, our ability to 
generalize increases, making our model and coefficients more effective, precise and of course 
allowing us to use a larger variety of variables to explain phenomena (Bell and Jones 2015, 2). 
However RE is realistically not able to control for unobserved heterogeneity between the 
country specific effects and the within country effects. Random effects assumes that the country 
specific effects are on average equal and random, while realistically we know this is not the 
case. Particularly countries are seen to be unique and special. Thus, unobserved heterogeneity 
is argued to be a large problem when using the random effects estimation. In addition, the 
combined error terms will suffer from a particular form of autocorrelation, or dependency. To 
account for this, and maintain the assumptions of linear regression described above, the error 
term is transformed and estimated using generalized least squares (GLS). To estimate the GLS 
however, we need to know the true variance in the population, which we do not based on our 
sample alone. Therefore, we estimate the feasible generalized least squares instead, by adding 
some assumptions. Now, if the assumptions hold in our sample and by statistical test, the 
population, we will have unbiased and efficient random effects coefficients that allow us to say 
something about all of the variation of a variable (Verbeek 2004, 348). Note that the RE 
estimator will use both the within and the between variance, and as such the coefficient it 
produces for a variable can be seen as a “net” effect of that variable. The between and within 
components can be very different, as I will clearly show in my regression models. That is yet 
another reason why it is important to separate the within and between effect of our variables of 
interest, unless we are specifically interested in a “net” effect of a variable. If that is the case, 
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regular random effects estimates this very nicely, but would still be exposed to group level 
unobserved heterogeneity effects from variables that are not included in the estimation.  
 
5.4.  Which estimation technique should I use? 
To see whether we should use a fixed effects or random effects estimation Hausman suggested 
a test to see whether 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖 is uncorrelated. Essentially, this test tries to see if the 
assumption we made above, that 𝛼𝑖 is not correlated to our independent variables, creating 
heterogeneity bias, holds. If not, the test suggests that a fixed effects estimation is superior 
because it will not be biased by the correlation between 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖. Therefore, the test has a 
null and alternative hypothesis as follows:  
𝐻0: 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝛼𝑖|𝑋2𝑖𝑡) = 0               𝐻1: 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝛼𝑖|𝑋2𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 
If the null hypothesis is true, and there is no heterogeneity bias due to 𝛼𝑖, the estimators for the 
random and fixed effects estimation will be similar. If there is heterogeneity bias, they will, to 
a degree, be different and we need to reject the null hypothesis. Note, however, that other 
misspecification issues that are described above can also cause a rejection of the null 
hypothesis, such as reverse causality, simultaneity and measurement error (Verbeek 2004, 352).  
Bell and Jones however, argue that the Hausman test does not tell us whether we should use 
fixed effects or random effects, and that if using a within and between estimation, it is redundant 
(Bell and Jones 2015, 138).53 What it actually does tell us, is whether the variation in the “within 
effects” and the “between effects” components are similar, and if they are we can use random 
effects. This is a crucial difference, because it is precisely when there is large variation (and 
thus possible valuable information) in the group specific variables and variation that we are told 
not to estimate this variation by using fixed effects instead. Thus, we give up a lot of 
information, and possibly important information. This is particularly so when we are interested 
in group specific variables or variation to explain our dependent variable (Bell and Jones 2015, 
139). Further, when much of the variation in a variable is due to between effects we eliminate 
much of that variable’s ability to explain the variation in our dependent variable even if the 
                                                          
53 The Hausman test was run for the fixed effects estimation and the within and between random effects 
estimation to see if this was true. It was. In every estimation, the within and between random effects estimation 
proved superior to the fixed effects estimation. As such, I do not report Hausman results in the results chapter 
except for Model 1, as an example.  
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variable displays some variation over time so that it is not dropped in a fixed effects estimation. 
For example, the corruption variable has 4/5 of its variation from between effects. Using fixed 
effects would not drop the variable, but would remove 4/5 of its variation.  
Their suggestion, which has been covered extensively by other authors as well (Verbeek 2004, 
354), is that of a within and between technique, which relies on the basis of the random effects 
model (meaning we do not exclude 𝛼𝑖). This technique transforms the variable into two 
components, a within variance component and a between variance component. As such, we get 
a much more precise estimation, if we are not specifically interested in only the within, between 
or net effect. For example, in some instances one could imagine that the between effect and the 
within effect are very different. By trying to create one coefficient for these two effects, we 
would probably attain insignificant results. Bell and Jones argue that this technique directly 
models and corrects for unobserved heterogeneity: 
“the RE model we propose in this article solves the problem of heterogeneity bias”(Bell and 
Jones 2015, 138) 
Now, Verbeek refers to this same method of a within and between estimation as a type of 
internal instrumental approach: 
“Finally, in many cases panel data will provide “internal” instruments for regressors that are 
endogenous... transformations of the original variables can often be argued to be uncorrelated 
with the models error term and correlated with the explanatory variables themselves and no 
external instruments are needed.”54 (Verbeek 2004, 345). 
Verbeek and Wooldridge (2004, 2002) write that the instrumental variables approach is very 
efficient for correcting bias, but that it is very hard to find an exogenous variable that we can 
use as an instrument. However, the approach suggested here creates group specific means (𝑋) 
on the independent variables as instruments, which are uncorrelated to the error term, even if 
the independent variables themselves might be, just as quoted from Verbeek above.55 As such, 
our estimation would be:  
4)   𝛾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖) +  𝛽3𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                                                          
54 Note that Verbeek uses endogeneity as an umbrella term for reverse causality, simultaneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity and measurement error. Essentially, all errors that will cause our independent variables to be 
correlated to the error term.  
55 Note however, this approach deals with unobserved heterogeneity bias only, it does not help with the issue of 
reverse causality or simultaneity. 
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In equation 4, 𝛽2(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖) represents a variable with within effects that vary over time (easily 
seen by 𝑖𝑡), and 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 represents a variable with “between” or constant unit specific effects 
(easily seen by only 𝑖). Our variables here will not be biased by unobserved heterogeneity from 
the group specific effects, because we use the group means of the variables themselves as 
instruments, allowing us to safely estimate without excluding group specific variation (Verbeek 
2004, -354). Bell and Jones refers to this as explicitly modeling the heterogeneity (Bell and 
Jones 2015, 134). 
In light of the argumentation above on the potential benefits of random effects estimation, so 
long as we can control for unobserved heterogeneity from group specific effects, and ability to 
do so by using a within and between transformation, I chose to use within and between effects 
transformation, and the random effects estimator.56 Another factor that heavily influences this 
choice is, as shown in section 4.5, that the majority of the variation in my independent variables 
is between variation. By separating the within and between component, I can observe more 
efficient and reliable results, as these two components will not be competing with each other in 
the calculation of the coefficient. I will also be able to distinguish whether it is the cross 
sectional country differences that matter the most or the change over time. This is also in line 
with my theoretical focus. I am interested in all aspects of corruption. Not simply the effect 
over time, between countries or an overall effect, but all of it, as precisely as possible.  
5.5. Interaction terms 
Conditional hypothesis are quite common in political science, because of the importance of the 
contextual factors on what we study. As I argue in this thesis, it is illogical to assume that 
corruption will have the same effect in different contexts. If a country is highly developed, has 
a strong rule of law and highly efficient bureaucracy, I do not believe corruption would have 
the same effect as it could in a less developed country with a weak rule of law and a highly 
inefficient bureaucracy. In more technical terms, variable Z magnifies, decreases or changes 
the effect that X has on Y. A technical example from this thesis could then be that in a country 
that is less developed (Z), corruption (X) has different effect on FDI inflow (Y) than in a country 
that is highly developed (Not Z).  
                                                          
56 Because the random effects command does not allow us to control for AR 1 structure, I also use the GEE 
estimation. While the technicality of this method has not been covered in detail here, it is not substantively 
different from the random effects estimation. Results from both are reported to increase robustness and reliability 
of the results (Gardiner, Luo, and Roman 2009). 
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From my discussion on corruption and its effects on FDI inflow, I suggest several hypothesis 
that are conditional in nature, and as such, I will use multiplicative interaction to try to answer 
these.  Interaction effects are essentially that 𝑋2’s effect upon 𝛾 is conditional on 𝑋3. An 
estimation with an interaction effect will look like this:  
5) 𝛾 = 𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4(𝑋2 ∗ 𝑋3) + 𝜀  
Some have argued that to avoid issues of multicollinearity between the constitutive variables 
(𝑋3 and 𝑋2) and the interaction term ((𝑋2 ∗ 𝑋3)) one can use means of the independent 
variables. This has been criticized by several, amongst them Golder et.al, who argue that you 
change nothing substantive by creating the means, and as such you do not fix any potential issue 
of multicollinearity (Golder, Clark, and Brambor 2006). Further, I follow the advice of Golder 
et.al to include all the constitutive terms in the estimation. The key argument for adding the 
constitutive terms is that omitting them forces the model to estimate one intercept, as opposed 
to two. This also makes the substantive interpretation more difficult (Golder, Clark, and 
Brambor 2006).  
When running the models with interaction variables, the following procedure has been 
followed: First, the interaction term has been created by multiplying the original constitutive 
variables. The constitutive variables have not been transformed to within and between variables 
before this. These are the original variables, lagged by one year. Then the product variable (or 
interaction variable) has been transformed into a within and between component, which is seen 
in the regression results. To be able to determine both substantive and statistical significance of 
the interaction terms in a more informative and detailed manner, I use the command “grinter” 
to graphically illustrate the marginal effect of the interaction term. This is done for all 
interaction terms that have a statistically significant coefficient on the fourth estimation.  
5.6. The fixed and remaining issues.  
All independent variables have been lagged by one year. This is common in the literature, and 
it helps with several issues. There is also a theoretical reason to do this. Information takes time 
to travel, be analyzed, and be of consequence for decisions. I therefore see it as more likely that 
corruption measures in 1995 effects FDI decisions in 1996, than in 1995. It is also, as 
mentioned, argued that lagging can help with issues of reverse causality and simultaneity. 
Reverse causality is less likely to happen when the independent variable is lagged; so too is 
simultaneity less likely. What causes the dependent and independent variable in one time-period 
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is less likely to do this simultaneously across time. Even though this has been criticized lately, 
there is no other real alternative. I do however admit that my solution for reverse causality and 
simultaneity is not nearly enough to state that the issue is fixed. This will also be kept in mind 
during the interpretations of the coefficients.57 The lag structure is the following: All 
independent variables have been lagged by 𝑡 − 1. This means that the values for the 
independent variables that is registered for 1995 is now registered for 1996, and so on.  To 
decrease the issue of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, I estimate all models with robust 
standard errors, clustered by country.  
From the variables that have been lagged one year I then create the within and between 
variables. This is done, as described above, by creating a constant mean for each country for 
each independent variable and then subtracting the original variable to create a time varying 
deviation variable. This is not done for the economic control variables, as they are not of 
theoretical interest in this thesis. This will effectively control for unobserved heterogeneity from 
group specific effects in my independent variable of interest. Three variables have been 
logarithmically transformed, namely, economic stability, trade and the dependent variable, FDI 
inflow.58  
For robustness of the results, several estimations are run and reported. First, fixed effects 
estimation is run with robust standard errors. Fixed effects is superb for showing the effect of a 
variable over time. However, I am interested in the entire effect of corruption, not just the 
change within a country over time. Next, standard random effects with robust standard errors 
is run. This will produce coefficients with a net effect of corruption on FDI, because we estimate 
the within variance and the between variance into the same coefficient. This is a very interesting 
result in its own right, but I am also interested in seeing whether it is the within or the between 
component that is significant, if they both are, and if they differ. In addition as random effects 
without the within and between transformation is likely to be affected by group level 
unobserved heterogeneity, I run random effects with the within and between transformation, 
with robust standard errors to correct for this potential bias. This will allow me to precisely 
discern the possibly different effects of corruption, based on the between country variance and 
the within country variance. As discussed above though, the estimation is likely to be affected 
by autocorrelation, AR 1 and possibly non-stationarity for some variables. I therefore also run 
                                                          
57 I do not argue that my coefficients indicate causality. I rely completely on theory to argue the way of causality 
between FDI inflow and corruption.  
58 This was presented in chapter four while discussing the variables in question.  
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a fourth model, which is a GEE model with the Prais-Winsten transformation and robust 
standard errors. All four estimations will be reported for each hypothesis. I also report a fifth 
estimation with results when taxes is added as an independent variable. This is because taxes is 
a significant determinant of FDI inflow, however over 600 observations are dropped when it is 
























6.0. Results, analysis and discussion 
This chapter will first in short manner present the hypotheses generated, and the expected 
effects from the independent variables of interest. I will then present the regression tables with 
the results for each of the hypotheses specific models. All regression models will be presented 
on the first next page after it is introduced by text.59 The coefficients will be commented in 
regards to sign, size, significance, sample size, multicollinearity and any other post-estimation 
results of interest. After this, a discussion of these results will be presented in regards to analysis 
in light of the existing literature and the expectations of the author. In the end, a summary of 
the most interesting findings and their implication for theory and policy recommendations will 
be presented.  
Chapter three produced several hypotheses on the effect of corruption on FDI, and how 
differences in internal and external factors might in turn affect this relationship.  
Table 8, hypothesis and expected effect 
   
Hypothesis Expected effect on FDI inflow 
H1a: Corruption 
H1b: Corruption 
H2: Bureaucratic Corruption 
H3: Political corruption 
H4 Corruption and gov/state institutions 
H5: Corruption and judicial institutions 
H6: Corruption and democracy 
H7: Corruption and natural resources 
H8: Corruption after year 2000 












6.1. What is reported in the models 
The models report the constant term of FDI (although I do not interpret this term). It also reports, 
of course, the coefficients for all the independent variables with standard errors in parenthesis. 
I will also make direct interpretations of the coefficients it terms of the size of the effect. This 
                                                          
59 The models take up to one page in space. To avoid large empty spaces I fill inn text, even though it is text 
analyzing regression results that are not seen until the next page.  
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is not normal in the literature using a logarithmic dependent variable; as such, I will focus on 
the sign, significance and general magnitude of the effect.  Because I have very many 
observations (>500) for most of my models, the official significance threshold is at the five 
percent level to minimize the likelihood of committing a type one mistake. I will however be 
dynamic in my interpretation of significance, and I will not simply state that a coefficient with 
a p-value of 0.08 is not significant, and just ignore it. It will however be seen as a much less 
robust finding, and be interpreted with care. The average VIF for the model is also reported, 
and when this is high, the cause of this will be discussed, except for the interaction models, 
where the VIF value is expected to be high. For these models I run a background estimation 
without the interaction term, and if the collinearity is high without the interaction, this will be 
discussed. R.sq is reported for the fixed effects and the random effects estimations, but it is not 
available for the general estimated equations estimations. The total amount of observations (n) 
is reported, along with the total amount of groups (countries).  
As estimation four employs both the within and between transformation, controls for AR 1, 
autocorrelation and non-stationarity and employs the largest sample of countries, this is the 
main estimation of all the models.60 
Because this thesis presents several models, in which only the independent variable of 
theoretical interest, corruption, is changed in some way with an interaction of a contextual 
variable or using a type specific corruption variable, I will spend less space commenting on 
systematic results and changes as I go through the models. For example, I will not explain in 
detail what estimation four does, as opposed to estimation three, except for in the first model. 
Because the results of the control variables are so systematic and non-changing, I will only 
discuss these in the first model, and summarize them at the end of the chapter. As this thesis 
emphasizes the importance of different estimation methods and econometric caveats, the 
differences between the estimations in each model will be a focus for the interpretations and 
discussions.  
6.2. Corruption and foreign direct investment 
The first model analyses the relationship of corruption on foreign direct investment, controlled 
for all the standard economic variables, market size, market potential, trade openness, level of 
                                                          
60 Thus, if the results are not significant in estimation four, I will not consider the results as significant. If they 
are significant in this estimation, but not in estimation three and/or five, it will be interpreted as lower robustness 
in the results. 
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taxes and economic stability. This is the baseline model, as I do not differentiate corruption by 
type, or add any non-economic contextual variable, thus estimating in the most general way the 
effect of corruption on FDI inflow. From the literature review and hypothesis generation, this 
effect could go either way. This is also shown in hypothesis 1a and 1b. My proposed theoretical 
model for corruption’s effect also allows for this relation to go either way, as the potential 
benefits can easily overcome the potential risk and uncertainty.  
Model 1, which presents the regression results, presents five estimations. The first estimation 
is a fixed effects model (1). As was made clear in the method section, fixed effects estimation 
only calculates coefficients based on the within variation of a given group (change within a 
country over time). In the descriptive statistics section, I showed how the large majority of 
corruption’s variance is between variance, and in the methodological review, I also show how 
the majority of newer studies employ fixed effects estimation while their research question is, 
without refinement, the effect of corruption on FDI. Now, as anticipated, the corruption 
coefficient is not significant in this model. This is expected because 4/5 of the variation in the 
corruption variable is between variance, which is controlled out. The result of the corruption 
coefficient here clearly demonstrates an important point, regardless of theoretical 
interpretations. If one runs a fixed effects estimation on variables that are highly characterized 
by the between country variance, we will most likely not get significant results.  
Of the economic control variables, market size is barely significant at the ten percent level, 
market potential is significant at the five percent level, while trade openness is significant at the 
one percent level. All the significant coefficients have the expected positive sign. Not only is 
the variance of the independent variable of interest, corruption, mainly situated between 
countries, so is also the variance of the dependent variable, FDI inflow. We can also observe 
from the sigma U and E that the majority of the variance in the dependent variable, FDI inflow, 
is due to between country differences (because sigma U is much larger than sigma E). The high 
rho value also confirms that the dependent variable is highly dependent on its previous values 
(AR 1). 61 
 
                                                          
61 This is very static throughout all of the models. I will therefore not spend more space to report or comment on 




























































































































Taxes - - - - 0.0155*** 
(0.0048) 
 















































Standard errors in parenthesis 




In the second estimation (2) standard random effects is used. This estimation thus uses the 
between variance as well, and as expected, corruption now becomes significant, even at the one 
percent level, and the coefficient is very different in size from the previous estimation. The 
coefficient is positive, meaning that the less corruption, the more foreign direct investment, and 
vice versa.62 The coefficient size tells us that for each unit increase in the corruption variable 
(meaning less corruption), FDI increases with 18.56 percent.63 Here the point made from the 
fixed effects estimation (1) becomes even clearer. Because the random effects coefficient 
combines the effect of both the within and the between variance, corruption becomes 
significant, as we now add five times as much variation into the estimation of the coefficient. 
However, as stated in the methods section, this coefficient is potentially biased by group level 
unobserved heterogeneity because there are country characteristics that I have probably not 
included into my model that probably affects corruption and FDI inflow in some way, and the 
country level effects are probably not random.64 The coefficient is also a net effect of corruption. 
This means that within and between components of corruption are estimated together, but they 
could be counteracting each other. As such, if we are not explicitly interested in the net effect 
of corruption, we need to use a different technique. If the research question is focused towards 
a net effect however, the random effects estimation does this very well.65  
Further, the previously significant control variables are all significant, market size is now 
significant at the five percent level, and natural resources becomes significant at the ten percent 
level. The increase in significance of the economic control variables here also show another 
important point in terms of estimation technique. Even the economic variables have a large part 
of their variance in the between component. As such, if we estimate the effect of market size 
on foreign direct investment using fixed effects, the coefficient does not tell us the total effect 
of market size, only the effect of market size within a country over time as it changes. Clearly, 
as the coefficient for market size substantively increases and becomes more significant, there 
is important between country variance we are not able to estimate using fixed effects.  
                                                          
62 Remember that the corruption variable, CPI, is measured counterintuitively. Low values indicate high 
corruption, while high values indicate less corruption.  
63 Note that to get completely precise coefficient sizes we need to exponentiate the coefficient. However, there is 
no substantive difference, and so to save space, I simply report the unexponentiated coefficients (Noymer 2011) 
64 Countries are often seen as unique and specific, which is exactly why the assumption of standard random 
effects does not hold when we study these political and economic phenomena. Had the country level effects been 
random, the random effects estimation would not be any more exposed to unobserved heterogeneity than a fixed 
effects estimation 
65 Note that some have called this net effect that the random effects model estimates an “uninterpretable 
weighted average” that suffers from unobserved heterogeneity as opposed to simply a different, “net” effect 
estimate (Bell and Jones 2015, 137) 
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In the third estimation (3) random effects is also used as the estimation technique, but on within 
and between transformed components of the corruption variable. As explained in detail in the 
methods section, this controls for unobserved heterogeneity produced from group (country) 
level variables. This is done by creating means that are theoretically not correlated to the error 
term, even though the original variable might be (Bell and Jones 2015).66 Further, we now also 
separate the “net” effect of random effects, into a within effect and a between effect. By 
observing the large differences between the within and between effect, and the corruption 
coefficient in estimation two (2), we can clearly see how important it is to be aware of what we 
actually measure using the different estimations. In addition, the large differences in the 
coefficients of the within effects component and the between effects component illustrates that 
we can get very different coefficients because the random effects estimation estimates a net 
effect in which the within and between variance could end up “competing” with each other. 
This is a very interesting and exciting observation. Clearly, it is the between effect of corruption 
that is significant. This is the component that makes corruption significant in estimation two, 
however the size of the coefficients are very different. The between effect coefficient tells us 
that for each unit increase in the CPI which means less corruption, FDI inflow increases with 
about 40.77 percent all else held constant at their means,67 compared to a 18.56 percent in the 
standard random effects estimation (2). This is mainly because the between component and 
within component are estimated as a net effect into a single coefficient in estimation two (2). 
The between component of corruption is highly significant at the one percent level, relatively 
large, and positive. The within component is, as expected, not significant, because it was not 
significant in the fixed effects estimation (1). The same control variables are significant with 
market size and market potential at the five percent level, and natural resources and trade at the 
1 percent level.  
These results would not be possible to estimate had I not performed the within and between 
transformation. I would be left with either an insignificant fixed effects coefficient or a 
significant and positive random effects coefficient. If my research question is oriented, as mine 
is, towards analyzing the entirety of the effect corruption has on FDI inflow, and not specifically 
the within effect or a net effect, I would not really be estimating the theoretical interest of my 
thesis. For the fixed effects, I would conclude wrong on the relationship between corruption 
                                                          
66 Remember that there are other forms of bias that can still cause our independent variables to be correlated to 
the error term as explained in the methods chapter. 
67 While these percentage numbers might seem very large, remember that the log-scale for FDI goes from -11 to 
+ 12. As such, 100 percent does not represent the largest amounts of FDI in the sample, simply a one point 
increase on the scale. However, these sizes are substantial.  
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and FDI, stating that corruption does not have an effect on FDI inflow. For the random effects 
estimation I would have made an unprecise and somewhat misleading interpretation, 
underestimating the effect of corruption on FDI inflow.68 This is why I argue that within and 
between estimation is an extremely valuable and interesting contribution in this thesis. For this 
estimation, I also ran the Hausman test to check that the within and between transformation RE 
model is superior to the fixed effects model in terms of efficiency and bias. The test is 
insignificant, and we thus reject the null hypothesis and find that the RE estimation with within 
and between transformation is efficient and unbiased (see appendix 9.9). 69  
The fourth estimation uses a different estimation technique. This is done to mainly control for 
AR 1 issues in the dependent variable. In the methods section I analyzed the characteristics of 
my variables to see if I would have any issues with the assumptions of the linear regression. I 
found that my dependent variable, FDI inflow, is a slow-changing variable and that the value 
of year two is highly dependent on the value of year one, and so on. This is the AR 1 issue, and 
it must be dealt with, or else the coefficients will be biased. Using a Prais-Winston differencing 
transformation I treat the AR 1 issue, however, it is not accessible for the regular random effects 
estimation. As such, the generalized estimating equations technique is used, which allows for 
the treatment of AR 1.70 This also effectively deals with autocorrelation, non-stationarity and 
AR 1 issues in the independent variables. If my results were sensitive to this, one could expect 
large changes in the results of estimation four, as opposed to estimation three. With the 
exception of the control variable trade, nothing substantial changes in this estimation. This is 
good, as it increases the robustness of the results. The coefficient of trade loses 87 percent of 
its size, and becomes insignificant.71 The between effect of corruption is still highly significant 
at the one percent level. Even though the coefficient loses some of its size, it is still substantial. 
Market size goes from the five percent level to the one percent level and all else stays the same. 
Note that three observations are lost when using the GEE estimation as opposed to the RE 
estimation. This is because for three of the countries there are less than two observations (n), 
                                                          
68 Had the differences between the within and the between effect been larger, the coefficient for corruption in 
model two would not have been significant either.  
69 This is done merely as an example, and will not be done for other estimations. Further, by logic it is apparent 
that by utilizing this transformation the Hausman test is redundant. This is because we now include both the 
within and the between components.  
70 Remember that the GEE technique is not substantively different from the random effects estimation. It is 
simply used because technicalities dictate it must be so. Also, the very small change from the random effects 
estimation to the GEE estimation assures us to a degree that indeed, there are no substantive differences between 
the methods and of course, that the results are not very affected by AR 1, non-stationarity or autocorrelation.  
71 Thus, it is quite plausible that trade is somehow affected by autocorrelation, non-stationarity and/or AR 1 
issues, and its strong effect on FDI in estimation one, two and three is actually a spurious one.  
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which makes it impossible to employ a differencing transformation on them. Since there are 
only three of these countries, it does not have any substantive effects on my estimation.  
In the fifth estimation the taxes variable is added. Once again, nothing substantive changes in 
this estimation from the previous. Market potential becomes more significant, from the five 
percent level to the one percent level. Economic stability has a very similar coefficient that it 
has been having for every estimation, but is now significant at the five percent level, with the 
expected negative effect. Trade remains insignificant after we controlled for autocorrelation, 
AR1 and non-stationarity. Taxes is highly significant at the one percent level, but with a 
surprising positive coefficient.72 The between effect of corruption is still highly significant, but 
the coefficient loses some of its size (0.0700 decrease). This estimation has 590 less 
observations than the previous one.73 The fact that nothing of interest really changes is an 
additional reassurance of the robustness of the results.  
Except for in the reduced sample size models of political and bureaucratic corruption, the 
economic control variables produce very similar results across estimations. I will therefore not 
spend much more space commenting on them.  
Theoretical interpretation:  
In terms of relevance for theory and hypothesis 1a and 1b, there are several interesting findings 
here. First of all, the studies that do not find a significant relationship of corruption on FDI, 
such as Busse and Hefeker (2007), Al-Sadig (2009) and Goswami and Haider (2014), get these 
findings not because corruption is  irrelevant for multinational corporations when making their 
decisions to invest, but because of their estimation method. The separation of the between and 
within component clearly shows that the between variation is highly significant, with a 
substantive size to the coefficient, while the within variation is simply not significant. That 
means that because levels of corruption do not change that much over time, researchers using 
fixed effects estimation will find this variable to not matter. This is not a problem if they are 
only interested in the within effect. Estimation 3 through 5 reports significant and positive 
coefficients for the between effect of corruption, which means that the less corrupt a country is 
on Transparency Internationals CPI, the more FDI that country receives. This supports 
hypothesis 1a, and strengthens the argument from the sand logic, that corruption is a phenomena 
                                                          
72 This is also the only reason for adding taxes, even though it decreases the amount of observations drastically. 
It is simply significant, and as such, important to include.  
73 For an overview of the countries in this sample, see appendix 9.3.  
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that increases risk and/or uncertainty, which is translated into higher cost in the cost-benefit 
equation, making the MNC less likely to invest in general. This is an important finding, because 
it indicates that countries are not better off by allowing corruption to be a part of their system. 
Less corruption, or at least the perception of less corruption, will attract more foreign direct 
investment. All the control variables have the expected signs, except for taxes, which indicates 
that the higher taxes, the more FDI. There is some new literature on taxes that argue that to the 
degree to which higher taxes imply better state institutions, infrastructure and development, 
higher taxes can increase investments (Kimel 2011).  Trade seems to be insignificant when 
accounting for AR 1, and economic stability is only significant in the last estimation with a 
reduced sample.  
6.3. Political and Bureaucratic corruption and FDI.  
The attempt to measure and estimate different types of corruption is an ambitious attempt, and 
that is reflected in the poor quality of the data. As I stated at the end of section 2.2.2 the data is 
indeed very poor, and sadly this was realized too late in the process to turn away from it. As 
such, results in this model will be interpreted with extreme care and critical view. Even though 
political corruption and bureaucratic corruption are two separate variables in the IPD dataset, 
their extremely high multicollinearity value (83 percent, see correlations matrix, appendix 9.1) 
makes it impossible to fit them into the same model. I therefore need to sacrifice comparability 
for ability to estimate the coefficients. I therefore run two different models, knowing that this 
reduces the ability to compare the coefficients directly against one another. The first model 
estimates bureaucratic corruptions effect on FDI.  
The first estimation (1) uses fixed effects, and surprisingly corruption is significant in this 
estimation, with a negative coefficient. This tells us that for one unit increase of bureaucratic 
corruption measured by IPD (meaning less corruption), FDI inflow decreases with 26.11 
percent. As thoroughly discussed in the previous model this coefficient is only calculated on 
the basis of the within variance, and as such does not represent the entire effect of corruption, 
but the within country effect which changes over time. Of the control variables, only market 
size is significant, and only at the ten percent level. This estimation is, because of its limited 
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other models. There are only 168 observations for this estimation. This is confirmed by the 
deviating results in the economic control variables, which are to a large degree continuously 
significant in models with more observations,74 and is found to be significant in other studies.  
The second estimation is with standard random effects, and at first glance, surprisingly, 
corruption is not significant here. This is the opposite of what was observed in model 1, and 
what one could expect from the inclusion of more variance. Because fixed effects and random 
effects measure very different things (within effect and net effect), it may not be so surprising 
that corruption is not significant in the random effects estimation after all. This also illustrates 
that it is extremely important that we think about what our theoretical interest is (RQ) and what 
we actually measure and estimate. As we will see in estimation three, the fact that corruption is 
insignificant in the random effects estimation allows me to point out yet another key point of 
within and between estimation advantages. This estimation tells us that there is no significant 
net effect of bureaucratic corruption on FDI inflow. Market size increases in significance to the 
one percent level, and the coefficient increases significantly in size, from 2.05 to 3.55. 
Economic stability becomes significant at the five percent level, with the expected negative 
coefficient.  
The third estimation is very interesting for two reasons. The first is that both the between and 
the within effect of corruption is significant at the five percent level. The between component 
is positive with a coefficient of 0.4145, while the within component is negative with a 
coefficient of -0.2390. This means that the less bureaucratic corruption a country has the more 
foreign direct investment it will attract. However, if a country becomes less corrupt in the 
bureaucracy over time, it actually receives less FDI inflow. The second is that this nicely 
describes another situation in which utilizing a within and between transformation of a variable 
can provide us with much more information and efficient coefficients. I stated it could be 
puzzling that corruption was not significant in estimation two (2), while it was significant in 
the fixed effects estimation (1). This is because the corruption variable here contains two 
contradicting and competing components, as was also touched upon in the previous section. As 
such, when trying to estimate the net effect of the two of them (0.4145 and -0.2390), the 
coefficient comes out insignificant. While these results must be interpreted with extreme care 
due to the very small sample, this point is not reduced because of this. Just as in the previous 
                                                          
74 Note that very many observations (>500) can also create significant results that are not of substantive 
significance. However, due to previous literature and the theoretical reasoning on the economic control variables, 
I do not believe that this is what makes them significant in the other models, while insignificant in these 
relatively reduced ones.  
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section, this highlights both the importance of estimating a within and between component, and 
the potential contribution of these estimations. 
Had a researcher employed fixed or standard random effects here, we can now directly see how 
the results could have led the researcher to conclude a negative or an insignificant effect, unless 
the researcher was explicitly interested only in the within or net effect, this would have been 
misleading. Economic stability loses some significance and is only significant at the ten percent 
level, and market potential becomes significant at the ten percent level. This estimation also 
illustrates that the fixed effects estimation indeed does a very good job at estimating the within 
effect of a variable, as the coefficients of the fixed effects estimation and the within effect is 
nearly identical.  
Estimating the GEE estimation allows us to deal with AR 1, non-stationarity and 
autocorrelation. When doing this in estimation four the results still hold, and do not change 
substantively. This increases the reliability and robustness of the results, even though the 
sample size is small. Now market potential and market size is highly significant at the one 
percent level, with coefficients that are similar to the other models (see for example Model 1). 
Economic stability is not significant.  
When adding taxes, the sample is further reduced, but this does not change any results either, 
further boosting the reliability of the results. The between component of corruption is still 
significant, though now only at the five percent level, with a positive coefficient. The within 
component is now significant at the one percent level, and is still negative. The size of the 
coefficient has increased with about thirty percent. Market potential is reduced to being 
significant at the five percent level.  
Theoretical interpretation:  
I hypothesized that bureaucratic corruption, because of its systematic nature, would not produce 
much uncertainty, but primarily risk, which should have a smaller negative effect than 
uncertainty. The fixed effects estimation and the within effect in the other estimations finds 
support for this, with a negative coefficient which means that the less bureaucratic corruption, 
the less foreign direct investment. As such, if a country has a given level of bureaucratic 
corruption, and it decreases this corruption over time, multinational corporations will invest 
less in the country. This reinforces the grease logic, and the arguments of Huntington (1968) 
and Leff (1964), the argument of Egger and Winner (2005) and hypothesis 2 in this thesis. A 
positive and significant between component of corruption however, indicates that in terms of 
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different bureaucratic corruption levels across countries, lower levels of bureaucratic corruption 
is associated with more foreign direct investment. This does not support hypothesis 2. This is 
very interesting, and could potentially indicate that MNCs prefer non-corrupt bureaucracies, 
but that they do not like change in the bureaucracy either. This possibly leads to uncertainty as 
to how to handle corruption in the given country, where as a steady situation of corruption is 
easier to navigate and causes more predictable risk that can be calculated. This only highlights 
the multidimensionality and complexity of corruption and how multinational corporations view 
it, and it lends credibility to my argumentation in section 2.5, on the three effects of corruption 
and how they work relative to each other. Of course, due to the small sample size, these results 
must only be read as indications, and they are not generalizable to the world, only to the sample 
and the countries highly similar to the countries in the sample.75 
Political corruption:  
Model 3 presents the results when using the political corruption variable. As this variable is 
from the same source as the bureaucratic corruption variable, the same critique of the quality 
applies here. The observations are very few, because of a very small time sample (4 years), and 
a limited geographic sample (52 countries).  
The first estimation (1) employs fixed effects estimation. As expected, corruption is not 
significant here. However, it is interesting that this coefficient was significant for the 
bureaucratic corruption variable, but not for the political corruption variable. Market size is 
significant at the five percent level, and market potential is significant at the ten percent level. 
Both have the expected positive sign. Natural resources is insignificant, this makes sense as this 
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The second estimation (2) employs the standard random effects technique. Surprisingly 
corruption is not significant here, even though we now use the entire spectrum of political 
corruption’s variance. This is yet another situation, as I touched upon with the bureaucratic 
corruption coefficient, where the issue is not only whether we employ all of the variance of the 
variable, but also that it is possible for the within and the between effect to have different effects 
on the dependent variable. This can be clearly seen from the third estimation (3), using the 
within and between components. However, this estimation (2) does tell us that there is no net 
effect of political corruption on FDI inflow. Market size becomes more significant, and as in 
the other models, its coefficient increases by about fifty percent. Market potential becomes 
insignificant, implying we might have competing components here as well.76 Economic 
stability becomes significant at the five percent level, with an expected negative coefficient.  
In the third estimation (3) I employ the within and between transformation. Now we can observe 
that the between effect of political corruption is very significant, at the five percent level, with 
a relatively large and positive coefficient. This implies that each higher unit of the political 
corruption variable a country has (meaning less political corruption), it increases FDI inflow by 
46.60 percent. The within effect is not significant, which is also why the net effect coefficient 
is not significant in the second estimation. The negative and insignificant within effect caused 
the net effect to become insignificant (2), which is what the random effects estimator estimates. 
This point cannot be stressed enough, because its implications for regression analysis is 
fundamental. When operating with variables that have both within and between variance (which 
nearly all variables do), it is vital to control that their effects are not counteracting each other, 
unless we are specifically interested in only the within or net effect. This is rarely the case 
though. Market size does not change from the second estimation, market potential is significant 
at the ten percent level again, and economic stability loses its significance.  
As explained in the method section, the third estimation (3) does not effectively deal with non-
stationarity, autocorrelation and AR 1 issues and this can seriously bias our coefficients. The 
GEE technique allows us to alleviate these issues through the Prais-Winsten transformation (4). 
With the exception of the significance level of market potential, which increases to the one 
percent level, and the increase of significance in the between effect of political corruption from 
five percent to the one percent level, there are no substantive changes . The between effect 
coefficient of political corruption increases some in size, but not enough to argue that it is of 
                                                          
76 Because the economic determinants, or control variables, are not the ones of theoretical interest in this thesis, I 
do not transform them into within and between components. This could be fruitful future work.  
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substantive meaning. The within effect remains insignificant. One observation is lost, due to 
one country not having more than one observations.  
In the fifth and final estimation (5) of the model, I add taxes. Even though forty observations 
are lost, there is very little change to the results, when compared to the fourth estimation (4). 
This is good, as it increases the robustness of the results.  There is a reduction in the size of the 
between effect coefficient of political corruption, but it is still relatively large. There is also a 
return to the five percent level of significance. Taxes does not come out as significant in this 
estimation. The results of these estimations are only interpreted as indications of correlations, 
because of the weaknesses in the data, and somewhat conflicting results from the larger sample 
regressions on the control variables. The results are also only generalizable to the sample and 
highly similar countries.  
Theoretical interpretation:  
From my conceptualization of types of corruption, and the effect through risk, uncertainty and 
potential benefits, I hypothesized that political corruption would have a different effect than 
bureaucratic corruption. Indeed, I argued that because of the nature of political corruption, 
political corruption would have a much stronger negative effect on FDI inflows. As explained 
previously, I had to sacrifice direct comparability within one model because of multicollinearity 
between bureaucratic and political corruption, but there is one interesting finding that could 
indicate that this is an interesting line of research to pursue. There is no effect of more political 
corruption that increased FDI inflow.77 For the bureaucratic corruption variable, there was a 
negative within effect, which meant that less bureaucratic corruption over time is associated 
with less FDI inflow and vice versa. Now, to interpret anything from this in comparison of these 
two variables must be done with extreme care and skepticism, but this could indicate that indeed 
there is a difference of effects from political and bureaucratic corruption. If political corruption 
produces the same effect of its bureaucratic twin, then it should also have had a within effect 
that decreased FDI as the level of political corruption becomes smaller. The one thing we can 
say, for the sample of the model, is that less political corruption is associated with higher levels 
of FDI inflow, but I am unable to confirm the hypothesis that political corruption has a more 
negative effect than bureaucratic corruption. Thus, hypothesis 3 is not supported by the results. 
                                                          
77 Because the political corruption variable is measured as low values equals high corruption, and high values 
equal low corruption, a negative coefficient for the political corruption variable would indicate that more 
corruption increases FDI.  
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6.4. Institutional framework 
From the political risk literature and the literature on FDI we can observe that the investment 
climate is very important for the attraction of FDI. Indeed, investment climate is in many ways 
all the locational advantages or disadvantages a country has. The institutional framework has 
been shown to be a very important part of this investment climate, and I have hypothesized on 
the conditional effect these institutions could have on the effect corruption has on FDI inflow. 
I estimate using two groupings of institutions, namely governmental/state institutions, and the 
judicial institution, as measured by the World Bank.  
6.4.1. Corruption, high quality of governmental/state institutions and 
FDI 
Model 4 estimates the relationship of corruption as measured by Transparency International 
(thus not making any internal or type differentiations) on FDI inflow, but examining whether 
having high quality governmental/state institutions affects the effect corruption has upon FDI 
inflow. This is done by interacting corruption and a dummy variable that gives the score one to 
all countries that are measured as having a high quality in their governmental/state institutions, 
and zero to the ones that does not. The within and between transformation is done for the 
interaction variable, because that is the one of interest and interpretation, not the constitutive 
variables.  
The first estimation (1), which is the fixed effects estimation, displays expected results, and 
similar results to the ones in model one. Corruption is not significant, and neither is having high 
quality governmental/state institutions. However, these variables are not of interest. They are 
only included because the method of interactions require them to be. Therefore, the variable of 
interest is the interaction of corruption and high quality of governmental/state institutions. This 
is also not significant, as expected (due to the low amount of within variance for both of the 
constitutive variables). Multicollinearity could seem to be an issue in this model. The average 
is at 10.66, which is very high for an average. Upon closer inspection, it is revealed that indeed, 
the constitutive terms and the interaction term is multicollinear at about sixty percent, and that 
quality of governmental and state institutions and the interaction term has VIF values of 29 and 
21, respectively. However, as was explained in section 4.5, high multicollinearity between 
constitutive terms is to be expected, it is natural, and should not be attempted to be circumvented  
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by technicalities or by dropping one of the constitutive terms.78 The economic control variables 
show no sign of multicollinearity, except for trade.79  
In estimation two (2), I employ the standard random effects technique. As expected, corruption 
becomes significant, but it does not matter as it is one of the constitutive terms. The interaction 
term remains insignificant, and when looking at estimation three (3), the reason is obvious. 
Based on what we now know of the different estimations we know that we cannot interpret an 
insignificant FE and RE estimation as evidence that the interaction term is not significant. We 
have simply estimated whether there is a within effect (estimation one) or a net effect 
(estimation two). The between effect is still hidden from us. Nothing changes in regards to 
multicollinearity, because we only changed the estimation technique, not the variables of the 
estimation.  
In estimation three (3), we can observe some very interesting results. First, the between 
component of the interaction is highly significant at the one percent level, and in contradiction 
to my expectations, the coefficient is negative. It is also a relatively large coefficient. The within 
component is not significant, and this was expected as the fixed effects estimator does a very 
good job at estimating the within effect, and that coefficient was not significant either (1). This 
result is yet another example of two contradicting sub-components of a single variable. Without 
the within and between estimation, it would have been impossible to distinguish these different 
effects in one estimation, and we could have mistakenly concluded that there is no significantly 
different effect of corruption in countries with high quality governmental/state institutions on 
foreign direct investment inflow. These results tell us that in countries with a high quality of 
political institutions the less corruption between countries, the less FDI inflow can be expected. 
Precisely, each unit increase (meaning less corruption) of the CPI in countries with high quality 
governmental/state institutions between different countries is associated with 45.75 percent less 
FDI inflow, all else held constant at their mean. Changes over time (within effect) is not 
significant. This can of course simply be because it is not important for MNCs, or that 
corruption does not change much over time and neither does the quality of the 
                                                          
78 I ran the regression without the interaction term. The individual VIF values of corruption and high quality of 
governmental / state institutions were 11 and 4, respectively. A value of 11 might indicate that corruption is 
affected by multicollinearity, but as was also discussed in section 4.1 on multicollinearity, the fact that the 
interaction term is still able to become significant actually only adds to its significance and importance (O’brien 
2007). The Collin multicollinearity test showed no issues with large VIF values (see appendix 9.2).  
79 Trade continuously generates high VIF values. This is strange, as it is not more than 0.25 collinear with any 
other variable, according to the correlations matrix. It could be that different components of trade’s variance is 
correlated to different independent variables, but this is speculation. As it is deemed an important determinant, 
and because the other controls are significant in most estimations, I chose to not drop it.  
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governmental/state institutions, thus not providing enough variance to estimate a significant 
effect.80  
In estimation four (4) I use the GEE estimation with the Prais-Winsten transformation. Now 
that the results are effectively controlled for non-stationarity, autocorrelation and AR 1 issues 
we can observe nearly no differences. The fact that the results of the between effect does not 
change that much is very good, because it increases the robustness of the finding. AR 1, non-
stationary or autocorrelation issues did not induce the coefficient in estimation three (3). The 
size of the market size coefficient increases substantially, with over fifty percent. To furtherr 
interpret the interaction term, I produce a graphical plot of the interaction. This is done using 
the command “grinter” in STATA. It shows the marginal effect of the interaction term on FDI 
inflow with the values of the conditioning variable on the horizontal axis.81 The magnitude of 
the tilt indicates that indeed, the effect is very substantially significant. It also shows that the 
effect is not significant for the countries that do not have high quality in their institutions, only 
for the countries that do (and are coded 1), because the confidence intervals cross zero, except 
at the end of the X-axis (Golder, Berry, and Milton 2012)(see appendix 9.10).   
In the fifth estimation (5), taxes is added to see if its effect is significant, even though it reduces 
the sample size both in terms on total observations and countries. The between effect coefficient 
of the interaction variable is reduced by about 25 percent. It is still a relatively strong and 
negative relation. Otherwise, nearly nothing changes, which is good in terms of robustness. 
Taxes is significant at the one percent level, justifying its inclusion.  
Theoretical interpretation:  
From the literature on corruption, and my proposed framework and causal model, I would 
expect any potential positive effect of corruption in terms of increasing efficiency, being able 
to gain the upper hand in procurements, or functioning as an informal business sector in lieu of 
non-functioning governmental/state institutions, to be reduced if the country has a high quality 
in these institutions. These regression results tell the opposite story, and do not support 
hypothesis 4. If a country has high quality governmental/state institutions, then having less 
                                                          
80 Note however, that in the descriptive statistics section both quality of political institutions and corruption does 
show a fair amount of within variance, which should be enough to estimate a significant effect, if the effect is 
relevant for FDI inflows. Also, note the significant fixed effects coefficient of corruption in model two.   
81 Because I have a dummy conditioning variable (high quality of governmental/state institutions) I am not able 
to read out the marginal effect over different values of the conditioning variable. However, this graph will allow 
us to observe in more detail the degree of both the substantial and statistical significance of the coefficient 
(Golder, Berry, and Milton 2012).  
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corruption is actually correlated with less FDI inflow. This is a very counter-intuitive finding. 
However, it might be that the potential benefits from corruption in countries that have a high 
quality in governmental and state institutions are larger. Take the example of Denmark. It is 
common knowledge that corruption is not systemic in Danish institutions, and as such, if there 
is a possibility of engaging in corruption one could gain a very large competitive advantage 
and/or lower costs. If there is a country that is perceived to have a very low quality of these 
institutions, corruption might be the normal way to get things done, and as such that would 
decrease the relative and potential benefits from corruption, because most companies would be 
doing it. This explanation would fit my proposed framework, as the relative benefits could 
become larger in countries with a high quality in governmental and state institutions, and when 
the country is less corrupt then, these very beneficial benefits could become less frequent and 
disappear. This negative effect on FDI inflow could not be directly compared between for 
example Denmark and Angola though, as the marginal effect is only significant for the countries 
that have a high quality in their governmental and state institutions, and not for the countries 
that are coded as not having a high quality. Therefore, this between effect, which indicates the 
differences are between countries, is only between countries that have a high quality in the 
institutions. As such, a valid example could be Norway and Denmark. Both Norway and 
Denmark have high quality in their governmental and state institutions, however, Norway has 
more corruption than Denmark, which then means that Denmark would attract less FDI inflow 
than Norway, due to Denmark having less corruption.  
6.4.2. Quality of the rule of law 
An institution that has received special focus in the political risk and foreign direct investment 
literature is the rule of law. I hypothesized, based on previous literature and the framework I 
employ that in countries with a high quality in the rule of law, the negative effects of corruption 
(risk and uncertainty) would increase. To answer this hypothesis I have interacted corruption 
as measured by Transparency International and a dummy variable of the rule of law (high 
quality).  
The first estimation (1) is the fixed effects estimation. As expected, and as in most of the other 
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that might reflect the low within variance of both the constitutive terms. Neither is any of the 
two constitutive terms significant, but these are not of interpretive interest. This estimation tells  
us that there is no significant within effect of the interaction variable on foreign direct 
investment inflow. The average VIF value of the estimation is very high, 27.78. This is due to 
the interaction term and its constitutive terms whom score high VIF values due to their 
collinearity, thus dragging up the average, which is unavoidable and natural according to the 
interaction literature (Golder, Clark, and Brambor 2006). Once I exclude the interaction term, 
the average VIF falls to five, with the trade variable once again pulling up the average with a 
VIF value of 14. The Collin test shows no issues of multicollinearity for this model without the 
interaction either (appendix 9.2).  
In the standard random effects estimation (2) nothing of substantive meaning changes. The 
interaction term does not become significant once we add the between variance. There can be 
two reasons for this. Corruption is simply not a significant determinant for FDI inflow. This 
would be a logical interpretation to make when we find no significance in either a fixed effects 
or a random effects estimation. However, we might yet again be facing competing 
subcomponents in the variable, and this will be revealed in the third estimation. From this 
estimation then, we can conclude that there is no net effect of corruption on FDI inflow.  
In the third estimation (3) I add the within and between effect variables of the interaction term. 
As suspected, the within and the between effect has very different coefficients. However, to my 
surprise, neither the between, nor the within effect is significant.  
In estimation four (4), there are some interesting changes. Once I control for AR1, 
autocorrelation and non-stationarity, the within effect becomes significant. The within effect 
has a negative coefficient which indicates that in countries with high quality judicial 
institutions, becoming less corrupt decreases FDI inflow, just as with bureaucratic corruption 
in model 2. Specifically, the coefficient tells us that for each unit increase in the CPI (meaning 
less corruption) FDI inflow decreases by 23.63 percent. I am somewhat perplexed that 
accounting for AR 1, non-stationarity and autocorrelation made the within effect significant, as 
the rule of law variable showed little to no issues with these phenomena. However, this does 
illustrate how important it is to be careful with the assumptions of linear regression and any 
issues one has in the data. That said, the fact that the significance levels are not stable over the 
different estimations (as several other results are), brings the robustness of the findings in 
question. Further, the grinter graph illustrates that the within effect coefficient is substantially 
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significant, but not statistically significant, because the confidence intervals cross the zero line 
of the vertical axis (Golder, Berry, and Milton 2012)(see appendix 9.10). 
In the fifth estimation I add taxes to control for its effect, and it does have a significant effect 
on FDI inflow which is constant across nearly all my models. This also serves, as mentioned, 
as an additional robustness test, because the total observations and the country sample is 
reduced with this variable, and to the degree to which the results are similar in this estimation, 
the robustness of the results is increased. Unfortunately, this estimation does not increase the 
robustness of the interaction, which is already relatively low due to differing findings from 
estimation three to four and the results from the grinter graph. Both the between and the within 
effect comes out as insignificant in this estimation, drawing the significance of the interaction 
between corruption and a high quality in the rule of law further into question. 
Theoretical interpretation:  
Because the results from the variable of theoretical interest, the interaction of corruption and 
the dummy for having high quality in the rule of law, differs in significance from estimation to 
estimation, I am reluctant to say that I have found any solid results. However, if taking the 
findings of estimation four (4) to be correct, where the within effect is significant, the following 
is a possible interpretation.  
The negative within effect, while at first seeming counter intuitive, actually makes sense. As 
with the bureaucratic corruption model (Model 2), it is possible that change itself is the issue. 
To use the example of Sweden; if a corporation has established its connections and “business 
as usual” structure, and these connections are based on corruption, the very change in this 
established “system” between the corporation and the country could increase risk and 
particularly uncertainty. Suddenly you are dealing with a situation that is more or less 
unprecedented in the investment relationship, and you have less historical context to rely on. 
As such, one could argue, based on the framework employed in this thesis and the empirical 
findings that as factors change, the change itself increases the relative risk and uncertainty 
effects of corruption, and this affects the cost – benefit equation any multinational corporation 
makes before investing in a foreign country. Even so, the results do not support hypothesis 5.  
6.5.  Corruption, democracies and foreign direct investment.  
I hypothesized, based on previous literature, that corruption would have a more negative effect 
on FDI inflow in democratic countries than in non-democratic countries. This is because the 
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argumentation for why democracies would attract more FDI inflow than non-democracies was 
very similar to the mechanisms described by scholars for as to why corruption would have a 
positive or negative effect on FDI inflow. Unfortunately, my model for this hypothesis does not 
generate significant results after controlling for some methodological caveats. Particularly, it 
does not generate significant results once I control for AR-1, autocorrelation and non-
stationarity in estimation four, but it was significant in estimation three, two and one, which 
does not control for this. The democracy variable was one of three variables that showed 
significant signs of non-stationarity, and as such when the results of the interaction variable 
becomes insignificant when controlling for non-stationarity by the differencing method, I 
cannot put any real faith in the robustness and validity of the coefficient. I therefore do not 
include the model here, but in the appendix (see appendix 9.11). Because the results are not 
significant in estimation four, the results do not support hypothesis 6.  
6.6. Corruption and natural resources 
Because of the special nature of natural resources in the OLI framework for foreign direct 
investment, and previous literature on the subject, I hypothesized that in countries with large 
natural resources, corruption could increase FDI, because it’s potential benefits can increase 
exponentially, thus far overshadowing the potential risk and uncertainty. Unfortunately, also in 
this model I encounter significance and robustness issues. The interaction term of large natural 
resources and corruption is as expected not significant in the fixed effects estimation. It is not 
significant in the random effects estimation either. Surprisingly, neither the between or the 
within effect components is significant in the third estimation, employing the within and 
between transformation, and finally they are not significant in the fourth estimation either, 
which controls for AR-1, autocorrelation and non-stationarity. However, in the fifth estimation 
which controls for taxes, both the within and the between component of the interaction term is 
highly significant, negative and relatively large in size (W -0.3937, B -0.4457). Since this 
estimation employs a smaller country sample and less total observations the robustness of this 
finding is in doubt. Apparently, the estimation is very sensitive to some of the countries that are 
dropped when adding taxes.82 I actually find this very counter intuitive, because the countries 
that are dropped are mainly very small island states, and authoritarian and closed states, some 
                                                          
82  The entire model was also estimated with different percentages of GDP as the cut off point for the dummy 
variable on a large extractive sector. To see if the thirty percent threshold was too strict, I also estimated using a 
twenty percent cut off point. There were no substantive changes, and in addition, thirty percent is already a 
modest threshold for defining large extractive sectors.  
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of who have very large natural resources, such as Iran and Saudi-Arabia. As such, this model 
is presented in the appendix (9.11).  
To the degree to which these results can be trusted, they are very interesting. The negative 
between effect indicates that in countries with large natural resources, countries with less 
corruption attract less FDI inflow, which supports hypothesis 7. The negative within effect 
indicates that in countries with large natural resources, the less corrupt you become over time, 
the less foreign direct investment you attract. Therefore, it seems to confirm the hypothesis and 
the theoretical framework of corruption within the OLI paradigm. The potential benefits of 
corruption from winning a tender, increasing speed and effectiveness in the business process, 
getting more lucrative deals (lower taxes, larger share of ownership, etc.) outweighs the 
negative aspects of risk and uncertainty when there are large natural resources in the country. 
If a country is less corrupt or is becoming less corrupt, these benefits become smaller and less 
available, thus decreasing FDI inflow. Of course, as mentioned, this is not robust over different 
estimations, particularly, estimation four, and as such must not be given much weight, but it 
does fit and confirm previous findings by Kolstad and Wiig (Kolstad and Wiig 2012; Kolstad 
and Wiig 2013), who use very different estimation techniques and in one instance, a different 
measurement of natural resources. Since estimation four (4) is not significant, the results do not 
support hypothesis 7 in this thesis.  
6.7. Corruption and increasing moral and reputational costs.  
As corruption has gained more and more attention in general, and as its effects upon people 
have been explored and found to be very negative, the moral view of corruption has become 
more negative over time, and the tolerance for it much lower. This is reflected in the different 
laws and conventions that have been made against it. As such, I hypothesized that corruption 
would have a more negative effect as the public opinion of corruption has changed. I interact 
corruption with a time dummy (all country-years on and after 2000 coded 1, all before coded 
0), to see if there is a significantly different effect after the year 2000, which should capture any 
change in the effect over time.83 
Much to my surprise the coefficient for the interaction term in estimation one (1) is not 
significant. As we understand by now, the fixed effects estimation estimates the within country  
                                                          
83 The use of a dummy variable here is justified on theoretical grounds. The conventions and laws are enacted 
right before and right after 2000, and as such, it is a natural cut off point. A continuous year variable would not 
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variance over time. Seeing as for this hypothesis time is of interest, I would have expected this 
to be significant, if there is any effect. The dummy variable for year is highly significant, but it 
is a constitutive term, and as such is not to be directly interpreted. Market potential and trade is 
significant at the five percent level, with the expected positive signs. The high mean VIF score 
arises from the collinearity between constitutive terms and the interaction variable. This could 
easily be fixed by removing the constitutive terms, but this is a serious error in interaction 
models, according to the interaction literature. Once the interaction is dropped, the VIF values 
drop, and only trade remains above the “threshold” of 10.  
In estimation two, using random effects, there is no real change. The interaction term is 
insignificant. Given that it was not significant in the fixed effects estimation this comes as no 
surprise. There is no between variation in the year variable (naturally), so for there to be a 
significantly different effect once adding the between variance was not expected 
In estimation three, using the within and between transformation on the interaction variable, 
neither the within nor the between component is significant. This tells us that the insignificant 
result in the previous estimations is not due to competing coefficients, which I discussed in 
previous models, but simply that neither the within effect nor the between effect is significant 
for FDI inflows. This once again also nicely illustrates that indeed, the fixed effects estimator 
is very good if you want to measure the within effect of a variable. The findings in this model 
would imply that there is no significant change in the effect of corruption after the year 2000 
upon FDI inflows. Interestingly, the VIF value increases significantly here. This is because once 
the within and the between components are separated, they are individually much more 
collinear with the corruption variable and the year dummy variable respectively. As stated 
above, there is no technical or easy solution to this, and it is recommended to simply leave the 
multicollinearity as it is because it does reflect reality.84 Once again, when the interaction term 
is dropped, the only variable that is above the “threshold” of 10 is trade.85  
 
 
                                                          
84 The fact that the between component of the interaction is highly collinear with corruption only reflects that 
corruption has relatively little variation over time within countries, but much between countries. The within 
component of the interaction is highly collinear with the variable for year, which is natural because one the 
constitutive part is a dummy of that variable.  
85 In addition, the Collin command in STATA shows no issues of multicollinearity once the interaction term is 





In the fourth estimation, using the Prais-Winsten approximated transformation, the results 
change in an interesting way. Now the within component is significant, albeit at the ten percent 
level, and positive.86 This would indicate that after the year 2000 becoming less corrupt 
increases FDI more than becoming less corrupt before the year 2000. Specifically, in countries 
after the year 2000, a one unit increase in the CPI (meaning less corruption) increases FDI 
inflow with 5.29 percent. This supports hypothesis 8, however, the significance level is low, 
and technically below the limit for this thesis, the five percent level. However, the grinter graph 
of the marginal effect indicates that the effect is substantial, and that it is also statistically 
significant (using 95 percent confidence intervals) (see appendix 9.10). The results also indicate 
that AR-1, autocorrelation or non-stationarity issues caused the within effect of corruption to 
be non-significant, which is interesting in itself, and very believable as these are issues that 
occur in predominantly longitudinal data. This shows us clearly how important it is to account 
for econometric issues.  
In the fifth estimation the significance level for the within effect of the interaction term increases 
to the five percent level. The size of the coefficient also increases some in size. This increases 
the robustness of the results.  
Theoretical interpretation:  
A significant positive coefficient for the within effect of the interaction term indicates that after 
the year 2000, the effect of corruption is different from before the year 2000. Becoming less 
corrupt attracts more FDI inflow now, than it did for the time period before 2000 and vice versa. 
This then, in light of the theory and framework, can be explained as hypothesized. As the 
knowledge of the costs and unfairness of corruption has spread through the populations of the 
world, and governments have become less tolerant and more judgmental towards corruption by 
implementing laws and conventions, the potential costs in terms of risk and uncertainty has 
increased over time. The cost-benefit calculation of investing in a corrupt country and engaging 
                                                          
86 Due to the high amount of observations in this model (1858), significance at the 10 percent level must be 
interpreted with much caution and skepticism.  
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in corruption is then potentially very different today, than it were in 1995, and then presumably, 
before that as well.87 This supports hypothesis 8.  
 
6.8. Corruption and less developed countries.  
In section 3.7, I hypothesized that the effect of corruption could be very different in developing 
countries, as opposed to developed countries. This because the potential benefits of corruption 
could be more important, and thus relatively larger in these countries, and that would make the 
risk and/or uncertainty effect of corruption relatively smaller. I therefore expect, as stated in 
hypothesis 8, that corruption increases FDI inflow in less developed countries.  
In the first estimation (1), using fixed effects, the interaction variable is surprisingly significant 
and positive. This was not expected, because, as stated before, corruption simply does not vary 
that much over time, giving us little variation to estimate on. Still though, unless our research 
question is only interested in the within effect, stating that this is the effect corruption has on 
FDI inflow would be incorrect. As is consistent with all of the previous models, even the control 
variables have relatively low significance, except for trade, which is significant at the one 
percent level with a large, positive coefficient. Surprisingly, economic stability is highly 
significant, with the expected negative sign. The average VIF value is high, as expected. Once 
again, when removing the interaction term, and rerunning the regression, the average falls 
below four. Only the variable trade has a high VIF value as in all of the other models. Note that 
there are much fewer observations for this interaction than the others.88 
In the second estimation (2), employing the standard random effects estimation, the interaction 
term is still significant. A situation like this has already been discussed in a previous model. 
This situation allows me to point out a final point as to why within and between estimation is 
very interesting, if we are interested in the entirety of the effect and not only the within, the 
between or the net effect. We have now observed both a significant and positive fixed effect 
and random effect coefficient. I could now conclude that, yes, corruption does have a significant 
effect on FDI inflow into less developed countries, namely, less corruption increases FDI  
                                                          
87 Because the time sample is limited to 1995 – 2012 (96 with lag), I do not have a lot of data to estimate the 
effect corruption had upon FDI inflow before the year 2000. The fact that the within coefficient comes out as 
significant shows that it is sufficient to estimate a significant difference, but I can only really speak for the five 
years before 2000. However, it is a relatively fair assumption that the public opinion and governments stances on 
corruption has not varied back and forth before 1995.  
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inflow. As we will see in estimation three (3), that would have been a mistake. As for the control 
variables, except for the usual changes, trade becomes insignificant already in this estimation.  
In the third estimation (3), I transform the interaction variable into between and within effects. 
Now we can observe a very interesting change in result. The between effect of the interaction 
variable is highly significant, negative and with a very large coefficient size. What this tells us 
is that less developed countries attract less FDI the less corruption they have, and vice versa. 
Specifically this coefficient tells us that for each higher unit of the CPI for less developed 
countries, meaning less corruption, FDI is estimated to be 62.60 percent smaller, all else held 
constant at their means. This supports hypothesis 8, and is in contradiction to the traditional 
stance of corruption as a hinder for FDI inflow and investments in general. It also confirms the 
finding of Egger and Winner (2005). The within effect is also significant, and the coefficient is 
vastly different from the between effect coefficient. The coefficient is positive, and relatively 
large. This indicates that as developing countries become less corrupt and more transparent, 
they also attract more FDI inflow. Specifically, it tells us that for each unit increase in the CPI 
in less developed countries, meaning less corruption, FDI inflow increases with 40.69 percent, 
all else held constant at their means. I have made this point apparent before, but I will do so 
again due to its importance. Without the between and within transformation, these important 
nuances in the results would have been hidden from us, and we would most likely have 
concluded very wrong about the entire relationship between corruption in less developed 
countries and foreign direct investment inflow. If you are not for some theoretical reason, only 
interested in a particular part of the relationship between your independent and dependent 
variable, running only a fixed effects, random effects or between effects estimation does not 
tell you what you are interested in knowing. As is clear from the results here, the effects these 
different estimations can produce can be very different.  
In the fourth estimation (4), I employ the first differencing transformation of Prais-Winsten. 
Essentially, nothing serious changes, which is good, because it increases the robustness of the 
findings. The between and within effect of the interaction is still highly significant, and the 
between effect increases its coefficient size with forty percent. In addition, the grinter graph for 
the between effect shows a strong substantive effect that is highly statistically significant for 
less developed countries (coded 1). It also shows an opposite effect for the countries coded as 
zero (developed countries) (appendix 9.10). For the within effect, grinter illustrates that the 
effect is both substantially and statistically significant. It also shows that there is a similar effect 
for developed countries, that is also statistically significant, albeit much weaker than for the 
109 
 
less developed countries. In all simplicity, this estimation tells us that the between and within 
effect of the interaction term and the effects of the control variables, are not affected by AR 1, 
autocorrelation or non-stationarity issues. 
In the fifth estimation (5), taxes is added, because it is clearly a significant control variable. 
Once again the between effect is robust to the changes in this estimation, and it seems that it is 
not that susceptible to changes in the sample. It does decrease some in coefficient size, but it is 
still very large and of substantial significance. The within effect becomes insignificant in this 
estimation, indicating that this result is susceptible to changes in the sample.89 Economic 
stability, in counter to all previous models, has maintained its significance throughout all the 
five estimations.  
Theoretical interpretation:  
A negative, highly significant and large coefficient on the between effect of the interaction term, 
across several estimations indicates that, indeed, less developed countries with higher levels of 
corruption does receive more FDI inflow, and very much more, than those with lower levels of 
corruption.90 Thus, one can theorize that in less developed countries, the market institutions are 
unable to perform their main function, at least properly, and corruption works as a grease in this 
regard. Any potential risk from corruption, in terms of getting caught or not receiving the 
service agreed upon are negated by the fact that corruption is nearly an institution in which the 
interaction between the host-country and the multinational company occurs regularly in less 
developed countries. The uncertainty corruption can create is negated by the same logic, this is 
the way the system probably works, and it would induce little to no more uncertainty than the 
formal institutions such as those in Sweden, France, or Spain. For those less developed 
countries that are also less corrupt than the others then, the effect of the corruption they do have 
might be more risky and uncertain, because corruption is not “institutionalized” in the same 
manner. Thus one could suddenly not receive the service one bribed for, one could potentially 
be caught if unlucky and face prosecution, fines, and bad publicity. If neither formal, legitimate 
market institutions have been established, nor informal corrupt institutions that can imitate that 
process informally, the uncertainty and risks of participating in corruption becomes higher. You 
simply know less about the potential outcomes, leaders and elites might be in it for the short 
                                                          
89 Of course, losing 40 countries and over 200 observations of 758 in total is a very large change in the sample, 
and it would be unfair to say that the within effect of the interaction is susceptible to small alternations. It is a 
very large alteration.  
90 Because being less corrupt than other less developed countries dramatically reduces the amount of FDI inflow. 
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run and then get out (with the investment or bribe in pocket) to enrich themselves quickly. An 
“institutionalized” system where corruption is business as usual would not be very prone to 
those sorts of situations.  
The significant and positive within effect states that as less developed countries become less 
corrupt, they increase the amount of FDI inflow. This I find very counterintuitive, both because 
it contradicts the between effect, and because it contradicts the explanation of change, which I 
have used to explain results several times in the other models. This correlation is difficult to 
explain using the framework I employed. One interpretation, ignoring the between effect and 
the effect of change argued earlier, is simply that as levels of corruption becomes smaller; FDI 
inflow increases because the uncertainty and risk corruption creates then also becomes smaller, 
thus increasing the stability and attractiveness of investment. However, this is in complete 
contrast to the between effect. If the effect of corruption in less developed countries was high 
risk and high uncertainty, the between effect of the CPI variable should have increased FDI 
inflow as well. This finding contradicts hypothesis 9. It is very possible that I am missing some 
variable, and that there is some effect at play here that I am not able to see. Because the within 
effect is not significant in estimation five (5) while the between effect is, the between effect is 
a more robust finding. One possible explanation could also be that because levels of corruption 
changes very slowly and not that much, then the between effect might reflect the effects of 
status quo. Then higher level of corruption is probably associated with higher level of 
institutionalization of corruption, which probably reduces uncertainty and risk, as argued in 
previous models. The within effect then reflects that as there is any change towards less 
corruption, this is taken as a good sign by MNCs, who might be tired of the corrupt status quo. 
This would need to be more closely researched and analyzed.  
6.9. Summary: What does the models contribute to theory? 
The models attempt to discern different effects of corruption by employing types of corruption 
and different contextual factors. The spread of significant findings of the models do seem to 
support that corruption does have different effects depending on context, but unable to confirm 
in a solid manner different effects of types of corruption. To the degree to which the results 
from the different models can be discussed against each other, there are some very interesting 
nuances. 
The first model used an aggregated measure for corruption in general. The between coefficient 
for corruption in this model was highly significant and positive, which tells us that countries 
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with less corruption is associated with higher FDI inflow. Thus, within the proposed framework 
and theory, the risk and uncertainty created by corruption seems to be greater than the potential 
benefits on average. On the other hand, I also find that over time, after the year of 2000, the 
effect of corruption has changed. Over time, corruption has had an increasing negative effect 
on FDI, because becoming less corrupt increases FDI inflows more after the year 2000, than 
before. This could mean that the risks and uncertainties have grown relative to the potential 
benefits. It is possible then, that in earlier time periods (60s, 70s, 80s) that the effect of 
corruption could have been positive.91 This lends credibility to the sand logic and the 
researchers that promote this (Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Shapiro and Globerman 2002; Wei 
2000). However, it also indicates that the effect of corruption has changed over time. As such, 
it could be that in previous decades, corruption worked more according to the grease logic. If 
we believe developing countries are following the industrialized countries historically, we have 
further evidence for this, as I find that corruption actually increases FDI inflow to less 
developed countries, based on the between effect.  
To the degree to which the results from bureaucratic and political corruption can be relied on, 
they also show very interesting findings. The between effect of both indicate that countries with 
lower levels of corruption have higher levels of FDI inflow. That discredits my argument that 
political corruption and bureaucratic corruption should have very different effects, due to 
political corruption causing more uncertainty than bureaucratic corruption. It could also indicate 
that the framework I employ for understanding the effects of corruption is flawed. This may 
also be due to the quality of the data though, and more research should be done on this before 
any conclusions are drawn. The negative within effect of bureaucratic corruption increases the 
credibility of the framework in this thesis though and lends some support to the idea that 
political and bureaucratic corruption has different effects. As bureaucratic corruption within a 
country decreases, it is actually associated with less FDI inflow.92 I argue that this indicates 
that, indeed, it is uncertainty that is the most negative aspect for multinational corporations. 
Because what is really the only thing that change brings with it? Uncertainty. Something new. 
So while being relatively corruption free in the bureaucracy might on average be associated 
with more FDI inflow than those who have more corruption, change in the level of corruption 
                                                          
91 This is of course a great deal of speculation, but it would make for a very interesting further study, if one could 
find data going longer back in time.  
92 Remember that this variable is also measured as 0 (high corruption) – 4 (low corruption).  
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in terms of becoming less corrupt actually decreases FDI inflow.93 This is very interesting. It 
could also be that this uncertainty has nothing to do with corruption in and of itself, but is only 
a statement of change in general. All changes could be seen as potentially dangerous to an 
investment, and could at first have a negative effect on the level of FDI inflow. An interesting 
topic for future research could then be to distinguish corruption types between corruption levels 
between countries and corruption change within countries and focus more closely on this 
distinction.  
One very counter-intuitive finding in my models is that of corruption in countries with high 
quality governmental/state institutions. Because most of the other institutional interactions were 
not robust over different estimations, I do not put much theoretical weight on them. However, 
the between effect of the interaction with corruption and high quality governmental/state 
institutions was significant across all three relevant estimations, and it indicates that in countries 
with high quality in these institutions higher levels of corruption is associated with more FDI 
inflow and that a lower level of corruption between these countries is associated with less  FDI 
inflow. The only argument I can fall back on that fits with my proposed causal model and 
framework for FDI is the competitive advantage argument. However, this argument in itself is 
flawed, because if one out of twenty companies benefits from a corrupt channel, the other 
nineteen do not and as such would not increase their FDI into the country. That one company 
would then have to invest incredibly large amounts into the country for this effect to come out 
as statistically and substantively significant in terms of increasing FDI inflow. It may be, dismal 
as it is, that the benefits of corruption in terms of gaining access to sectors, or paying lower 
taxes, breaking regulations and taking short-cuts are so potentially lucrative, that these are the 
driving force for the benefits of corruption even in countries with high quality in their 
governmental and state institutions. Not the somewhat more legitimate and understandable 
effect of increasing efficiency, working in lieu of formal market institutions (of which the 
governmental and state institutions are a large part) because there is little other choice. This 
lends credibility to corruption as a grease, and also discredits those who view corruption only 
as a characteristic of institutional quality (Busse and Hefeker 2007; Shapiro and Globerman 
2002).  
                                                          
93 It would be interesting to estimate the short and long run effects of this. If my tentative interpretation is 
correct, this negative within effect should only be a short run effect, as the new “corruption situation” is adapted 
to by the MNCs.  
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The fact that the between effect of the interaction with less developed countries and corruption 
is highly significant, robust over estimations, large in size and negative, increases the credibility 
of my proposed causal model and the OLI framework for understanding corruption and FDI.  
Less developed countries embody many of the factors that would increase the relative benefits 
of corruption as opposed to the relative costs (risk and uncertainty). The market institutions are 
usually underdeveloped, the bureaucracy is inefficient and slow, corruption is often business as 
usual, and institutions such as the rule of law are often weak. All these factors would increase 
the potential benefits of corruption and they would decrease the degree of risk and any 
uncertainty. This is logical, because risk comes primarily from the service bribed or colluded 
for not being delivered, being caught by the authorities that can induce large fines and possibly 
reputational costs. Uncertainty comes primarily from changes in a known system, lack of 
knowledge of the system and history, large skewness in power between two parties (i.e political 
elite and MNC). The abovementioned characteristics of less developed countries would 
mitigate all of these aspects, creating an environment where the risk and uncertainty corruption 
produces is relatively low, and the potential benefits relatively large. The regression result of 
the between effect seems to confirm this expectation. In less developed countries, lesser levels 
of corruption decrease FDI inflows. This is in complete contrast to the results of the first model, 
which estimates the general and average relationship between corruption and FDI inflow for all 
countries of the sample, as such indicates that the effect of corruption is strongly dependent on 
contextual factors. As such, this finding nicely illustrates the point that it might not be either 
the sand logic or the grease logic that explains corruption, but that the degree to which 
corruption produces benefits, risk and uncertainty, it can fit into any or both of these logics 
(Egger and Winner 2005; Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Huntington 1968; Leff 1964; Wei 2000) 
The positive and significant within effect is very interesting, but also very contradicting. If less 
developed countries receive less FDI inflow because the relative benefits outweigh the relative 
costs in regards to corruption, it is confusing to see a positive coefficient for the within effect. 
This implies that as you become less corrupt (higher value on the CPI) you receive more FDI 
inflow. This cannot be explained by the “change is a negative factor in itself” argument, because 
it directly opposes this. This does strengthen the view of corruption as sand in the machinery, 
but in light of the opposite between effect I am unable to fully theoretically understand it. It 
would seem that, even in less developed countries, corruption creates risk and uncertainty 
around foreign direct investments, and these are reduced as a country becomes less corrupt, 
leading to more foreign direct investment. Also, it could be that the MNCs are tired of the status 
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quo, in which relatively high levels of corruption might be stable in terms of uncertainty and 
risk, but is still costing them potentially large monetary sums. As such, a country moving 
towards less corruption and more formal institutionalization might be very attractive amongst 
less developed countries. This puzzling finding in light of the between effect and the framework 
employed for this thesis is very interesting, and only exemplifies the multidimensionality of 
corruption and its effects upon foreign direct investment.    
For summary purposes, what all of the models tell us is that corruption is a multidimensional 
phenomenon. Its effects are very nuanced, potentially depending on the type of corruption and 
particularly the contextual factors. As such, when studying corruption in an econometric 
analysis, it is fundamentally important to be aware of what you want to study about corruption, 
conceptualization of corruption, measurement and estimation techniques and what they actually 
estimate.  
The economic control variables:  
Throughout nearly all of the models, the economic control variables act the same away across 
different estimations, following and confirming the previous determinants literature.94 Only two 
results are unexpected from the control variables, namely the effects from trade and taxes. The 
effect of trade seems to be susceptible to autocorrelation, because it becomes insignificant once 
I employ the Prais-Winsten transformation. Taxes has a surprising sign, positive. Higher taxes 
is associated with higher levels of FDI inflow. Higher taxes could potentially increase the 
reliability of a country and increase trust for MNCs because it could reflect more governmental 
responsibility, better infrastructure and such. This is also discussed in newer economics 
literature (Kimel 2011).  
Consequences for policies:  
In terms of policy recommendations, these results are quite interesting and nuanced. Corruption 
in general does decrease FDI inflow, at least in terms of differences between countries, and this 
supports the one-sided focus which policies have been focused on so far, to remove corruption 
in order to increase societal development and decrease injustices. However, in certain contexts, 
and particularly in less developed countries, removing corruption outright might be a mistake, 
depending on which effect we put most faith in. These results suggests that corruption works 
as a grease in these countries, and thus maybe the focus should not be on corruption and 
                                                          
94 This is discussed in model 1.  
115 
 
governance, but on infrastructure, health and education, as Sachs and McArthur famously 
argued for (McArthur and Sachs 2001). In addition, the results indicate that changes in the 
degree of corruption is associated with less FDI inflow. Therefore, if one does make it a priority 
to remove corruption, it should be done in a controlled and paced manner, not by a quick change 
in laws, police crack downs, and such. To the degree to which corruption works as an informal 























This thesis has focused on the themes of foreign direct investment and corruption. It has argued 
that although the relationship between foreign direct investment and corruption has been studied 
by several scholars, there is still work to be done. Primarily, a formal framework is lacking, and 
this thesis suggests a fusion of the OLI framework and political risk theory to understand how 
corruption affects FDI. Further, the literature is lacking in its conceptualization of corruption 
as a multidimensional phenomenon. The separate corruption literature is very adamant in its 
argumentation that corruption must be seen as a multidimensional phenomenon that manifests 
empirically in different ways, and has different effects. As such, this thesis proposed the 
following research question: “What effect does corruption have upon the level of foreign direct 
investment inflow to a country? Moreover, do internal types of corruption (e.g. bureaucratic 
corruption), and external contexts (e.g. level of development) affect the manner in which 
corruption affects foreign direct investment inflow to a country?” To answer this research 
question, the quantitative method of regression analysis was chosen. Further, the thesis argued 
that the existing literature has not been critical or transparent enough with its use of methods 
and the implications of these choices, as such this thesis employs a relatively unused method, 
the within and between transformation. Therefore, the endeavor of the thesis has been threefold: 
first, suggesting a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of corruption upon 
foreign direct investment; second, revitalizing the view of corruption as a multidimensional 
phenomenon; third, making it clear what different estimation techniques estimate and how this 
is relevant for our research question and findings.  
In order to answer the research question, I performed a hypotheses-generating literature review, 
focusing on the FDI-Corruption literature. In the table below, I present the hypotheses, the 
effects interpreted from the analysis, and the results for the hypotheses.  
Table 9, Summary of hypotheses results.  
 
Hypothesis Analysis interpretation Result 
H1a: Corruption decreases 
the amount of FDI inflow to 
a country.  
 
The between effect coefficient for the CPI 
variable on corruption is positive, meaning 
less corruption attracts more FDI inflow, and 




H1b: Corruption increases 
the amount of FDI inflow to 
a country.  
 
The between effect coefficient for the CPI 
variable on corruption is positive, meaning 
less corruption attracts more FDI inflow, and 
vice versa. 
Discarded. 
H2: Bureaucratic corruption 
increases the amount of FDI 
into a country.    
 
The between effect coefficient for the IPD 
bureaucratic corruption variable is positive, 
meaning lower levels of bureaucratic 
corruption is correlated to more FDI inflow 
and vice versa. The within effect is opposite, 
but I argue that it could be change in 
corruption levels itself that is causing the 
negative effect on FDI inflow, not 






H3a: Political corruption 
decreases the amount of FDI 
into a country more than 
bureaucratic corruption. 
 
The between effect coefficient of the IPD 
political corruption variable is positive, 
meaning lower levels of political corruption 
is correlated to more FDI inflow and vice 
versa. The within effect is not significant 
Discarded.  
H4: In countries that have 
high quality governmental 
and state institutions, 
corruption decreases the 
inflow of foreign direct 
investment.  
 
The between effect coefficient of the 
interaction term is negative. This means that 
in countries with high quality 
governmental/state institutions, less 
corruption is associated with less FDI inflow 
Discarded. 
Opposite between 
effect observed.  
H5: In countries that have 
high quality juridical 
institutions, corruption will 
decrease the inflow of 
foreign direct investment.  
 
The within effect coefficient of the 
interaction term is negative. This means that 
in countries with high quality judicial 
institutions, lesser corruption is associated 
with lesser FDI inflows. This finding is not 
robust across estimations. Also theorizing on 
a general negative effect of change.  
Discarded. 
Opposite within 
effect observed.  
H6: In highly democratized 
countries, corruption 
Non-significant findings in estimation four.  Discarded.  
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increases FDI inflow to the 
country.  
 
H7: In countries with large 
natural resources, corruption 
increases FDI inflow to the 
country.  
 
Non-significant findings in estimation four.  Discarded.  
H8: The effect which 
corruption has upon the 
inflow of FDI has become 
more strongly negative since 
the year 2000 
The within effect of the interaction term is 
positive. This means that in countries after 
the year 2000, less corruption is associated 
with more FDI inflows over time.  
Supported.  
H9: In less developed 
countries, corruption 
increases FDI inflow 
The between effect of the interaction term is 
negative. This means that in less developed 
countries, lower levels of corruption is 
associated with lower levels of FDI inflow. 
The within effect is the opposite. This means 







Based on the results of the hypotheses, the answer to the research question of this thesis is clear. 
The effect corruption has upon the level of foreign direct investment inflows to a country is in 
the most general of terms, negative. In a world sample without any interaction effects or 
specification of types, less corruption is associated with more FDI inflow. As for the second 
part of the research question, the results also cumulate to a clear answer. Yes, the effect 
corruption has upon foreign direct investment inflows into a country is potentially dependent 
on the internal types of corruption but particularly the external contextual factors are 
important. The effect can go from negative to positive and stronger to weaker. As such, we 
should not try to understand corruption by employing either the sand logic or the grease logic. 
Both are applicable under different circumstances.  
7.1. Recommendations for future research 
Throughout the process of writing this thesis there have been several interesting aspects that I 
have simply had to drop due to resources, capacity and space. Some of these aspects have been 
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mentioned in footnotes and the text of the thesis, and I will briefly summarize what I think 
deserves more research here: 
First is the need for collecting better quantitative data on different types of corruption. The 
quality of the data I had for bureaucratic and political corruption was not optimal, and I had to 
spend a lot of time and work to create these panel variables manually. Thus, there should be 
larger and more focused data collection and creation of measures for types of corruption. This 
would greatly increase the quality of this data, both in terms of validity and reliability. Then 
better studies on different types of corruption could be conducted.  
In terms of contextual factors and interaction effects, there are several other variables of interest 
to look at. An example could be political stability, which I simply did not have time to prioritize 
in this thesis. Further, this thesis is broad in its scope, and as such focusing more intently on 
single interactions, by using better conceptualizations, better measures, better estimations and 
post-estimation techniques is something that deserves more research. Also, the two contextual 
factors found to be insignificant in this  thesis, namely democracy and natural resources should 
be more closely studied, as at least natural resources has been found to be significant by other 
scholars, and it makes intuitive sense that democracy should matter also.  
Lastly, to conduct these same estimations with better data and data that covers a longer time 
dimension would be very interesting. This would allow for a much more precise test of 
hypothesis 8 on the changing effect of corruption over time, as well as allow us to see if the 
grease and sand camps are dependent on time periods. In addition, the contradicting within and 
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Taxes Trade Econ. 
stabili
ty 




(CPI) 0.45 1.00              
Demo
cracy 0.14 0.36 1.00             
Large 
natur
al res. -0.03 -0.23 -0.30 1.00            
Judici
al 
instit. 0.20 0.76 0.38 -0.21 1.00           
Gov/S
tate 
instit. -0.12 -0.63 -0.53 0.26 -0.66 1.00          
Less 
devel










(IPD) 0.41 0.90 0.32 -0.28 0.66 -0.60 -0.44 0.87 1.00       
Mark




tial 0.04 -0.23 -0.24 0.27 -0.47 0.24 0.41 -0.12 -0.10 0.05 1.00     
Natur
al res. 0.07 -0.36 -0.41 0.65 -0.42 0.43 0.31 -0.37 -0.37 -0.12 0.55 1.00    
Taxes 0.10 0.23 0.08 -0.00 0.13 -0.19 0.30 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.40 -0.02 1.00   
Trade 0.20 0.34 -0.24 -0.11 0.23 -0.28 -0.24 0.31 0.35 -0.27 -0.13 -0.27 0.03 1.00  
Econ. 
stabili
ty -0.16 -0.46 -0.36 0.42 -0.40 0.50 0.63 -0.48 -0.54 -0.02 0.30 0.42 0.01 -0.18 1.00 
 
9.2. Collin – Individual VIF values (Model specific calculation, 
grouped together, excluded interactions) 
Variable VIF 
Corruption (CPI)  1.47 – 2.88 (Differing models) 
Democracy 1.44 
Large natural res. 1.12 
Judicial instit. 2.56 
Gov/State instit. 2.43 
Less developed 1.79 
Bur. Corruption (IPD) 1.42 
Pol. Corruption (IPD) 1.41 
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Market size 1.16 
Market potential 1.14 
Natural res. 1.23 
Taxes 1.23 
Trade 1.16 
Econ. stability 1.09 
 
9.3. Country coverage 
Total country sample (majority of regressions), by country name 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, 
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Fiji, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kiribati, Korea Dem. People's Rep. of, Korea Republic of, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao 
People's Dem. Rep., Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,  Lithuania, Libya, Luxembourg, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Serbia,  Serbia 
and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Sudan (...2011), Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, TFYR of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of), Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Countries not covered by UNCTAD by country name (total) 
Andorra, Cape Verde, Cuba, Cyprus (-1974), Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia (...1991), Germany 
Democratic Republic of, Germany Federal Republic of, Hong Kong Liechtenstein, 
Malaysia (-1965), Mauritania, Monaco, Pakistan (-1970), San Marino, Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, South Sudan, Taiwan, Tibet, Tuvalu, Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, Vietnam North, Vietnam South, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen Democratic, 
 
Country-years dropped due to negative FDI values and log transformation (155 total) 
Afghanistan 1997, Afghanistan 1998, Angola 2005, Angola 2006, Angola 2007, Angola 
2010, Angola 2011, Angola 2012, Angola 2013, Angola 2014, Australia 2005, Azerbaijan 
2006, Azerbaijan 2007, Bahrain 1998, Belgium2008, Belgium 2014, Belize 2003, Bhutan 
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1997, Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2005, Burundi 1999, Cameroon 1999, Canada 2004, 
Chad 2005, Chad 2006, Chad 2007, Congo 2004, Dem. Rep. of the Congo 1997, Denmark 
2004, Denmark 2008, Denmark 2010, Denmark 2013, Ecuador 2000, Egypt 2011, El 
Salvador 2010, Equatorial Guinea 2008, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 1997, Falkland 
Islands (Malvinas) 1998, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 2006, Finland 2008, Finland 2013, 
France 2004, Gabon 1996, Gabon 1997, Gabon 1999, Gabon 2000, Gabon 2001, Germany 
2004, Indonesia 2003, Iraq 1996, Iraq 2000, Iraq 2001, Iraq 2002, Ireland 2004, Ireland 
2005, Ireland 2006, Ireland 2008, Italy 2008, Japan 2006, Japan 2010, Japan 2011, Kiribati 
2001, Kiribati 2010, Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 1999, Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 
2001, Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 2002, Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of 2006, Kuwait 
2001, Kuwait 2003, Kuwait 2008, Kyrgyzstan 2000, Liberia 1996, Libya 1996, Libya 1997, 
Libya 1998, Libya 1999, Libya 2001, Lithuania 2009, Luxembourg 2007, Malta 2002, 
Malta 2009, Marshall Islands 2009, Mauritania 1996, Mauritania 1997, Mauritania 1998, 
Mauritania 2009, Mauritius 2001, Micronesia (Federated States of) 1996, Micronesia 
(Federated States of) 1998, Micronesia (Federated States of) 1999, Micronesia (Federated 
States of) 2001, Micronesia (Federated States of) 2008, Nepal 2000, Nepal 2002, Nepal 
2004, Nepal 2006, Netherlands 2010, New Zealand 2001, New Zealand 2003, Niger 1998, 
Palau 2001, Palau 2002, Palau 2009, Palau 2010, Papua New Guinea 2006, Papua New 
Guinea 2008, Papua New Guinea 2011, Papua New Guinea, 2014, Qatar 2013, Samoa 
1999, Samoa 2000, Slovakia 2009, Slovenia 2009, Slovenia 2013, Solomon Islands, 2001, 
Solomon Islands 2002, Solomon Islands 2003, Somalia 1999, Somalia 2003, Somalia 2004, 
South Sudan 2013, South Sudan 2014, Suriname 1997, Suriname 1999, Suriname 2000, 
Suriname 2001, Suriname 2002, Suriname 2003, Suriname 2004, Suriname 2006, Suriname 
2007, Suriname 2008, Suriname 2009, Suriname 2010, Swaziland 1997, Swaziland 2003, 
Swaziland 2005, Switzerland 2005, Switzerland 2013, Tonga 1997, United Arab Emirates 
1999, United Arab Emirates 2000, Vanuatu 2013, Vanuatu 2014, Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Rep. of) 2006, Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) 2009, Yemen 1996, Yemen 1997, Yemen 
1998, Yemen 1999, Yemen 2003, Yemen 2005, Yemen 2011, Yemen 2012, Yemen 2013, 
Yemen 2014 
 
Countries not covered by Taxes that is covered by UNCTAD by country name 
Albania, Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Ecuador, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, 
Malawi, Marhsall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Montenegro, Nauru, Saudi 
Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Timor-












9.4. Scatterplots and histograms of dependent variable, FDI inflow. 
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Before logarithmic transformation:  
 
 
                                                          










































































































































lag1lnecon~y       3,133    0.96840     59.909    10.075    0.00001
 lag1lntrade       3,136    0.90640    177.598    12.751    0.00001
   lag1taxes       1,849    0.95300     54.938     9.545    0.00001
lag1natura~s       3,305    0.70049    596.456    15.784    0.00001
lag1market~l       3,288    0.74117    512.984    15.407    0.00001
lag1market~e       3,174    0.28375   1374.155    17.801    0.00001
lag1polcor~n         200    0.97673      3.789     2.754    0.00294
lag1burcor~n         200    0.98965      1.685     1.079    0.14020
      lowdev       1,238    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
highburqua~y       2,629    1.00000     -0.000         .    0.00001
highruleof~w       2,686    1.00000      0.000   -56.004    1.00000
highextrac~e       3,305    1.00000      0.000         .    0.00001
   democracy       2,901    1.00000      0.000   -54.634    1.00000
lag1corrup~i       2,429    0.89293    160.623    12.308    0.00001
         fdi       3,300    0.95712     85.272    10.979    0.00001
                                                                   
    Variable         Obs       W'          V'        z       Prob>z
                  Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
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9.7. Autocorrelation test result:  
 
           Prob > F =      0.2628
    F(  1,     181) =      1.262
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial trade
           Prob > F =      0.0064
    F(  1,     150) =      7.640
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial taxes
           Prob > F =      0.0001
    F(  1,     187) =     17.079
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial naturalres
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,     179) =    275.522
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial marketsize
           Prob > F =      0.0579
    F(  1,     188) =      3.642
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial marketpotential
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,     192) =    223.568
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial ruleoflawqual
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,     190) =    230.572
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial bureauqual
           Prob > F =      0.0002
    F(  1,     183) =     14.631
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial levelofdev
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,     180) =    472.810
H0: no first-order autocorrelation











9.8. Stationarity results:96  
Variable  Unit Root (non-stationarity), significance 
Corruption, CPI No 
Less developed, HDI No 
Democracy Yes 
Gov/state institutions No 
Judicial institutions No 
Large natural resources No 
Bureaucratic corruption, IPD No 
Political corruption, IPD No 
Market size Yes 
Market growth Yes 
Trade No 
Taxes No 








                                                          
96 The tests needed to be run individually per variable and taking enormous space. Raw results are available per 
request.  
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,     185) =     48.815
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial econstability
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,     187) =     32.824
H0: no first-order autocorrelation






















                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9510
                          =        0.70
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      tradeW      .0069177     .0068859        .0000317        .0000738
 naturalresW       .022456       .02245        6.04e-06        .0003524
 marketsizeW      2.68e-13     2.70e-13       -1.42e-15               .
marketpote~W      .0190574     .0187916        .0002659        .0003586
corruption~W      .0896612     .0893774        .0002838               .
                                                                              
                     FE           RE         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))




9.10. Graphical illustrations of interactions (grinter) 
Interaction of corruption and high quality governmental and state institutions:  
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
highruleoflaw
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
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Corruption and after year 2000 dummy:  
 
Corruption and less developed countries:  
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lowdev
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
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9.11. Other regression models:  
 






























































































































Taxes - - - - 0.0161 
(0.0048) 
 































Standard errors in parenthesis 


























































































































































Taxes - - - - 0.0183*** 
(0.0046) 
 































Standard errors in parenthesis 
*= p < 0.10 **= p<0.05 ***= p<0.01 
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